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Nuclear bombs and Iranian regime’s military doctrine |
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Tuesday, 12 July 2005 |
 Iranian regime’s military doctrine and the options before the international community to deal with this threat.
Address by Ali Safavi, President of the Near East Policy Research in
Paris Conference; "Iran after elections - Global consequences"
Since the year 2000, under the direct supervision of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s military planners and strategists have
been working on a new concept for the theocratic state’s military
doctrine to take into account the new realities in the region and on
the world stage. That concept is “asymmetric warfare.”
And obtaining nuclear weapons is an indispensable part of this strategy, with three important benefits:
- The survival of the theocratic state in Iran would be guaranteed;
- The Islamic Republic would become the undisputed regional hegemon
and capable of blackmailing governments in the region, particularly its
southern Arab neighbors;
- It would raise the Islamic Republic’s standing in the Muslim
world as the Umm-ol-Qura, (the Mother of All Islamic Lands), which
would in turn facilitate both the recruitment of extremists and export
of Islamic revolution to other Muslim nations.
Iran’s Two-Track Nuclear Program
The Iranian regime has organized its nuclear program in two parallel,
autonomous systems – a civilian and a military program - that
ultimately fall under the supervision of the Supreme Leader and a close
circle of trusted advisers.
The main agency in the civilian program is the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI). It is responsible for power plants such as
the Bushehr light water reactor and the nuclear fuel cycle activities,
including the mining site in Saghand, the yellow-cake producing sites
in Bandar-Abbas and Ardakan, and the Uranium Conversion Facility in
Isfahan.
This program is not just a cover for the military program, but also
provides it with both technological expertise, a pool of experts and
access to the necessary materials and equipment. For this reason, AEOI
itself is under the supervision of the Supreme National Security
Council
The military program is controlled by the secretive Supreme Military
Committee, made up of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Maj. Gen.
Hassan Firuzabadi, IRGC Commander in Chief Maj. Gen. Rahim Safavi, and
Defense Minister Adm. Ali Shamkhani. All three are from the
Revolutionary Guards.
The IRGC and the Defense Ministry run the nuclear weapons program, with
the IRGC effectively in control of activities in the relevant
departments of the Defense Ministry. The Supreme Military Committee
reports directly to Khamenei.
It is essentially focusing on three key projects: production or
procurement of enough quantities of HEU for a nuclear bomb; development
of alternative enrichment techniques; work on weaponizing technology
and means of delivery.
Chain of Command
All important decisions regarding the nuclear project are taken with the full participation and approval of Khamenei.
The two-track system gives Iran greater ability to conceal the military
program and thwart international inspections. Those involved in the
military component are essentially kept away from IAEA inspectors.
Scientists and experts in the military program have full, unimpeded
access to all expertise and materials in the civilian program, but
those in the civilian program are kept completely in the dark as far as
the military program is concerned.
The following are the unmistakable signs of Iran’s bomb-making plans:
- Covert plants for the production of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium;
- Traces found of these weapons-capable materials;
- Experiments with polonium (a neutron initiator used to trigger nuclear explosions);
- Experiments with laser enrichment (an unconventional technology
with little commercial promise but with the potential to produce
bomb-grade uranium with high efficiency);
- A heavy water reactor that is too small to produce significant
electrical power, too large for legitimate civilian research, but
ideally suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium;
- There is an overall pattern of deceptions, omissions and belated
admissions of covert nuclear activities. These constitute clear
evidence of ongoing activities that, unless halted, will lead
inevitably to bomb-making.
What’s to be done?
The election of Ahmadinejad as the new president is consistent with the
Supreme Leader’s strategic decision to continue nuclear enrichment. The
choice is all the more significant because in the past five years, the
Iran’s nuclear program has been managed and directed by the
Revolutionary Guards Corps. As a former IRGC commander, Ahmadinejad,
was a perfect fit for the job.
While the deadly London bombings revived the tragic memories of Madrid,
Bali, New York and Washington, DC, the question we have to ask
ourselves today is which regime now poses the greatest threat to
civilized society?
Traditionally speaking, seven countries have been identified as
terror-sponsoring regimes. Two, Iraq and Afghanistan, have gone through
regime change. Libya is trying to return to the international
community. The Sudan and Syria are on the retreat. North Korea is a
threat more because of its nuclear program than terror sponsorship. And
the Island nation of Cuba espouses an ideology that Muslim
fundamentalists would never accept.
We are left with only one country that not only considers itself as the
guardian of Islam but also is hell bent on exporting its fundamentalist
brand of Islam to the rest of the Muslim World. I am, of course,
speaking about the theocracy that has ruled Iran for the past quarter
century.
The mullahs have closed ranks because they feel the domestic and
international pressure to change their ways. The only way to resist the
winds of change, the Supreme Leader felt, was to have total control of
all levers of power.
Against this backdrop, Europe, and particularly Britain, France and Germany, face a grave responsibility.
This is the make-or-break point for the international community as it
faces the prospects of the world’s most dangerous regime arming itself
with the world’s most dangerous weapon. The “cut-a-deal” approach with
the terror masters of Tehran has never worked before and will not work
now.
This is the moment of truth: either refer the mullahs’ nuclear file to
the United Nations Security Council right now, or be prepared to
ultimately face the world’s most active sponsor of terrorism armed with
nuclear weapons.
Appeasement has clearly failed and it is time for a new approach:
decisiveness. Part and parcel of this new approach is to reach out to
anti-fundamentalist Muslims who have hitherto been hamstrung because of
appeasement
Paris - July 12, 2005
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