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Iran's Message: No More Nice Guys |
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Friday, 24 June 2005 |
 If Mr. Rafsanjani should win, he will play diplomatic games with
the U.S. and Europe. He will probably be even more skillful than Mr.
Khatami has been in stringing along the European triumvirate -- Blair,
Chirac and Schrِder.
The Wall Street Journal
By GEORGE MELLOAN
Whoever wins an electoral runoff and becomes Iran's new president, the
news won't be good, either for Iranians or Americans and Europeans
disturbed about the regime's quest for nuclear weaponry. The country's
ruling mullahs blatantly displayed their muscle, and vote-rigging
skills, in last Friday's initial vote. That suggests that they are no
longer interested in creating even the illusion of political moderation.
The retiring incumbent, Mohammad Khatami, is a genial man who once
stirred hopes of political reforms in Iran. When reforms appeared to be
gaining ground, the Guardian Council, through which the mullahs wield
their absolute power, stepped in and quashed them. They also shielded
themselves from a possible uprising in last Friday's presidential
election by disqualifying all candidates except those professing
loyalty to the regime.
They didn't even stop there. Although a former president, the wily Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, came out on top, it was no clear victory.
Under mysterious circumstances that included a late-day official order
keeping the polls open an extra four hours, a dark horse with no known
popular following came in second. His name is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a
former mayor of Tehran and acknowledged hard-liner. He and Mr.
Rafsanjani will go head-to-head in a runoff election scheduled for
Friday.
Antiregime forces who monitored polling places claimed there was
nowhere near the 62% voter turnout the government claimed. Few Iranians
today support the harsh theocratic rule that has been their lot since
the cynical and murderous ayatollahs came to power. An election boycott
seemed to be succeeding until the overtime was called.
Friday's exercise was too much even for supposed loyalists. Mahdi
Karroubi, who was nosed out for second by the last-minute surge of Mr.
Ahmadinejad, publicly accused the authorities of vote rigging, which
emboldened some of the other defeated candidates to complain. Supreme
ruler Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was no doubt shocked, shocked, that anyone
would believe him capable of such a thing.
But, indeed, Mr. Ahmadinejad moved into second place after what
appeared to be a wave of last-minute ballot stuffing and voter
coercion. That strongly suggested that he is Mr. Khamenei's candidate.
Mr. Rafsanjani is no moderate, judging from the oppression when he held
the presidency from 1989 to 1997. But he is also no favorite of the
regime. He once stood above Khamenei in the esteem of that old rascal
who established Iran's clerical dictatorship, Ayatollah Ruhallah
Khomeini. The two are longtime rivals. That aside, he is not the kind
of character in whom a supreme leader, or anyone else, would want to
put a lot of trust.
Mr. Ahmadinejad is the very antithesis of a moderate. Earlier in his
career he was one of the top commanders of the Revolutionary Guard,
with a direct hand in silencing opposition to the mullahs and, by some
reports, in supporting terrorist activity abroad.
So expect a messy runoff. Mr. Rafsanjani, who has a political base of
his own and is himself capable of ballot-box chicanery, will battle the
mullahs' favorite son. The mullahs have a trump card, as they have
demonstrated since Khomeini seized power 26 years ago and displayed
again last Friday: They control the military and the secret police.
Random reports suggested that those two instruments of coercion were in
use last Friday in persuading reluctant voters to make use of that
extra four hours of voting time to express their loyalty to the regime.
Iranians who don't have a stamp on their registration card proving they
voted can suffer penalties in Iran, including difficulty in getting a
passport, a job or a ration card.
So what does all of this mean for the West? If Mr. Rafsanjani should
win, he will play diplomatic games with the U.S. and Europe. He will
probably be even more skillful than Mr. Khatami has been in stringing
along the European triumvirate -- Blair, Chirac and Schrِder -- that
has been trying futilely to talk Iran out of building a nuclear weapon.
Yet he is not likely to have either the power or desire to turn the
mullahs from their present course.
Mr. Ahmadinejad is a wild card. At 49, he is 21 years younger than Mr.
Rafsanjani. Judging from his rambling discourses, he has visions of
restoring the Persian empire. "We did not have a revolution in order to
have democracy," he told a wire service in May. He believes that George
Bush is "hostile" towards Iran. If he wins, the West would at least
have a better idea of where it stands.
The more optimistic reading is that the mullahs have just demonstrated
that they are concerned about their grip on power. By cutting moderates
some slack with the accession of Mr. Khatami, they allowed expectations
of political improvement to arise among Iranians, particularly the
nation's youth. They then chose to suppress those expectations, which
only made matters worse from their point of view.
Now, they appear to have decided to return to a hard line, offering no
hope of reform or a relaxation of their power over the everyday conduct
of ordinary Iranians. Mr. Ahmadinejad is just the man to choose if you
want a president who will keep a tight lid on political discontent.
But that could be a mistake, too. Mr. Karroubi's complaint about the
election theft shows that even supposedly loyal politicians have limits
on how much high-handedness they will tolerate. Mr. Karroubi's alleged
5 million votes suggest that he has at least some political following.
The other losing candidates had supporters as well. Should former
loyalists go into opposition and a defeated Mr. Rafsanjani choose to
use his political skills as well, Ayatollah Khamenei might have a
problem.
That would not necessarily mean a sudden turn toward genuine democracy.
A more likely scenario would be a military coup that would install some
equally odious ayatollah. Whatever the future holds, one central fact
remains. The regime had to resort to fraud because it is highly
unpopular. How long can a government like that survive? Maybe a long
time, as Stalin and Mao once proved. But maybe not. |
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