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HomeEditorial - National Council of Resistance of IranEDITORIAL: the Power Struggle in the Final Phase of Iran’s Regime

EDITORIAL: the Power Struggle in the Final Phase of Iran’s Regime

EDITORIAL: the Power Struggle in the Final Phase of Iran’s Regime
Qalibaf and Qassem Soleimani

Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, one of the main elements of oppression and warmongering in Iran’s clerical regime, and a leading figure of plundering and embezzlement was appointed as the regime’s new parliament speaker on May 28.  

In his first speech on May 31, Qalibaf exposed the nature and the roadmap of a parliament filled with members of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and corrupt elements of the intelligence and oppression network 

He made important an acknowledgment about the regime’s critical and disunited situation and counted some of the threats against the regime. He said:  

The first threat is the reduction of the social capital of the system, which is the result of the saturated managerial inefficiency of the country and the distance of the officials from the principles of the revolution, creating economic and livelihood challenges, preparing the ground for unemployment and widespread social harm. Another threat is corruption, a concern that has penetrated and become institutionalized in various structures and led to increased discrimination and dissatisfaction, and the failure to achieve justice.”  

Qalibaf made these remarks while he is one of the leading figures of governmental corruption within the regime. As part of the infighting by rival factions, the state-run Etehad Khabar website, in an article published on May 30, identified him as a leader of theft and looting in the mullahs’ regime and wrote: “Now Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf is head of a legislative power which intends to fight corruption. The important question is: Could we wipe a window with dirty napkinCan a person accused of corruption be the center of the fight against corruption? Of course, everything will be clarified after some time.”   

Qalibaf also said: “The country’s disrupted administrative-executive system is another threat that has ruled out good governance.” 

He concluded: “What makes the situation more dangerous is the executive branch’s administrative model, which, along with its inefficiency and managerial confusion and its focus on looking to the outside, does not believe in the principles and components of the jihadi management model.”  

Qalibaf also called any negotiations with the United States fruitless. While persisting on continuing terrorism and warmongering in the region, he described the leadership of Ali Khamenei, the regime’s supreme leader, as the best opportunity for the regime. While the regime’s hollow power in the region has shattered after the elimination of Qassem Soleimani [head of the terrorist Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force], Qalibaf said: “The systems’ achievement have been rendered due to the efforts made by people like Qassem Soleimani.” He continued: “The Eleventh Majlis [parliament] considers strong confrontation with foreign enemies, especially the United States and the Zionist regime, as one of its basic principles, and will not hesitate in confronting the opposition and internal hypocrites. The 11th parliament has pledged to continue the path of Martyr Soleimani in increasing the power of the Axis of Resistance as an unchangeable strategy. It considers supporting the Palestinian people, Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance groups, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the oppressed people of Yemen as its revolutionary and national duty. Negotiation and compromise with the U.S. as the axis of Global Arrogance is considered fruitless and harmful.  

Qalibaf’s speech portrays a complete picture of the regime’s comprehensive crises and the deadlock in which it is trapped.   

The regime’s supreme leader, Khamenei, in a meeting with regime’s paramilitary Basijis in universities, described the establishment of a “young and Hezbollahi government ” as the country’s  way out of crises and said by a young and Hezbollahi government, he meant someone like Qassem Soleimani, the eliminated commander of the terrorist Quds force. 

This critical situation, highly multiplied by the coronavirus crisis, has terrified the regime’s forces and pushed them to the brink of defection. They are particularly fearful of the people’s uprising, as the fire under ashes could rise again. In this regard, Khamenei, in the same meeting during which he spoke of a young Hezbollahi government, with an unprecedented frankness warned about Iranian youth approaching the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) just like the first years of the anti-monarchic revolution. He warned them not to help the enemy recruit people.  

In order to boost the morale of his forces who are disappointed and hopeless of the situation getting better, Khamenei had intended to fulfill his longtime dream of unifying his regime. But in reality, it was revealed that this Majlis, even after dozen times of filtering, is another field of infighting and with the intensifying problems between the regime’s factions, the crisis will be more intensified than before. In other words, even unifying this regime demands a capability and potential that does not exist in the regime.   

But most importantly, Khamenei clearly showed his regime’s strategic roadmap, which is a policy of contraction in all aspects, including in dealing with the U.S. 

The result of Khamenei’s remarks and the regime’s future actions, despite the infighting and crisis it has created inside the regime, clarified the regime’s strategic plan for the era after the current president, Hassan Rouhani, which has one result: The last hope of the regime’s apologists and lovers of negotiation and interaction with the U.S. has shattered.