The truth about Iran nuclear deal
Following the announcement on the framework agreement reached between the Iranian regime and 5+1 countries in Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 2, state-run news outlets in Iran reported that the joint statement delivered by Mohammad-Javad Zarif and the EU's Federica Mogherini is “neither binding nor does it have any legal implications.”
The media note published by the US State Department entitled, “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program,” contains glaring differences with the version released by the Iranian regime entitled “Summary of a collection of understandings related to solutions for a comprehensive joint plan of action.”
The DoS asserts its release contains “the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.”
Even assuming that the what the DoS released present the true state of agreement and even assuming that the current Provisionals in the agreement is enough to prevent the Iranian regime pursuing nuclear bomb, there can be no doubt that any presumed retreat by the regime is more than anything the result of facts on the ground, namely:
• The fear of the Iranian regime from a public revolt. It is now beyond any doubt that the people of Iran, contrary to years of propaganda by the regime and apologists in the West, do not consider the nuclear program as “national pride” and do not even support it.
• The regional coalition against the expansion and aggression of the religious fascism ruling Iran in Yemen and operation “Decisive Storm” was a major blow to the regime, further undermining its position in the region.
• The fear of adoption of a resolution in the US Senate for further sanction or requiring Senate approval was a decisive element forcing the regime to reluctantly accept certain limits.
• The crippling impact of sanction, despite some relaxation as a result of agreed Plan of Action in November 2013.
Nevertheless, a statement of generalities, lacking Khamenei’s signature and official approval, will never block the path to the regime obtaining nuclear weapons nor prevent its intrinsic deception. Thus, these facts indicates that the only option is to increase the pressure and close all the loopholes.
In addition, the Iranian regime version of the agreement not only is different in substance with what the DoS has published, but it is also defined as a general “understanding” with no “legal bearing.”
The question that needs to be asked is: Is the text released by the Department of State the official text of the agreement? Has the Iranian regime officially accepted the terms indicated in that text and is it committed to them? If that is the case, then how can one explain the contradictory elements contained in the regime's official press release? Some of the more obvious contradictions between the Iranian version and the American version have been outlined below:
1. The text released by the regime’s Foreign Ministry states, “The document outlining these solutions has no legal bearing and merely contains guidelines set out for preparing and writing down the comprehensive joint plan of action.”
Thus, the so-called agreement is downgraded from the outset as a non-binding accord without any legal bearing whatsoever. The DoS release, however, does not explicitly indicate that “this text has no legal bearing.”
Destruction, closure or suspension of nuclear activities
2. The regimes’ press release states, “Within the framework of available solutions, none of the nuclear-related installations and activities would be halted, shut down or suspended, and Iran’s nuclear activities in all nuclear installations, including Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan and Arak will continue.”
There is absolutely no such understanding reflected in the DoS version. On the contrary, it says that “Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges.”
The reference to a “two-third” reduction in the number of centrifuges is rather misleading because there were only 9,000 centrifuges in operation in Iran and the other 10,000 declared centrifuges were not operational even before the Geneva talks and agreement. Initially, the regime was not supposed to have any operational centrifuges. Subsequently, however, western negotiators conceded that Tehran could have several hundred, then 1,500 and now 6,000. This set of facts seems to be incongruent with what has been presented in the DoS statement.
New enrichment installations
3. The English text states, “Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.”
There is no mention of this in the Iranian version.
4. The DoS text explicitly says, “Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.” And “Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.” These phrases effectively mean that the Fordow site will no longer remain as a nuclear site.
However, the text released by the Iranian Foreign Ministry states, “The Fordow nuclear installation will turn into an advanced nuclear and physics research center.” It adds, “Half of Fordow installations will be allocated to advanced nuclear research and production of persistent isotopes with the help of some of the P5+1 countries, which have important applications in industry, agriculture and medicine.”
5. The statement released by the DoS states, “Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.”
There is no such indication in the Iranian text regarding the use of only the older (first-generation) centrifuges. Rather, it contains phrases that are not explicitly mentioned in the DoS text. For example, it says, “Machineries in excess of this figure [5,000] and related infrastructure will be consolidated and stored under IAEA supervision as potential replacements for machines that would be damaged during the course of this period. Iran will also be able to allocate its current stockpile of enriched material for production of its nuclear fuel complex or for exports to international markets in exchange for purchasing uranium.”
6. The DoS statement states, “Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years و . Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.”
The Iranian text, however, says, “Iran will continue its research and developments on advanced machines [centrifuges] and the initial phases and the process of completing the research and development of the IR-4, IR-5 and IR-6 centrifuges will continue for the duration of the ten-year Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action."
7. The DoS statement states, “Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.”
The regime's release states, “The Arak heavy water reactor will remain intact and will be upgraded and updated by being redesigned. This will be initiated according to a set timetable in the framework of a joint international project managed by Iran. Immediately after the redesign, construction will be started and completed according to a predetermined timetable.”
IAEA and PMD
8. The DoS document states, “Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.”
There is no reference to this issue in the Iranian text, and in particular there is no mention of the program's PMD.
9. Regarding the Addition Protocol, the DoS text states, “Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.”
The regime's release states that Iran will “voluntarily” and “temporarily” implement the Additional Protocol. “The process of ratification of this protocol will continue on the basis of a timetable within the authorities of the President and the Parliament.” Therefore, the entire ratification process depends on the parliament’s approval.
10. The DoS text states, “Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments. The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance. All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD and transparency).”
The regime's release states, “After implementation of the joint plan of action, all UN Security Council resolutions will be lifted and all the multilateral European economic and financial sanctions, as well as the unilateral US sanctions, including financial, banking, insurance, investment and all the various related services including in the fields of oil, gas, petrochemical, and car industry will be annulled."