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Thursday, 14 July 2005 |
 The Washington Times
By Nir Boms and Reza Bulorchi
Officially, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incoming Iranian "elected"
president, will assume his post next month — but his presence is
already felt in the political circles and the streets of Tehran. Since
his election, under the banner of a renewed Islamic revolution, the
clerical regime hanged six people and sentenced another to death in the
past week alone.
The elections, no doubt, were a sham and the controversy about election
irregularities is far from settled. It was no less than the outgoing
President MohammadKhatamiwhoannounced an upcoming release of a report
documenting the extent of electoral violations and smear campaigns. A
similar account, further exposing factional disarray within the
theocratic rule, was introduced by former parliament speaker, mullah
Mehdi Karroubi, who lost his presidential bid in the first round.
More significant, however, is the fact that Mr. Ahmadinejad's
presidency, which will officially commence in early August, is already
showing a policy course that must raise some concern for all who care
about the future of Iran.
Far from being a "populist" son of a blacksmith who is hoisting the
flag of class warfare against the "wretched rich and corrupt," Mr.
Ahmadinejad's win can be attributed to his unquestioned loyalty to the
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the full support of the
Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards Corps' top brass.
A former commander of the Qods (Jerusalem) Force in the Guard Corps —
tasked with planning and execution of terrorist plots and assassination
abroad — Mr. Ahmadinejad was catapulted to presidency by the ultra
conservative faction. His presidency was backed by Mr. Khamenei and
engineered by the IRGC.
Indeed, the real story of this election is the full metamorphosis of
the Guards Corps from an ideological army to an omnipresent political
military powerhouse. With Mr. Ahamadinejad's win, the IRGC is now able
to spread it wings over all key centers of power in Iran. This may
account for the most major power realignment within the ruling
theocracy since Mr. Khamenei's death in 1989.
The first success of the IRGC's resurgence took place during national
municipal elections in 2003. Then, in the February 2004 parliamentary
elections, at least 40 former IRGC commanders won seats. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Khamenei appointed a top IRGC general as head of Iran's
national broadcasting.
As an ominous sign of things yet to come, Ahmadi Moghaddam, the No. 2
in the paramilitary Bassij, was appointed by Mr. Khamenei as Iran's new
chief of police. The appointment of Mr. Moghaddam, who once said "a
country where liberal ideas rule will get nowhere," brings Iran's
regular police force under the domination of the IRGC and signals the
readiness to rein in social and political dissent.
State-run media have reported the crackdowns on "social vice" and on
"shops and public places in where public chastity and Islamic values
are ignored" has already begun. A senior security
officialtoldreportersthat "mal-veiled or unveiled individuals inside
and outside of cars" would now be the target of arrests. Responding to
the looming crackdown, a group of students from Tehran University
rallied as they demanded the release of all political prisoners
carrying the banner "Infidelity does not overthrow a regime,
Suppression does."
Currently, the IRGC has full control over Tehran's terror network and
has won the admiration of Mr. Khamenei for "running effective
intelligence and diplomatic operations" in Iraq. Mr. Khamenei has also
placed Iran's nuclear development under the IRGC's full command.
Further, active or former commanders of the IRGC maintain control over
many of the principal dailies, the municipal councils and the Supreme
National Security Council.
In the aftermath of Mr. Ahmadinejad's win — and in the absence of any
feasible alternative for engagement or military action that will
neutralize the clear and present threats posed by Tehran — other
alternatives must be considered in the complex Euro-American Tehran
policy equation.
A housewife in Tehran recently expressed hope that an Ahmadinejad
presidency would hasten the regime's collapse. She told Reuters that
"This is the best result...The moment of real change has just got much
closer." She seems to have well captured one of the strategic
implications of Mr. Ahmadinejad's presidency for the success of
democracy movement in Iran.
And this is where the American policy toward Iran needs to gravitate.
It is a security and policy imperative since only a fundamental change
in Tehran would ultimately rid Iran and the region of the ayatollahs'
menace and the pending nuclear weapon that may soon be at its service.
Nir Boms is the vice president of the Center for Freedom in the Middle
East. Reza Bulorchi is the executive director of the U.S. Alliance for
Democratic Iran. |
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