Maryam Rajavi: IAEA report underscores the need to impose comprehensive sanctions

Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the Iranian Resistance, described the latest report (September 7, 2010) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iranian regime as a warning to the international community that underscores the need to adopt a firm international policy against the regime. She added: Imposition of comprehensive sanctions against the regime is the essential first step and regime change is the ultimate solution to rid the world of the fundamentalists armed with Atom Bomb. Mrs. Rajavisaid:The Iranian Resistance has for years exposed the regime’s ominous plans to acquire nuclear bomb, but due to the prevailing policy of appeasement the regime was granted more concessions and incentives instead of a firm policy and imposition of sanctions. This provided adequate time and necessary resources to the religious fascism to complete its nuclear project to a point where the mullahs’ nuclear program and prospect of obtaining nuclear weapons has emerged as an immediate threat to the entire international community. She added: Since the medieval faltering regime considers nuclear weapons as being crucial to its survival, it will never give up its nuclear weapons projects. Thus, the ultimate solution to rid the region and the world of the nightmare of the Islamic fundamentalists armed with nuclear weapons is democratic change in Iran by the people and the Resistance.

In a press conference in Washington

New top secret nuclear site, Abyek, exposed

In a press conference at the National Press Club of Washington, DC on September 9, 2010, the Iranian Resistance revealed exclusive details on a major top-secret and strategic nuclear site in the town of Abyek, 120 kilometers west of the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Report by International Atomic Energy Agency:

- The construction of the secret uranium enrichment site code-named 311, located near Qazvin, began in early 2005 and 85 percent of its construction has been completed
- The site, 100 m deep under ground, has a tunnel as the main entrance that leads to large halls and offices. It is ready to be installed with centrifuges
- The site is a new part of the command center and nuclear weapons manufacture of the Iranian regime, namely Mojdeh site
- The extensive dimensions of the site show that the regime’s nuclear weapons program is far larger than what the International Atomic Energy Agency knows about

Report on page 4

Report on page 2
Iranian Resistance unveils new clandestine nuclear site near Qazvin

In a press conference at the National Press Club of Washington, DC on September 9, 2010, the Iranian Resistance revealed exclusive details on a major top-secret and strategic nuclear site in the town of Abyek, 120 kilometers west of the Iranian capital, Tehran.

The information about the site were obtained through several years of extensive and vigilant investigation, research and intelligence work by the internal network of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).

Code-named 311

In the press conference, Mrs. Soona Samsami and Mr. Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed that the construction of Behjatabad-Abyek nuclear site code-named 311 near Qazvin began in early (February or March) 2005 and 85 percent of the construction work on it has been completed.

The work has proceeded slowly. One reason was the geology of the land, which made the drill of the tunnels very difficult. The ground in this area is hard and includes volcano-type rocky area. Another reason has been the extreme security measure adopted to avoid detection.

Inside a mountain near Qazvin

According to the information provided in the conference, the precise location of this top-secret site is 20 kms from the city of Abyek, on the land between the villages of Behjatabad and Todaran. This region is located along a mountainous area east of the central section of the town of Abyek. (The center for this region is Nasser-Abad village). The nuclear site is built within a 30 Sqr. Km fenced area inside a mountain.

Unlimited budget

So far the regime has spent 100 million dollars on the project, but experts involved in the projects have said that it has unlimited budget. For example, one of the companies affiliated with the MoD, which is tasked with building some of the facilities in the site has received 25 million dollars in the past three years alone.

According to sources inside the clerical regime, the Armed Forces General Headquarters, headed by Major General Hassan Firouz-Abadi, and the Ministry of Defense, headed by Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, have embarked on building this new secret site, located between the cities of Abyek and Qazvin. The project began under the former Minister of Defense who is currently Minister of the Interior, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar.

To keep the site secret from local inhabitants, the site is named Javad-nia 2. This is a MoD training garrison about two miles south of the current site. The name Javadnia-2 is meant to mislead the locals. Javad-nia 1 is used to provide the logistical support for the initial phase of constructing the new site, including electricity and other requirements. The use of electricity in this region has risen dramatically since last year, which demonstrates increased activity inside the site.

New command center

This site is a new part of the Command center and nuclear weapons manufacture of the Iranian regime, namely Mojdeh site. It is under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, who is the director of Mojdeh.

Although the construction of this site is not yet complete, similar to Fardow in Qom, currently, nuclear experts from Mojdeh nuclear site have been stationed at this site to realize the intended nuclear objectives.

Maze of Tunnels

The site has a tunnel as the main entrance, 8 meters wide and nearly 200 meters long. It leads deep inside the ground to three large halls, 16-20 meters wide and 200 meters long. The site also has an exit shaft and a vertical shaft. There are halls and office space inside the tunnels.

As such, the mountain which sits on top of the tunnel has a...
According to assessment of nuclear experts, the suitable height to prevent radioactive material emission is 80 meters. The thickness of dirt on top of the tunnel also neutralizes any possible impact of aerial bombardment on the facilities inside the tunnels.

The site has four entrances and exits in total: Two main entrances in the main warehouse which are used for entry. One is for entering and the other for exiting. In addition, there is one individual exit and one emergency escape exit through the vertical shaft.

The facilities inside the site are set up to installing centrifuges and building workshops for nuclear work. Nuclear safety systems as well as radiation detecting devices have also been installed inside both complexes and experts are monitoring the work progress and its quality.

**Agencies involved in the construction**

The Armed Forces’ General Headquarters has set up an extensive organization to construct underground secret site. The head of this organization is Brig. Gen. Jalali, Deputy Commander of the Passive Defense forces for the Armed Forces. Brig. Gen. Tabatabi, his deputy, oversees the day-to-day operations. Brig. Gen. Jalali is Deputy to Major General Hassan Firouz-Abadi, the Commander of the Armed Forces’ General Headquarters.

The AFGH has tasked the MoD and the IRGC’s engineering directorates with constructing secret tunnels. The Aero-space Engineering Directorate headed by Brig. Gen. Nasrollahi-Zadeh is the executive director of the project in Abyek. The official directly responsible to implement the plan is Brig. Gen. Abolqassem Amiri, who is Nasrollahi-Zadeh’s deputy.

According to a confidential directive issued by the Armed Forces’ General Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense to all engineers and technicians as well as others involved in the planning and building of this site, the disclosure of the site will irreparably undermine the regime’s international standing and would have unimaginable repercussions.

All persons involved in this project as under the tight control of the MoD’s counterintelligence department. MoD agencies and highest ranking commanders of the Ministry are monitoring and controlling the building of this site.

**New dimension of mullahs’ enrichment program**

This site is far more important than the Fardow site near the holy city of Qom, which explains why the MoD has taken extraordinary concealment measure to avoid its detection. The Fardow plant, as is widely reported, was first unveiled by the PMOI in a press conference on December 20, 2005 in Paris. Later, in a press conference on 25 September 2009, President Obama confirmed the existence of that site.

The Abyek site is built deep inside mountains to withstand aerial bombings and confirms that the regime is in hot pursuit of nuclear weapons and will in no way abandon it.

The date when work began on this site is significant because it proves that contrary to its deceptive tactics, implying that the regime had stopped its military nuclear activities in 2003, this type of work has gone underground and expanded. The extensive dimensions of the site show that the regime’s nuclear weapons program is far larger than what the International Atomic Energy Agency knows about.

Specifically, the enrichment program is much more extensive than what has been revealed to the IAEA, which explains why the Iranian regime is refusing to ratify the Additional Protocol.
Enrichment Related Activities

Iran has estimated that, between 23 November 2009 and 6 August 2010, it produced an additional 995 kg of low enriched UF6, which would result in a total production of 2803 kg of low enriched UF6 since the start of operations in February 2007. The Agency reminded Iran, in a letter dated 19 July 2010, of a number of incidents involving the breaking of seals by the operator at FEP. In a letter dated 9 August 2010, Iran provided more information about these incidents and stated that the breakages were accidental and that “all necessary advice and instructions have been given to the operator to exercise more vigilance and control in this respect”. The consequences for safeguards of these seal breakages will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of the next PIV, which is currently planned for October 2010.

In a letter dated 30 June 2010, Iran informed the Agency that it intended to start feeding LEU into the interconnected Cascades 1 and 6 and requested the Agency to rearrange the seals to allow Iran to operate the two cascades as planned. Iran has estimated that, between 9 February 2010 and 20 August 2010, a total of approximately 310 kg of UF6 enriched at FEP was fed into Cascade 1 and that 22 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced.

Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. The Agency verified that FFEP was being built to contain sixteen cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.

The Agency has asked Iran on a number of occasions to provide additional information regarding the chronology of the design and construction of FFEP, as well as its original purpose. In response to these requests, Iran has stated that, “The location [near Qom] originally was considered as a general area for passive defence contingency shelters for various utilizations. Then this location was selected for the construction of [the] Fuel Enrichment Plant in the second half of 2007”. The Agency has also reiterated the need for access to companies involved in the design and construction of FFEP.

The Agency informed Iran that it had received extensive information from a number of sources alleging that design work on the facility had started in 2006. In a letter to the Director General, dated 4 June 2010, Iran stated that there were “no legal bases” upon which the Agency could request information on the chronology and purpose of FFEP, and that the Agency was “not mandated to raise any question beyond the Safeguards Agreement”. The Agency considers that the questions it has raised are within the terms of the Safeguards Agreement, and that the information requested is essential for the Agency to verify the chronology and original purpose of FFEP to ensure that the declarations of Iran are correct and complete.

In its response to the Agency’s request that Iran submit a complete DIQ for FFEP, Iran said, in a letter to the Director General dated 4 June 2010, that it had “fulfilled its obligation in providing the DIQ of FFEP” according to its Safeguards Agreement. The Agency has informed Iran on a number of occasions that it considers that, based on the current construction status of the facility, additional information must be available to Iran and that this information should be included in the DIQ.

Other Enrichment Related Activities

In light of the announcement made by Iran on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser uranium enrichment technology, and its announcement on 9 April 2010 regarding the development of ‘third generation’ centrifuges, the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 18 August 2010, reiterated its previous request that Iran provide access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment (including laser enrichment), and uranium mining and milling activities. In its reply dated 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the Agency with the requested information but reiterated that it was “continuing to cooperate with the Agency in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement”.

Heavy Water Related Projects

As indicated in the Director General’s previous reports, the Agency, as mandated by the Security Council, has requested that Iran make the necessary arrangements to provide the Agency, at the earliest possible date, with access to: the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP); the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for the taking of samples; and any other location in Iran where projects related to heavy water are being carried out. In a letter to the Agency dated 10 June 2010, Iran stated that the Agency’s requests had “no legal basis since they are not falling within Iran’s Safeguards Agreement” and that the requests also went beyond the relevant Security Council resolutions that “request only verification of suspension”. Iran also stated that it had not suspended work on heavy water related projects. To date, Iran has not provided the requested access.

Design Information

Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.

In the case of both the Darkhovin facility and FFEP, Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1, and has provided only limited design information with respect to those facilities. Iran has also not provided updated design information for the IR-40 reactor. Iran has also said that the statements on design information as
set out in paragraphs 30 to 33 of the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2010/28) have “no legal base”.

The modification of PFEP to produce uranium enriched up to 20% in U-235, which is clearly relevant for safeguards purposes, was not notified to the Agency by Iran with sufficient time for the Agency to adjust its safeguards procedures, as required under Article 45 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.

**Designation of Inspectors**

In a letter to the Director General dated 3 June 2010, Iran stated that, henceforth, if confidential information acquired by the Agency as a result of implementing its Safeguards Agreement “leaks, in any way, and/or [is] conveyed to the media; for the first reaction, the designation of the relevant inspector(s) will be withdrawn”.

In a letter to the Director General dated 10 June 2010, referring to the “false and wrong statements in paragraph 28” of the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2010/28), Iran informed the Agency that it objected to the designation of two inspectors who had recently conducted inspections in Iran.

While Iran’s Safeguards Agreement does permit it to object to the designation of Agency inspectors, the Agency rejects the basis upon which Iran has sought to justify its objection in this case. The Agency has full confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the inspectors concerned, as it has in all of its inspectors, and confirms that the Director General’s previous report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran (GOV/2010/28) is fully accurate.

In a meeting with the Resident Representative of Iran to the Agency on 20 July 2010, the Agency informed the Resident Representative that the repeated objection by Iran to the designation of inspectors with experience in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and facilities hampers the inspection process and thereby detracts from the Agency’s capability to implement effective and efficient safeguards in Iran.

**Possible Military Dimensions**

Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and the actions required of Iran necessary to resolve those issues. In the Director General’s February 2010 report (GOV/2010/10), the Agency described a number of technical matters it needed to address with Iran.42 Since August 2008, however, Iran has declined to discuss the outstanding issues with the Agency or to provide any further information or access to locations and people necessary to address the Agency’s concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forged documents.

Based on an overall analysis undertaken by the Agency of all the information available to it, the Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. There are indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004.

The passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of some relevant information increase the urgency of this matter.

**Summary**

While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, it has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

More specifically, Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran’s nuclear programme and to resolving outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme, including by providing access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. Iran also needs to implement the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

In addition, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of FEP and PFEP at Natanz, and has started the enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at PFEP, now in two interconnected cascades. Iran has continued the construction of PFEP.

In order to verify the chronology and original purpose of FFEP, Iran still needs to provide the Agency with access to relevant design documents and to companies involved in the design and construction of the plant. Iran also needs to submit a complete DIQ for the facility. Iran has also announced that it has selected the venues for new enrichment facilities and that construction of one of these facilities will start around March 2011, but has not provided the Agency with the necessary design information and access in accordance with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangements.

Similarly, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and with heavy water related activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the HWPP.

Iran objected to the designation of two inspectors who had recently conducted inspections in Iran. The Agency rejects the basis upon which Iran has sought to justify its objection; it is also concerned that the repeated objection to the designation of experienced inspectors hampers the inspection process and detracts from the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards in Iran.
MKO claims denied; no undeclared nuclear installations in Iran

Mehr state-run news agency, September 10 – The chair of the Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, reacted to recent reports by foreign news agencies about revelations regarding a new nuclear site near the city of Qazvin by the Mujahedin-e Khalq group (MKO), and said, “We have no such installation that enriches uranium and if they (opposition groups) are aware of such a development, they should tell us. We will thank them.”

He emphasized that nuclear installations have a clear definition, and said there are many facilities for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes all over Iran which are not subject to this definition.

Iran has not been working in secret – All our country’s activities are related to enrichment and monitored by IAEA

ISNA, September 12 – The deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Islamic Consultative Assembly described recent claims by the Mujahedin-e Khalq group (MKO) about the existence of undeclared enrichment facilities in Iran as attempts to revive this dead group, and implement a psychological war against the Islamic Republic with the most cooperative with the agency in the past years,” the chairman of the agency said.

He said that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is carried out under the supervision of the IAEA.

Speaking on the sidelines of the IAEA’s meeting of Board of Governors in Vienna, Amano told reporters, “The agency does not have precise information about the facilities or the amount of enrichment activities carried out in them.”

Amano added that the information was provided to the agency by opponents of the Iranian government and only contains general information about secret installations in Iran that are operating out of view of the inspectors.

He called on Iran to respect the agency’s rules and its obligations and to inform the agency before taking any steps in its nuclear program.

The three-pronged US psychological war against Iran

Fars news agency, September 15 – On the brink of negotiations between Iran and P5+1, the US and some of its European allies known as the Vienna group, has initiated a three-pronged and extensive psychological war against the Islamic Republic with the help of anti-revolutionary groups and the sedition front.

First angle: Iran’s nuclear activities

Iran’s nuclear activities and the issue of uranium enrichment form the first side of the triangle of psychological war by the US and its European allies. The role is played jointly by the Mujahedin-e Khalq terrorist organization (MKO) and the director of the IAEA.

On September 10, Radio Farda, which is tied to the CIA, cited the MKO as saying that the Islamic Republic of Iran has started building a new uranium enrichment site at the Abyek region since five years ago.

Amano: The agency is reviewing the MKO report

ISNA, September 13 – The terrorist Mujahedin-Khalq group (MKO), claiming several days ago that Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program despite assessments by the US National Intelligence Estimate in 2003 which had said Iran had stopped such a program.

One of the members of this terrorist group, which usually serves as the source of information for the US and the agency, has on many occasions criticized the White House for offering wrong information and wasting the agency’s time, provided information to reporters in Brussels and claims that there are information about two sites in Iran which perform secret studies about nuclear warheads.

According to Reuters, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said at a press conference on Monday at the agency’s headquarters in Vienna that, “We were made aware of the information through the media and are now reviewing this information. I don’t have anything further at this stage.”

West plays ‘political game’ on N-program

Press TV, Thursday Sep 16, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says the country’s “transparent” nuclear program has been dragged into a “political game” by certain countries.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear activity is one of the most transparent cases in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” the minister said on Wednesday in a meeting with his Armenian counterpart.

“Unfortunately, such a transparent case has been dragged into the political games of certain countries which always repeat their claims against Iran,” Mottaki said in reference to recent remarks made by IAEA chief, Yukiya Amano, on Iran’s nuclear program.

On Monday, Amano said the IAEA was looking into a report by the terrorist Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), claiming that the agency did not have complete information about the extent of Iran’s nuclear program.

MKO claimed last week that it had evidence of a new secret uranium enrichment site under a mountain near the city of Qazvin - about 120 kilometers west of Tehran - which was about 85 percent complete.

Mottaki said that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is carried out under the supervision of the IAEA.

“Compared to other IAEA member states, Iran has been the most cooperative with the agency in the past years,” the Iranian foreign minister said.
Iran ‘constructing vast underground nuclear complex’

Iran has been secretly constructing a vast underground complex to hide a nuclear facility in the mountains east of Tehran in a development that would violate the UN sanctions regime, it has been claimed.

by Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent

September 9, 2010 - The site, code-named 311, is set inside a military base near Abyek, 75 miles outside the capital, and consists of a series of four bombproof tunnels made from reinforced concrete set 656ft (200m) deep inside a desert ridge. The People’s Mujahedeen of Iran, an opposition group with an extensive network inside the country, said Tehran launched construction at the facility in 2005 and had spent $100 million (£65 million) on the tunnels.

The group has previously revealed secret atomic plants at Natanz and Qom that the Iranian regime has subsequently acknowledged to be nuclear facilities.

“If construction was started in 2005 it would represent an embarrassing failure of US intelligence which concluded the Iranian leadership had suspended enrichment of uranium, the key component of a nuclear weapon, at the time,” a Western diplomat said.

A diplomatic report said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN agency that safeguards atomic materials, would be expected to examine the report. If the information is credible the IAEA would demand access to the site to ensure that no refinement of uranium or other nuclear materials had taken place there.

“Any new plant would be in contravention of a six UN security council resolutions warning Iran to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities,” the diplomat said.

Opposition Group Claims Iran Secretly Developing ‘Major’ Nuclear Enrichment Site

September 9, 2010 - An Iranian resistance group claimed Thursday that it has compiled evidence showing Iran has been secretly developing a nuclear enrichment site for years outside Tehran, a development one official said proves Iran has a “hidden, secret nuclear weapons program.”

The Iran Policy Committee hosted a press conference in Washington, D.C., where research from the Iranian resistance, known as the Mujahedeen Khalq, was unveiled. The findings could not be independently confirmed.

The presenters cited evidence, including satellite imagery, they claimed was compiled after years of extensive research. They said that the Behjatabad-Abyek enrichment site is located near the city of Qazvin, about 75 miles outside of Tehran. The group claimed the regime has spent about $100 million to date on the underground project, which started in early 2005, and that construction is 85 percent complete.

Alireza Jafarzadeh said the research shows the Iranian officials have been “lying through their teeth” in claiming to have disclosed all nuclear activity to international inspectors. He said it proves Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, only more secretly than before.

Soona Samsami called the project a “major” enrichment site more important than the facility at Qom confirmed by Western officials last year.

The opposition group was the first to reveal the existence of secret Iranian uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak back in 2002 - the sites were later confirmed by U.S. intelligence.

Iran opposition claims to have found secret nuclear site

By Lachlan Carmichael

September 9, 2010 - Leading Iranian opposition members claimed Thursday to have uncovered a secret nuclear enrichment site buried in the mountains northwest of Tehran and run by Iran’s defense ministry.

Information obtained by the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran (PMOI) has revealed Iran began building the site in Abyek, about 70 miles (120 kilometers) northwest of Tehran, in 2005, the opposition members said.

“This is controlled, run and operated... by the ministry of defense,” Alireza Jafarzadeh, former media spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), told a press conference in Washington.

... Soona Samsami, who was US representative for the NCRI, said the Iranian authorities have so far spent 100 million dollars on the project and completed about 85 percent of the construction.
Dissident group says Iran has secret nuclear facility

By Greg Miller
September 9, 2010 - An Iranian dissident group said on Thursday that it has identified a previously undisclosed nuclear facility under construction northwest of Tehran, claiming to have evidence that shows the Islamic nation is deceiving inspectors and moving forward in its pursuit of a bomb.

...The People’s Mujaheddin Organization said the new site is located just north of a major highway connecting Tehran with the Iranian city of Qazvin. Satellite images presented by the organization showed significant excavation amid otherwise mountainous and barren terrain.

The group said that Iran has been engaged in major excavation work at the site for at least five years, building a network of underground tunnels designed to hold centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade purification levels.

A spokeswoman for the Iranian group, Soona Samsami, said the new compound was 85 percent complete and could prove to be “far more important than the Qom site,” a facility that Iran worked on in secret for years before it was exposed by the Obama administration in 2009.

The dissident group’s information came from an “internal network of sources” inside the country, Samsami said, adding that details had been shared with U.S. government agencies, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, which carries out United Nations-mandated inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites.

The New York Times

Dissidents Claim Iran Is Building a New Enrichment Site

By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, September 9, 2010 - A dissident group that had previously revealed the existence of several hidden nuclear sites in Iran claimed Thursday that it had evidence that the country was building another secret uranium enrichment plant.

The group, the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran, showed satellite photographs of an extensive tunnel-digging operation near a military garrison northwest of Tehran. But the group had no pictures of the interior and no evidence to back up its claim that the site was intended to hold several thousand centrifuges, the machines used to enrich nuclear fuel for power production or weapons. The Obama administration, which publicly revealed evidence a year ago of a hidden nuclear facility near the holy city of Qum, reacted cautiously to the group’s announcement.

...The exile opposition group has a long and tense history with the United States government, and it has openly called for a change of government in Iran. But it accurately revealed the existence of the country’s main underground nuclear enrichment center, at Natanz, and the facility at Qum, which is still under construction. Both are now visited regularly by international nuclear inspectors.

Iran Dissidents Pinpoint Alleged Nuclear Site

By JAY SOLOMON
September 9, 2010 - Iran is developing an underground military installation in the mountains west of Tehran, according to U.S. officials and Iranian dissidents, but the facility’s exact purpose is in dispute.

An Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, on Thursday told a Washington news conference that the site, which it called Javad-nia 2, is a nearly completed uranium-enrichment facility aimed at fast-tracking Iran’s nuclear program.

The MEK said the facility is 85% complete and adjoined to a major Iranian military garrison. The dissidents said they didn’t believe that cascades of centrifuges, which are utilized to produce nuclear fuel, have been introduced to the mountainous site. But they said that three halls to house the centrifuges have already been constructed and that the Iranian government has spent roughly $100 million on developing the facility.

“This type of work has gone undetected and is expanding,” said Soona Samsami, an MEK representative.

The MEK has played a significant role in recent years exposing some of Iran’s covert nuclear activities. In 2002, it disclosed the existence of Iran’s nuclear installations in the cities of Natanz and Arak. Subsequent investigations conducted by the United Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, verified the MEK’s claims and set off the international community’s current standoff with Tehran over the nuclear program.