Brenda Shaffer, research director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University in Arms Control Association:
“An interesting aspect of this year’s revelations on Iran’s nuclear program is the fact that the information provided by the NCRI has been astonishingly accurate. In many political settings, oppositions abroad tend to exaggerate information in order to gain support for their causes against ruling regimes. The NCRI has shown restraint in its reporting on the nuclear program.”
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New York Times senior science writer and Pulitzer Prize winner William J. Broad:
“Frank Pabian, a senior adviser on nuclear nonproliferation at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, strongly disagreed. ‘They (NCRI) are right 90 percent of the time,’ he said of the council’s disclosures about Iran’s clandestine sites. ‘That doesn’t mean they’re perfect, but 90 percent is a pretty good record’.”
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Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status Updated December 20, 2019:
“Prior to the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but the IAEA had never found Iran in violation of its safeguards agreement.”
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Foreword:
For over three decades, the ruling clerics in Tehran, who continue to harbor ambitions of inaugurating a regional Islamic Caliphate to this day, have been desperately trying to join the Nuclear Club. The mullahs view nuclear weapons as an insurance policy that grants them perpetual international impunity while reinforcing their illegitimate rule of terror at home and in the Middle East.
But throughout these complicated years, the regime’s nuclear designs have been seriously frustrated by the organized opposition. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), and its main constituent body the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), have been going the extra mile to uncover and raise awareness about the regime’s illicit activities. The MEK’s sizeable social network has penetrated some of the most secretive enterprises of the regime, laboriously unearthing top secret information that has triggered global action. The resistance movement has thus shed the spotlight on troubling developments that could have otherwise morphed into some of the most enduring and serious threats against regional stability and global peace and security.
According to Massoud Rajavi, the Chairman of the NCRI, “Were it not for the Iranian Resistance’s efforts, today, nuclear-armed mullahs would have been anchored at the Horn of Africa.” Indeed, had it not been for the Resistance’s countless groundbreaking revelations, today’s regional security architecture and strategic calculus would have looked considerably different.
Clearly, the Iranian Resistance lacks the cutting-edge or ultramodern technologies commanded by familiar Western intelligence agencies. But, its position as an indigenous opposition has afforded it the singular opening to make up for that deficiency by leveraging human intelligence sources on the ground. Of course, if and when these sources’ identities are exposed, state retribution would be swift and ruthless. The opposition’s sources are thus not simply bribed or enticed through other means to divulge such intelligence. Literally risking their lives, these daring individuals undoubtedly sympathize with the NCRI’s broader aims to establish a non-nuclear Iran that prioritizes democracy and prosperity for generations over the failed policies of a theocracy that have brought ruin to multiple generations of Iranians since 1979.
Despite the opposition’s notably impressive track record when it comes to divulging intelligence about the Iranian regime’s nuclear activities, including the very first revelation in June 1991, that was followed by the major revelation about the Natanz enrichment facility and Arak heavy water site in August 2002, which triggered the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Organizations (IAEA), detractors have on many occasions cast doubt on the NCRI’s underlying intentions or the information’s authenticity. At every turn, however, those doubts have been shown to be unwarranted, not least because most if not all of the information has thus far been corroborated by Western intelligence agencies and/or formed the basis for steps taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Perhaps the most flattering substantiation has been produced by Tehran itself, as it orchestrates a well-funded demonization campaign against the NCRI/MEK and their increasingly popular political agenda.
The mullahs routinely besmirch these organizations as a Fifth Column and “traitors” who have unleashed sanctions “against the Iranian people” by betraying “national secrets.” By all indications, however, the ruling regime, which monopolizes the free flow of information domestically, has failed to persuade the general population of the merits of its most strategic arguments, including the need for a nuclear program. As demonstrated in multiple nationwide uprisings in recent years, the Iranian people openly and vehemently decry the diversion of their national resources toward theocratic projects like the nuclear weapons program or meddling in regional politics instead of investing in the tanking national economy. In this way, the Iranian people regard the Resistance’s revelations as a patriotic duty that would hasten the downfall of the despised theocracy, a persistent nationwide demand that has gained serious momentum in recent years. That explains the Resistance’s competitive advantage for obtaining intelligence through human elements, intelligence that would otherwise be largely inaccessible to the international community.
The following chronology demonstrates the NCRI’s persistent and laudable attempts to prevent a nuclear-armed regime in Iran. It also shows how Tehran has tried in vain to deceive the world to get back on track. For the past few months in Vienna, world powers have struggled to entice the regime to rejoin the 2015 nuclear pact. But history should be a guide to the regime’s future modus operandi. Thus far, it has advanced its nuclear weapons program through denial, deception, and duplicity. Below should serve as a brief reminder:
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Washington Post, June 26, 1991 – “At a private Capitol Hill luncheon Monday given by Rep. Mervyn Dymally (D-Calif.) and other members of Congress for Mohammed Mohaddessin, the foreign policy spokesman for Iran’s leading anti-Islamic movement, the People’s Mujahedin, Mohaddessin said Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons on a cash basis — and has the money to do it.”
Washington Post, February 15, 1992 – “International Atomic Energy Agency officials returning from a seven-day visit to Iran said the country’s activities appeared consistent with a peaceful nuclear energy program, a finding that Iranian officials said should clear the way for greater technical assistance from abroad… Iran invited the IAEA visit to dispel reports of undeclared nuclear facilities on its territory in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty it signed in 1970. The inspectors said one facility, described by Iranian dissidents as a key nuclear site at Moallem Kalayeh in the northern Elburz mountains, turned out to be a “motel-size” retreat where nuclear scientists travel for language training and recreation.”
“Kamal Kharazzi, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, said in a telephone interview from New York today that the new IAEA report “clarifies all of the allegations that Iran is looking for development of nuclear weapons… There is nothing secret in Iran.”
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November 1991 – during the Chinese president’s visit to Iran, the NCRI’s office in the United States held a press conference at the National Club of Journalists to reveal detailed information about the regime’s latest efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, including a plan to equip long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. Alireza Jafarzadeh told the conference: “Based on information obtained by the members of the Mojahedin from inside Iran, high-ranking officials of the Khomeini regime state that the main focus of their talks during the Chinese president’s visit to Iran was nuclear cooperation.
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March 10, 1992 – Mr. Massoud Rajavi, head of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, sent a telegram to the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, warning of the Iranian regime’s accumulation of deadly weapons. Mr. Rajavi wrote: “In the last three years, the Iranian regime has bought $5 billion from China and $4 billion in weapons from the former Soviet Union, and it has billions of dollars in multi-year contracts with other countries to build nuclear facilities and buy other weapons.”
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October 12, 1992: Mohammad Mohaddesin, head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, told during a press conference in Washington DC about the Iranian regime’s agreement with Kazakhstan to acquire nuclear warheads.
Associated Press, October 12, 1992: Iran has made a deal with the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan to buy four nuclear warheads, the leading Iranian opposition group said Monday. Mohammed Mohaddesin, director of international relations for the People’s Mujahedeen, said Mujahedeen agents inside Iran obtained information about the deal. The warheads have been paid for but not delivered, he said.
Washington Post, October 12, 1992: “The Bush administration was warned about this nuclear purchase last week by Mohammed Mohaddesin, an exiled Iranian dissident leader whose information has proved accurate in the past. His Iraq-based organization, the People’s Mujahedin, learned from its sources in Tehran that Iran had signed the agreement with Kazakhstan and paid for the warheads, which Iran may want to fit to Chinese-made Silkworm missiles, but that delivery had not yet taken place.”
Following the revelations, increasing international pressure on the deal intensified and Kazakhstan’s nuclear warheads were eventually prevented from being transported to Iran and delivered to the Iranian regime.
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November 12, 1992 – The Iranian Resistance revealed the names of several research centers on weapons of mass destruction in Iran. Reuters news agency reported: “Iran’s main opposition group and Middle East-based analysts say Iran is strongly developing a plan to build weapons of mass destruction. The Mojahedin have listed the names of the Iranian regime’s research and development centers as follows:
- Karaj project: The Revolutionary Guards, the Ministry of Defense, and Jihad of Construction Organization are setting up a chemical weapons complex 14 km west of Tehran near the Tehran-Karaj road. Chinese specialists are helping to build the complex. A special team is also working on developing biological weapons at the Razi Vaccine Production Center in Karaj, on the Qazvin-Hesarak road.
- Razi Chemical Company: In the former Shahpour port, the company is producing the materials needed by the IRGC chemical warfare unit.
- Marvdasht Center: The site is located in Fars province, which includes research facilities and laboratories where Mustard gas is being produced.
- Polyacrylic Company: The company runs under the name of ordinary commercial operations and is one of the main facilities for the production of chemical gas by the Revolutionary Guards. The company is located 45 km from Isfahan on the Isfahan-Mobarakeh road.
- Bandar Abbas Project: A Revolutionary Guards unit is working to increase the range of Chinese-made silkworm missiles. The project is made possible by equipment sourced from Munich-based aerospace and electronics manufacturers Messerschmitt AG and Bulker Bloom.
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November 28, 1992: At the time when former Iranian regime’s president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani was secretly visiting Saghand, Yazd, the office of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK/PMOI) issued a statement revealing the construction of a secret nuclear site next to the Atomic Energy Organization’s public facilities on the edge of the desert in Saghand, Yazd. According to the statement, the IRGC has chosen this place due to the existence of a uranium mine in the region.
Washington Post, December 20, 1992: “Iran’s push to produce a nuclear bomb — known in Iran’s leadership circles as “the great secret plan” — is accelerating, with President Hashemi Rafsanjani devoting more time and resources to the project. The Iranian resistance group, the People’s Mojahedin, whose information has proved accurate in the past, detailed for us the latest information regarding the Iranian nuclear program that they’ve pieced together from their own contacts in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran… Yazd. One of the most recently built nuclear sites is located in the vicinity of Yazd in central Iran near a uranium mine. Little is known about this complex, which has been built over the last three years.”
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April 7, 1993 – Mohammad Mohaddesin, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NCRI, cites intelligence from the Iranian regime in an exclusive interview with the New York Times, revealing a major arms deal between Iran and North Korea. “Since early 1993, the Iranian regime has provided $500 million to North Korea to invest in a Nodong-1 missile project and to receive other weapons,” Mohaddesin told the Times.
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January 9, 1995 – The NCRI revealed new details about the Iranian regime’s nuclear projects in Isfahan, Karaj, Darkhovin, Moallem Kelayeh, and Bandar Abbas.
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NTI, 13 December 1995- Washington Times columnist Stephen Green writes that Iran is close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability because of Chinese assistance. With Chinese help, Green writes, Iran reportedly built a cyclotron uranium enrichment facility in Karaj, 25 miles south of Tehran, according to information from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the Mojahedin-e Khalq). Iran has 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities and maybe building the eleventh site south of Tabriz with Chinese help, Green writes. —Stephen Green, “Nuclear Helping Hand for Iran,” Washington Times, 13 December 1995, p. A18
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NTI, 26 January 1999: The National Council of Resistance of Iran states that VX nerve agent is produced in the Construction Crusade’s War Engineering Research Center. — Soona Samsami, “Clerical Regime’s Quest for Biological Weapons & Germ Arsenal,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 26 January 1999, p. 3.
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February 4, 1999: The representative office of the National Council of Resistance in Italy held a press conference with the Italian and international media attending at the Hotel Nazionale in Rome, revealing the Iranian regime’s program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The press conference was led by Ms. Mitra Bagheri, NCRI representative in Italy, and Mr. Antonio Stango, co-founder of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The NCRI said that the mullahs’ regime is rapidly advancing the mass production of biological weapons.
NTI, February 1999: Iran’s opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents: “The Iranian regime….is now capable of producing at least three types of biological munitions, usable for germ warfare. Teheran is concentrating on increasing production to mass production levels, and safeguarding these biological weapons,” says Mitra Bagheri, the Italian representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. According to the Iranian opposition group, four different organizations/facilities are now engaged in producing biological weapons: Special Industries Organization of Iran’s Ministry of Defense; Research Center of the Construction Crusade; Revolutionary Guards Corps research concentrated in the Imam Hossein University; and the Biotechnology Research Center. These sources have also supposedly identified an additional six unnamed BW research and production centers. — “Iran Opposition Says Teheran in Deadly Weapons Drive,” CNN, 4 February 1999, www.cnn.com; “Group Accuses Iran of Germ War Program,” Washington Times, 27 January 1999, p. A12; Arnold Beichman, “Arsenal of Germs in Iran?,” Washington Times, 26 January 1999, p. A17.
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August 14, 2002 – The National Council of Resistance of Iran unveiled the Natanz nuclear site and the heavy water project in Arak during a press conference in Washington. The revelation of these projects was confirmed by the IAEA and triggered worldwide condemnation and scrutiny that dramatically slowed down the clerical regime’s pace for nuclear weapons.
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February 20, 2003 – NCRI revealed the Kala Electric Company in Abali, near Tehran which was registered as a watch-making company, exposed that centrifuge machines were tested there; also the production of centrifuge parts in Isfahan.
February 23, 2003 – At three conferences, representatives of the NCRI in Washington DC, London, and Berlin said that the Iranian regime had stopped installing new machines in Natanz, but that new centrifuges were being produced in Isfahan and were being tested centrally in Abali, Tehran.
Washington Post, December 19, 2002: Two recently disclosed sites, near the cities of Natanz and Arak south of Tehran, appear designed to help produce enriched uranium or plutonium, the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons. Until the facilities were revealed in August by the opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Iranian government had not disclosed their existence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an arm of the United Nations… A company called Kala Electric, based in Tehran obtained materials and equipment for the project in Natanz, described by the resistance group as a fuel fabrication plant and by other experts as an enriched uranium facility. The Natanz project, which was started two years ago, is spread over 25 acres, with sections 25 feet underground and protected by eight-foot thick concrete walls. Kala Electric officials traveled repeatedly to India and China last year, the resistance group said.
Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2005: The Iranian exile group solved that problem on the eve of Mr. ElBaradei’s visit to Iran. At a Washington news conference, it announced that Iran was testing centrifuge equipment at a front company it named as Kala Electric. The NCRI, citing its sources inside Iran, gave the address as “Km 2.5 Ab-Ali highway, next to Kemi Daroo Company… When the IAEA was finally allowed a full inspection of Kalaye Electric that August, it found that workers had completely remodeled one building, pulling up the flooring and repainting and retiling the walls. Still, when the inspectors’ samples came back they showed traces of enriched uranium, some to near weapons grade. “
Note: Upon visiting the “Kalaye Electric” site in Abali in August 2003, the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium.
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May 15, 2003 – the NCRI revealed the Lavizan-Shian site in Iran. This was the headquarters of the clandestine weaponization aspects of the regime’s nuclear project. There, 17 types of experiments on various aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction were carried out. The revelation seriously undermined the regime’s nuclear weapons project, though the extent of the impact would only be understood gradually, over a period of years. According to information gathered primarily by the MEK’s intelligence network, the Nuclear Committee of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), chaired at the time by Hassan Rouhani, had predicted that the IAEA would visit the Lavizan-Shian site and would find out about the secret nuclear weapons activities there. Therefore, the committee decided to demolish and relocate the site, which had been operating for 15 years. The regime razed the building saying that Tehran Municipality owned the property and decided to turn this military site into a park. Until the IAEA’s visit in June 2004, the regime had cleaned up all traces in the site and had even removed the soil. Because of considerable delay in the inspection, Iran had the opportunity and the time to raze the entire site and remove soil.
New York Times (nuclear chronology): June 2004 – IAEA board says Iran’s cooperation with the agency was not full, timely and proactive. Satellite pictures show Iran razed a site at Lavizan in Tehran that U.S. officials say was related to atomic programme.
NTI, 12 May 2006: UN inspectors find new traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment in Iran. The samples of highly enriched uranium are allegedly from the former research center at Lavizan-Shian. Anonymous sources are quoted as saying that the purity of the obtained samples appear to be close to or above the level used to make nuclear warheads. —”Diplomats: Enriched uranium found in Iran,” CNN, 12 May 2006; “New HEU traces found in Iran,” Global Security Newswire, 12 May 2006.
Laurence Livermore National Laboratory, October 23, 2012: (Deferring sanctions) Iran further defers international sanctions by engaging in negotiations preceding key international events and deadlines, such as before IAEA or UNSC meetings. In these negotiations, Iran may provide smaller concessions to indicate the country’s willingness to cooperate to derail criticism and pressure for sanctions. In January 2006, for example, Iran provided IAEA with access to sample certain equipment that had been removed from the Lavizan-Shian military site, in the hopes that this increment of cooperation might “derail an American and European initiative to immediately send Iran’s nuclear case for judgment by the United Nations Security Council.”81 Similarly on October 30, 2011 before the IAEA’s November 8 report on Iran, Iran invited IAEA Safeguards Department head Herman Nackaerts to Tehran – after the IAEA report was published – for talks “aiming at a resolution of matters.” The invitation tried to signal transparency and may have given Nackaerts “a chance to ask for a renewed trip to Parchin that included a visit to the suspected building.”82 When the November IAEA report noted its concern with the possibly military dimensions of Iran’s program, Iran canceled the invitation.
ISIS Report, June 10, 2020: Location 1: Lavisan-Shian, The first location discussed in the IAEA report is the Lavisan-Shian site. It was this site that was subject to such extensive razing as to make another visit not worthwhile.
In reference to this site, the IAEA reported in its June 5, 2020 report the possible presence in Iran between 2002 and 2003 of “natural uranium in the form of a metal disc, with indications of it undergoing drilling and hydriding, which may not have been included in Iran’s declarations: the origins of this disk; and where such material is currently located.” The statement about “drilling and hydriding” appears to refer to the production of uranium deuteride (UD3), which is used in a neutron initiator Iran was developing in the Amad Plan.
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NTI, 27 May 2003: In a Washington press conference, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reveals the existence two previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facilities west pf Tehran. —Howard LaFranchi, “US weighs a tougher Iran stance,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 2003, www.csmonitor.com.
Wisconsin Project: In a press release dated May 27, 2003, the NCRI claimed that the Iranian government had also developed two additional enrichment facilities, both smaller than the Natanz facility. According to the NCRI, the first facility is located at Lashkar-Abad, near Hashtgerd, and the second is located five kilometers away, at Ramandeh village. The group claims that the Iranian regime intends to use the facilities as enrichment sub-stations or, alternatively, as back-up stations in the event of a military attack on the Natanz facility. The group also alleged that several front companies were being used to manage these and other AEOI facilities. The companies included: Hasteh Farayed Company, Kavoshyar Company, Energy Novin Company, Novin Puneh Company, Mesbah Energy Company, Kala Electric Company, Tavan Gostar Company, and Noor-Afza-Gostar Company.
Note: The Iranian regime first showed the IAEA a nearby site, intended to prove the NCRI wrong. However, they eventually showed the IAEA the real site. In Agency’s visit in 2004, it was determined that the site was dedicated to Laser enrichment. NCRI proved accurate, and this revelation forced the regime to stop the activities in this site and close it down.
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July 8, 2003 – During a press conference in Washington, the NCRI revealed a secret site of the regime in the Kolahdooz military complex west of Tehran, where a uranium enrichment test center was nearing completion.
NTI, 9 July 2003: According to Mr. Jafarzadeh, the site—known as the Kohladouz complex—is under more direct military control than other sites that were previously revealed by NCRI and confirmed by the IAEA. In addition, Mr. Jafarzadeh states that information on the site came from the group Mujahedeen Khalq and that the complex is hidden among warehouses and workshops for building tanks and armored personnel carriers. —Brian Knowlton, “Iranian Exiles Describe Newly Found Nuclear Site,” International Herald Tribune, 9 July 2003.
China Daily: Javad Dabiran, a member of the Iranian resistance council, presents a satellite picture of nuclear facilities in Natanz, Iran in this July 9, 2003 file photo at a news conference in Berlin.
Note: The site was visited by the IAEA on 5 October 2003. The September 2, 2005 report of the IAEA, states that “the Agency found no nuclear-related activities at Kolahdouz.” It turned out that by the time the inspections took place, the regime had moved the containers, and IAEA inspectors were taken to a similar area in the vicinity.
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October 7, 2003 – NCRI official website published a story titled ‘Secret nuclear site in Isfahan region’
October 14, 2003 – NCRI representatives in London and Vienna unveiled the Iranian regime’s new nuclear base, located 15 km from Isfahan, in a military base.
CNN, 14 October 2003: U.S. officials and international inspectors are looking into an allegation by an Iranian opposition group that Iran is secretly building a uranium enrichment plant near the city of Isfahan… The NCRI said in news conferences in Vienna and London on Tuesday that Iran is building a nuclear-related facility just east of Isfahan.
NTI, 14 October 2003: Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, in responding to an allegation that Iran had been hiding a nuclear facility near Isfahan, tells Reuters, “We have certainly not [hidden any facilities from the IAEA].” National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) opposition group head Firouz Mahvi says, “The site has been built to test centrifuges that enrich uranium.”
The Guardian, October 15, 2003: The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) said the Isfahan Fuel and Research Production centre was designed to run and test up to 180 centrifuges, which had yet to be installed. “The site will be completed in 2006,” Dowlat Nowrouzi, the NCRI’s London representative, said yesterday.
Note: The regime had built the workshop for the centrifuges, but after the revelation, further work was stopped there to avoid detection. The IAEA visited the location, but nothing was detected as the regime had stopped the activity upon being exposed. The NCRI revelation halted Tehran’s effort to expand the centrifuge program.
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November 19, 2003 – The NCRI held a press conference in Vienna, detailing the role of military units and the Revolutionary Guards in uranium enrichment, dedicating several hundred million dollars in budget for this purpose.
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April 28, 2004: At a press conference in Brussels, Mr. Mohammad Mohaddesin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, announced: “In order to keep its nuclear projects secret and to accelerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the mullahs’ regime has placed many of its sites under the control of military agencies and transferred many of its nuclear experts to these agencies.” Mr. Mohaddesin told the press about the dedication of 400 nuclear experts to the Military Industries, exposing the new Center for ‘Readiness and New Defense Technology’ (Lavizan 2)
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Also read other NCRI studies:
Study: Iran’s Military Nuclear Program
Study: Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Timeline of Iran’s Opposition Exposing the Regime’s Terror Networks & Ballistic Missile Projects
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June 2, 2004 – The Secretariat of the NCRI issued a statement about the Iranian regime’s pacing towards nuclear weapons production under the supervision of the Revolutionary Guards. According to the statement, the IRGC is carrying out this project through four military organs, namely the “Center for Modern Defense Training and Technology” (headed by Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi), the New Warfare Headquarters, the Nuclear Research Department of Imam Hussein University (under the command of Brigadier General Fazaeli) and special industries in The Military Industries Organization.
The statement also suggested: “The P2 centrifuge project, the evidence of which was first discovered in one of the regime’s military centers called the Lavizan garrison, is not within the scope of the regime’s Atomic Energy Organization, rather the responsibility has been handed over to the Special Industries Division of the Military Industries Organization. This project is under the supervision of Dr. Ali Pazirandeh (Professor of Nuclear Physics, University of Tehran, who cooperates with special industries) and Dr. Mohammadi, officials of the Defense Industries Organization and a specialist in the construction, assembly, and commissioning of Nazanz centrifuges. The Center for Modern Defense Training and Technology is under the supervision of Brigadier General Dr. Seyed Ali Hosseini Tash and is one of the four military bodies involved in the nuclear weapons production project, which have been under direct control of the Revolutionary Guards since the beginning of this year.”
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September 10, 2004 – At a press conference in Paris, Mohammad Mohaddesin, the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, revealed for the first time the details about the Bandar Abbas nuclear site, the second-largest facility for converting uranium ore to yellowcake. Mr. Mohaddesin also explained about the regime’s dedication of 16 billion dollars to nuclear technology, purchase, and smuggling of Deuterium from Russia, as well as details of the Atomic Energy Organizations’ front companies.
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November 17, 2004 – During a press conference Mr. Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, unveiled a central site of the Iranian regime called the Center for Advanced Defense Training and Technology, which operates directly under Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, one of the Iranian regime’s top nuclear experts. Mr. Mohaddesin also told reporters about the demolition of the Lavizan Shian site by the regime, following its disclosure via the NCRI.
NTI, 17 November 2004: The exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), alleges that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan gave Iran weapons grade uranium and a design for a nuclear bomb. According to the same group, Khan had already given a quantity of HEU (highly enriched uranium) to Iran in 2001. Iran is purportedly also secretly enriching uranium at a military site previously unknown to the IAEA, even though it promised to halt all such work. —Louis Charbonneau, “Iran Got Warhead Design, Bomb-Grade Uranium – Exiles,” Reuters, 17 November 2004
Washington Post, November 18, 2004: On Wednesday, Mohaddessin used satellite photos to pinpoint what he said was the new facility, inside a 60-acre complex in the northeast part of Tehran known as the Center for the Development of Advanced Defense Technology. The group said that the site also houses Iranian chemical and biological weapons programs and that uranium enrichment began there a year and a half ago, to replace a nearby facility that was dismantled in March ahead of a visit by a U.N. inspections team.
NBC News, November 18, 2004: The group, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, or NCRI, also claimed that Iran received blueprints for a Chinese-made bomb in the mid-1990s from the global nuclear technology network led by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
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November 19, 2004 – In another press conference in Paris, Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair revealed the regime’s new Laser Enrichment at the Center for Readiness and New Defense Technology (Lavizan 2) and added that the equipment from razed Lavizan site has been moved to this site.
“In 2000, the Iranian resistance exposed the use of this method (laser enrichment) by the clerical regime, which was operating at a site in Lashkar Abad, Hashtgerd, Karaj,” reporters were told in the conference. “The site used 22kg of natural uranium metal smuggled from the former Soviet Union. The laser enrichment project was subsequently halted at the regime’s Atomic Energy Organization, and the project was transferred to two centers within the Ministry of Defense and the Revolutionary Guards.”
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December 2, 2004: In a press conference in London, Ali Safavi of the NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee unveiled the Iranian regime’s program for long-range missiles and production of nuclear and chemical warheads, at Hemmat Missile Industries. A list of names and details of the complexes involved in the project was made public.
NTI, December 2, 2004: The National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI) opposition group has raised suspicions regarding two covert Iranian military sites where nuclear activities may be taking place, sparking IAEA’s interest to inspect the sites. UN diplomats state that the IAEA lacks the legal authority to search these sites as they may only monitor civilian nuclear programs, and the facilities in question were never declared as nuclear sites. —Louis Charbonneau, “UN Lacks Right to Inspect Sites in Iran – Diplomats,” Reuters, 2 December 2004.
NTI, December 2, 2004: IAEA inspectors seek access to two secret Iranian military sites. Intelligence data suggests the Iranian Ministry of Defense may be working on atomic weapons there. The information is based on satellite photos indicating testing of high explosives, and procurement records showing the purchase of equipment that may be used for uranium enrichment. The two sites are the decades-old Parchin military complex, southeast of Tehran, and a newer facility, Lavizan II, built in northeastern Tehran. Information on the second site was provided by the Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI). —William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, “Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Iran Sites,” The New York Times, 2 December 2004.
New York Times, December 2, 2004: The second site is a relatively new facility, called Lavisan II, built in northeastern Tehran, near the site of an older facility that was dismantled within the past year. The existence of the new facility was highlighted last month by an Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance.
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, Nuclear Policy of Iran (DRAFT REPORT): Furthermore, the NCRI, the Iranian dissident organization, announced that Iran had been testing explosives at Parchin and Lavizan II military bases for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. IAEA inspectors. IAEA inspectors visited the Parchin military complex and found nothing suspicious. Nevertheless, it seems that some doubts still remain, as the IAEA is repeatedly seeking access to these sites to continue its investigation.
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December 8, 2004 – At a meeting in Paris, Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair announced that following the exposure of the regime’s clandestine nuclear projects, Tehran’s security apparatus has started to arrest a large number of employees of its nuclear sites. Hereby, the regime is trying to eliminate risking points and terrorizing staff to prevent further revelations by the resistance that has warned the IAEA and the world.
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February 3, 2005 – At a press conference, Mohammad Mohaddesin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NCRI, revealed the Iranian regime’s secret project to produce Plutonium 210 and Beryllium to make atomic bomb detonators.
NTI, February 3, 2005: The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group, has asserted that Iran has experimented with “a crucial triggering mechanism for a nuclear weapon.” —”Iran Tests Nuclear Trigger Mechanism – Opposition,” Reuters, 3 February 2005.
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March 24, 2005 – In a telephone interview with Reuters, Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the NCRI office in Washington DC revealed that the Iranian regime is engaged in laser enrichment at a secret underground power plant in Parchin.
Boston Globe, March 26, 2005: Alireza Jafarzadeh, who has reported accurately in the past about covert Iranian nuclear activities, said the underground nuclear facility at the Parchin military complex, about 20 miles southeast of Tehran, was built recently under the supervision of the chief engineer of Iran’s aerospace agency, whom he identified by the family name Yadegary. Jafarzadeh also identified the scientist in charge of the laser project as Mohamad Amin Bassam, a physicist who studied laser enrichment at Imam Hussein University in Tehran.
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March 31, 2005 – At a press conference, the NCRI disclosed new details of the Iranian regime’s covert nuclear program to acquire nuclear weapons. Mohammad Mohaddesin revealed that the heavy water production facility in Arak will be put into operation in September 2005. He also unveiled a confidential report from the Iranian regime’s parliament on the topic. It was also revealed at the conference that Khamenei, the regime’s Supreme had allocated $ 2.5 billion last year to acquire three nuclear warheads. The responsibility for this project had been assigned to the Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani and then-head of the regime’s Aerospace Industries Organization, Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi.
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NTI, 20 May 2005: Iranian exile and former National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) spokesperson Alireza Jafarzadeh says Iran’s Defense Ministry is smuggling graphite and graphite compounds, such as ceramic matrix composite (CMC), which could be used to encase a nuclear warhead. Mr. Jafarzadeth adds that a purported steel manufacturing plant near Ardekan is actually a graphite technology plant. Although CMC is a dual-use item, international trading of CMC is prohibited for use in nuclear weapons under the Missile Technology Control Regime. —Tyler Marshall and Sonni Efron, “Iran Said to Smuggle Material for Warheads,” Los Angeles Times, 21 May 2005; “Iran Reportedly Smuggling Nuclear-Related Materials,” Global Security Newswire, 23 May 05.
NBC News, May 20, 2005: With most countries adhering to international agreements banning the sale of such “dual-use” materials to Tehran, Iran has been forced to buy it on the black market, Iranian exile Alireza Jafarzadeh told The Associated Press — allegations confirmed by a senior diplomat familiar with Iran’s covert nuclear activities.
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NTI, 18 July 2005: Mohammad Mohaddessin, chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, warns that Iran’s mullahs have made progress in their pursuit of a nuclear bomb and adds that terrorist and fundamentalist activities will continue. —”Iranian Resistance Warns of Mullahs’ Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Bombs,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 18 July 2005.
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July 28, 2005 – At a press conference in Paris, the Iranian Resistance unveiled in detail the Iranian regime’s efforts to obtain Maraging steel.
Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2005: In allegations to be made public in Paris today, the NCRI also names front companies in Germany, Russia, Japan and the United Arab Emirates that it claims Iran is using to import maraging steel. The group also claims that a research laboratory affiliated with Iran’s Defense Ministry is working on producing the steel domestically. NCRI has periodically made claims about Iran’s nuclear program, some of which the IAEA has verified.
NTI, July 28, 2005: Mr. Mohaddessin claims the steel is illegally smuggled to Iran from other countries by the Iranian Defense Ministry imports, the Iranian National Steel Company (NSC) and its Director General, Amir Harati. Mr. Mohaddessin accuses the regime of using different front companies to illegally purchase Maraging Steel, such as ASCOTEC, in Iran, Germany and the United Arab Emirates, and ICS in Russia. — “Iran Secretly Acquiring Super-Strong Steel for Nuclear Bomb – Exile,” Iran Focus, 28 July 2005; “Iran After Obtaining Maraging Steel to Build Nuclear Bomb Casing,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 28 July 2005.
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August 9, 2005 – In an interview with reporters, Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed that the Iranian regime has secretly built 4,000 centrifuges.
CBS News, August 9, 2005: Alireza Jafarzadeh told The Associated Press the centrifuges — which he said are unknown to the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency — are ready to be installed at Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz.
In June 2004, diplomats told AP in Vienna that Iran had acknowledged inquiring about 4,000 magnets needed for uranium enrichment equipment with a European black-market supplier and had dangled the possibility of buying a “higher number.” It was unclear whether the magnets were intended for use in the 4,000 centrifuges Jafarzadeh cited. A month later, in July 2004, Iran confirmed it had resumed building centrifuges, although it said it had not restarted uranium enrichment.
New York Times, August 10, 2005: The dissident, Alireza Jafarzadeh, said in a telephone interview from Washington that the centrifuges were ready to be installed at Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz. The centrifuges were produced in two different places, he said, including a facility in Isfahan at Malek Ashtar University.
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The Guardian, Aug 19, 2005: In London yesterday the Iranian activists said Tehran has been fooling the UN and the EU by secretly constructing some 4,000 centrifuges while pursuing negotiations.
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August 22, 2005 – The Iranian regime’s nuclear program and its ominous intentions were exposed in a press conference in the Canadian Parliament by Shahram Golestaneh, President of the Committee in Defense of Human Rights in Iran. Mr. David Kilgour, an independent member of the Canadian Parliament also raised alarm on the regime’s nuclear threat. The role of the Malek Ashtar University in Tehran was central to Golestaneh’s revelations based on information obtained by the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The Malek Ashtar University is one of the main research centers for the regime’s nuclear program and its secret nuclear activities is overseen by Revolutionary Guard Brigadier General Hossein Tash.
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August 25, 2005 – At a press conference in Brussels, the NCRI revealed new aspects of the Iranian regime’s covert nuclear weapons activities. In another press conference in Oslo, Mr. Parviz Khazaei, the NCRI representative in the Nordic countries, described the Iranian regime’s efforts to set up a heavy-water center in Arak to obtain plutonium, as well as the regime’s efforts to obtain tritium.
UPI, August 25, 2005: “While the international community has been focused on stopping the clerical regime’s fuel cycle involving uranium enrichment, Tehran has been working at full speed to obtain a heavy water reactor in Arak and plutonium as the main element for a nuclear bomb,” said Ali Safavi, a member of the NCRI’s foreign affairs committee.
The opposition grouping, which is engaged in a fierce lobbying campaign to get the Mujahideen removed from EU and U.S. blacklists, also revealed details of Tehran’s attempts to get its hands on tritium — a substance that greatly increases the explosive power of a bomb. The IAEA has barred Iran from obtaining the material, but the NCRI claims the clerical regime has set up a front company to smuggle it in from South Korea. The NCRI has revealed 15 nuclear sites in Iran since 2000 and information gathered by its high-placed “moles” within the regime has been used by intelligence services in Europe and the United States.
NTI, August 25, 2005: The National Council of the Resistance of Iran alleges that the Arak nuclear site “will be ready in 2008 – seven years before Tehran’s official forecasts – to produce 14 kg of plutonium.” —”French Report: Exiled Opposition Claims Iran Closer to Nuclear Weapons Goal,” Pairs Le Figaro, 26 August 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050826338006.
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August 26, 2005 – Alireza Jafarzadeh spoke at a press conference in Washington about the regime’s efforts to obtain cruise missiles technology with a range of 3,000 kilometers and the ability to carry a nuclear warhead. Simultaneously, at a conference in Rome, Mr. Mahmoud Hakamian, a member of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee exposed the regime’s covert activities in obtaining dual-use tritium.
NTI, August 29, 2005: Former representative of Iranian dissident group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, Alireza Jafarzadeh, alleges Iran’s revolutionary guard commander secretly met with A.Q. Khan to “acquire nuclear-capable missiles with a range of 1,800 miles.” In addition, Jafarzadeh claims Mohammad Reza Ayatollahi, then deputy director of Iran’s Atomic Energy Oraganization (AEO), and Seyyed Mohammad Haj Saeed, chief of the Directorate of Research of the AEO, also met with Khan. — “Iran’s Nuke Missiles” UPI, 29 August 2005.
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August 30, 2005 – At a press conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, Parviz Khazaei, the NCRI representative in the Nordic countries, revealed two other aspects of the regime’s covert efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Mr. Khazaei laid out the details of the clerical regime’s efforts to obtain tritium and the continuation of the Arak project to accelerate the acquisition of plutonium for use in the atomic bomb.
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September 1, 2005 – At a press conference in London, Hossein Abedini, a member of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee said: “The Iranian regime is working hard to obtain the metal beryllium and has recently smuggled significant quantities of this metal into the country.”
September 1, 2005 – In a press conference in Stockholm, Sweden, Parviz Khazaei, NCRI representative in the Nordic countries, exposed the smuggling of beryllium metal and also disclosed information about some labs that work for the IRGC as well as the Ministry of Defense producing the drug and the cover company that is smuggling it.
NTI, September 1, 2005: National Council of Resistance of Iran member Hussein Abedini alleges Iranian company Madj Gostar imported 20 kilograms of beryllium from China last year. – “Iran took Chinese Beryllium for Nuclear Weapons,” Pravda, 1 September 2005.
SverigesRadio, September 2, 2005: Speaking here in Stockholm Thursday, the main Iranian opposition group charged that the country’s Islamic regime has smuggled materials to use to make nuclear bombs. Perviz Khazai, an official in the Scandinavian branch of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, says last year Tehran smuggled 20 kilos of Beryllium from China. Beryllium is a high-melting, lightweight metal that can function as a neutron reflector surrounding the fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
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Gulfnews, September 14, 2005: “In order to enrich uranium to weapons grade, the Iranian regime has been concentrating on … manufacturing some 5,000 centrifuge machines,’ Ali Safavi, an NCRI official, told a news conference in Brussels. Centrifuges purify uranium for use in nuclear power plants of weapons. A commercial enrichment plant typically has tens of thousands of centrifuges so 5,000 would be relatively small.
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September 16, 2005 – At a press conference with Patrick Clawson, Alireza Jafarzadeh, Paul Leventhal, and Raymond Tanter, major evidence was presented about the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons program.
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September 20, 2005: At a press conference in Vienna, Austria at a press conference in Vienna, Shahin Ghobadi, a member of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee exposed the Iranian regime’s use of nuclear warheads on long-range advanced gyroscopes.
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September 22, 2005 – At a press conference in Brussels, Mohammad Mohaddesin, head of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee presented a comprehensive report on the Iranian regime’s secret nuclear program to members of the press. This data set consisted of 7 sections and was based on a thousand reports. These reports proved that the regime’s nuclear activities revolved around the nuclear fuel cycle, the construction of bombs, nuclear warheads, and missile launchers. This report clearly showed the role of the Revolutionary Guards in directing and controlling the Iranian regime’s nuclear programs.
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NTI, 5 October 2005: According to allegations made by the Iranian opposition group, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad places the military in control of the country’s nuclear program. Commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also take charge of the National Security Council’s internal security, strategy and political posts. —David Sands, “Army Takes Control of Iran Nukes,” Washington Times, 5 October 2005.
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NTI, November 11, 2005: At a European Parliament conference Mohammad Mohaddessin, chair of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, alleges that the “Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is determined to pursue and complete Tehran’s nuclear weapons program full blast…[and] would have the bomb in two- or three-years’ time.” —”Mullah’s Leader Determined to Complete Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Program – Mohaddessin,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 11 November 2005.
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November 21, 2005 – At a press conference in Washington D.C., Alireza Jafarzadeh presented new documents detailing the extensive tunneling system around Tehran, the companies, the officials, and organizations involved in the missile project.
ABC News, November 21, 2005: Speaking this morning at the National Press Club, Jafarzadeh described an “extensive large-scale operation” for the development of nuclear-capable missiles “in the most sophisticated, hidden way” in tunnels in a mountain range east of Tehran. Jafarzadeh named several Iranian entities involved in Iran’s missile program, overseen by the Hemmat Industries Group. He said that eyewitnesses describe the facilities, begun in 1989, as an “underground township.” Jafarzadeh added that, in addition to work on the Shahab family of missiles, Hemmat is overseeing work on a new long-range missile, Ghadar, which is still in development and has a projected range of 1,300 to 1,900 miles.
UPI, November 21, 2005: North Korean experts have cooperated with the Tehran regime in the design and building of this complex,” said Alireza Jafarzadeh, president of Strategic Policy Consulting, and a former representative of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq. “Many blueprints of the site have been prepared by North Korean experts.
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November 23, 2005 – At a press conference in Vienna, Austria, the National Council of Resistance of Iran exposed the Iranian regime’s deceptive plans to conceal its nuclear activities. “Following the revelation last year by the NCRI about particular nuclear activities on military sites, including the Parchin and Shiyan Lavizan sites, the Iranian regime has made every effort to prevent the IAEA inspectors to identify its activities,” Ali Safavi said at the press conference. “The regime has practically allowed only limited inspections of one part of the Parchin site, while the Parchin is divided into 12 sections, known as the Twelve Plans.”
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December 8, 2005 – At a press conference at the Grand Hotel Oslo, Parviz Khazaei, NCRI representative in the Nordic countries, presented documents and slides related to the regime’s nuclear sites, revealing the latest information and evidence about the regime’s nuclear project and described the terrorist and nuclear threats of the Iranian regime. The conference was attended by members of the Norwegian Parliament Defense Committee Bjorn Jacobson, Foreign Affairs Committee member Morten Høglund, former MP Ingold Goodall, and former MP Lars Rise.
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December 20, 2005 – The NCRI held two press conferences in London and Paris. In the French capital, Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, detailed underground facilities that have been built in at least 14 sites near Tehran, Isfahan, and Qom. He noted that construction had begun in 2000 by a specialist engineering division of the IRGC. Nearly four years after the NCRI’s press conference, US President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed the existence of the same secret site, Fordow. Their joint press conference on September 25, 2009, took place only after Iranian authorities acknowledged its existence to the IAEA, recognizing that the NCRI’s revelations had rendered Fordow an open secret.
Hossein Abedini, NCRI Foreign Committee member in the UK, unveiled the regime’s extensive tunneling networks in the Parchin and Khojeer regions of Tehran as well as in the cities of Qom and Isfahan.
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January 10, 2006 – Citing information obtained from the Iranian Resistance sources inside the country, Alireza Jafarzadeh told at a press conference that the Iranian regime has continued uranium enrichment in Natanz while preparing 5,000 centrifuges for installation at the site. He also revealed two main companies building the Natanz site, naming Tose’eh Silo Company and the Sazeh Pardaz Company of Iran. Former National Security Council staff, Raymond Tanter contributed to the conference as well.
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January 20, 2006 – At a press conference in the British House of Commons, Dawlat Nowruzi, the NCRI representative in the UK, said: “The mullahs’ regime has succeeded in obtaining two types of equipment, the Hot Iso-static Press and the Hot Press, to shape enriched uranium as part of the production of the atomic bomb and both of these machines are banned items. These machines are able to use simultaneously pressure and heat to produce uranium spheres for production of the nuclear bomb.”
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January 31, 2006 – Alireza Jafarzadeh and former US National Security Staff, Raymond Tanter disclosed IRGC plans to construct a top-secret tunnel as part of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.
NTI, February 1, 2006: Former chief spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Alireza Jafarzadeh alleges that the Iranian military is working through a front company to build a “top-secret” tunnel in northeast Tehran. Allegedly, the tunnel is meant to further Iran’s nuclear weapons research and development activities while shifting most of its operations underground. —Joe Fiorill, “Iran resistance alleges more nuclear tunnel work,” Global Security Newswire, 1 February 2006
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March 3, 2006 – Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed new details of the Iranian regime’s missile program. Providing what he said were secret details of those missile programs, Alireza Jafarzadeh told the AP Thursday that Iran had “significantly increased the production line” of its Shahab 3 missiles last year, and was now turning out 90 a year — more than four times its previous production rate.
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March 12, 2006 – The Iranian Resistance unveiled a secret plot by the Iranian regime in northern Tehran.
The Telegraph, March 12, 2006: Iran’s leaders have built a secret underground emergency command centre in Teheran as they prepare for a confrontation with the West over their illicit nuclear programme, the Sunday Telegraph has been told. The complex of rooms and offices beneath the Abbas Abad district in the north of the capital is designed to serve as a bolthole and headquarters for the country’s rulers as military tensions mount… The opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) learnt about the complex from its contacts within the regime. The same network revealed in 2002 that Iran had been operating a secret nuclear programme for 18 years.
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March 20, 2006 – In a conference at the National Press Club in Washington DC, Alireza Jafarzadeh explained about IRGC Imam Hossein University’s role in the regime’s clandestine nuclear weapons program.
ABC News (Australia), March 20, 2006: Alireza Jafarzadeh, former spokesman for the The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of an armed resistance exile group, says that 21 professors and researchers of Imam Hossein University in Tehran are involved in the program.
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April 27, 2006 – At a major press conference in Paris, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mohammad Mohaddesin informed French and international media reporters about the Iranian regime’s secret project to acquire P-2 centrifuges and its efforts to obtain an implant-type atomic bomb.
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August 24, 2006 – During a major press conference in Paris, Mohammad Mohaddesin revealed the assembly centers for P2 centrifuges, saying: “According to the information obtained by the Iranian resistance, at least fifteen P2 centrifuges have been assembled and are currently being tested.” At this conference, the names of the companies involved in covering the nuclear facilities for the Iranian regime and the addresses of these companies were revealed.
NTI, August 25, 2006: The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group and the political wing of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, alleges that Iran has built 15 advanced uranium centrifuges of the P-2 type and will have hundreds more by next year. —Craig S. Smith, “Foes say Tehran builds Fast Uranium Centrifuges,” New York Times, 25 August 2006
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September 14, 2006 – At a major press conference in New York, Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed new details of the Iranian regime’s covert laser enrichment activities, announcing the names of enrichment sites and 28 operatives.
NTI, September 14, 2006: The Washington Post claims that Iran may be experimenting with the enrichment of uranium using laser technology. According to Alireza Jafarzadeh, who heads the Washington-based Strategic Policy Consulting Inc., an Iranian opposition group, says that Iran is secretly conducting laser enrichment activities at Lashkar Ab’ad and is using “every possibility that is available to them to rush to the bomb.” —Edith M. Lederer, “Opposition: Iran Using Laser Enrichment,” Washington Post, 14 September 2006
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February 22, 2007 – In a press conference in Paris, Afshin Alavi, member of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee told reporters that by changing the names and addresses of companies, the Iranian regime attempts to conceal its nuclear activities from the eyes of the IAEA and to neutralizing the UN Security Council sanctions.
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August 22, 2007 – Alireza Jafarzadeh explained at a press conference at the Willard InterContinental Hotel in Washington DC about the mullahs ‘extensive efforts to acquire nuclear, microbial, and chemical weapons, which former president Rafsanjani described as a “strategic guarantee of survival” for mullahs’ rule.
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September 27, 2007 – In a press conference in Paris on Thursday, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed details of a secret nuclear site under construction in Iran. Mr. Mehdi Abrishamchi, Chairman of the NCRI’s Peace Committee disclosed details about a new site, five kilometers south of Natanz site, near a small village called Abbas-Abad.
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November 14, 2007 – The NCRI reported about a series of explosions at Parchin military site (where missiles, including Cruise missiles, are manufactured) in southern Tehran.
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Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2007: The Iranian opposition group that first exposed Iran’s nuclear-fuel program said a U.S. intelligence analysis is correct that Tehran shut down its weaponization program in 2003, but claims that the program was relocated and restarted in 2004.
The claim, to be made public today by the National Council for Resistance in Iran, joins a broad pushback by conservative hawks who say the U.S. analysis has wrongly given the impression that Iran’s nuclear-fuel program doesn’t present an urgent threat.
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February 20, 2008 – At a press conference in Brussels, Belgium, Mohammad Mohaddesin, the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair revealed two separate parts of the Iranian regime’s nuclear military research centers.
Reuters, February 20, 2008: An Iranian opposition group called on Wednesday for the U.N. nuclear watchdog to immediately inspect facilities in Iran which it said were at the core of an accelerated nuclear weapons programme. The National Council of Resistance of Iran dismissed a December U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that Tehran stopped trying to make a nuclear warhead in 2003, shortly after the group first revealed the country’s nuclear enrichment activity. It charged that Iran had established a new command and control centre for the programme coded-named Lavizan-2 at Mojdeh on the southeastern outskirts of Tehran last April, near the site of a previous facility razed after its exposure.
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The Sunday Times, March 23, 2008: The National Council of Resistance of Iran, a coalition of groups opposed to the regime in Tehran, was the first to identify Fakhrizadeh, 47, as one of the leading figures in Iran’s nuclear programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also named him as the man it would most like to interview about the programme, adding that despite repeated requests the Iranian government has refused access.
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Reuters, September 24, 2009: An exiled Iranian opposition group said on Thursday it had identified two previously unknown sites where it said Iran is working on developing high-explosive detonators for use in atomic bombs. The Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) said the sites were part of a unit affiliated with Iran’s ministry of defence called “Research Center for Explosion and Impact”, known under its Farsi language abbreviation Metfaz.
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September 27, 2009 – The NCRI published a report about the IAEA’s negligence and indecision to investigate underground nuclear facilities near the city of Qom that were unveiled in a press conference in Paris by the Iranian Resistance on December 20, 2005 and also later exposed by leaders of the United States, France, and Britain on September 25, 2009.
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NCRI website citing AFP, November 4, 2009: Iran has been building secret nuclear weapons labs separate from its uranium enrichment sites since as early as 2000, the country’s main opposition group in exile claimed Tuesday… On Tuesday, at a press conference in Paris, the movement gave what it said were more details of Tehran’s alleged attempt to construct a nuclear warhead, claiming to have evidence that the work goes back more than eight years.
NCRI website citing AP, November 4, 2009: Abrichamtchi said his group had signaled the existence of the METFAZ site, in a military area near the town of Sanjarian, to the International Atomic Energy Agency but had received no response.
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October 28, 2009 – The NCRI website published a report, unveiling information that the Iranian regime has tested missiles with a range of 3,000 km, capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
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December 16, 2009 – The NCRI website published a report, revealing that the Iranian regime has tested a missile with a 2,500 km range, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
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Reuters, July 5, 2010: Sanctions imposed on Iran over the past four years are having a direct impact on its nuclear programme and causing widespread bank liquidity problems, according to an exiled Iranian opposition group. Citing intelligence gathered in Iran in the last four months, The National Council of Resistance of Iran, a Paris-based group that says it has many followers in Iran, said Tehran was struggling to get equipment for its Natanz enrichment facility.
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September 9, 2010 – In a press conference at the National Press Club of Washington DC, the Iranian Resistance revealed exclusive details on a major top-secret and strategic nuclear site in the town of Abyek, 120 kilometers west of the Iranian capital, Tehran. Soona Samsami named Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi as top officials involved in a project where the Iranian regime is secretly building a uranium enrichment site near Qazvin, 120 km west of Tehran.
CNN, September 9, 2010: Supporters of an Iranian opposition group announced Thursday that they have “exclusive” details on a major top-secret strategic nuclear enrichment site buried deep in a mountain northwest of Tehran… Jafarzadeh said that Iran’s Ministry of Defense has taken “extraordinary concealment measures to avoid its detection. He said the site, codenamed 311 by the Iranians, is “far more important” than a site disclosed earlier near the holy Iranian city of Qom.
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April 7, 2011 – Soona Samsami and Alireza Jafarzadeh issued a statement to reveal the Iranian regime’s clandestine “TABA” site that is used for the production of centrifuge parts.
Washington Post, April 7, 2011: The National Council of Resistance of Iran said the alleged plant makes centrifuge parts for Iran’s uranium enrichment program and is closely tied to Iran’s Defense Ministry. The dissident group also claimed that Iran already has made components for 100,000 centrifuge machines, far more than is needed to supply the country’s known uranium facilities.
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November 8, 2011 – The Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran issued a statement and announced: ” The project to acquire a nuclear weapon is controlled in a headquarters headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahanadi. The name of this center is constantly changed to keep secret its activities. Numerous documents proving that the Iranian regime pursues acquiring nuclear weapons carry signatures of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and are kept in a center named ‘Amad’ (logistics). The ‘Amad’ center or ‘Mojdeh site’ is the same center that since March 2011 has been named as SEPAND (New Defense Researches Organization) and functions under IRGC supervision.
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May 11, 2012 – The Iranian Resistance revealed 7 divisions and 60 experts and commanders involved in the research and design of the regime’s nuclear bomb project.
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July 11, 2013 – The Iranian Resistance unveiled a new nuclear site codenamed “East Mine”, located in a series of tunnels under a mountain near the city of Damavand in the north of Tehran.
The Times, July 12, 2013: Iran is secretly developing a new nuclear site in mountain tunnels north of Tehran, according to an exiled Iranian opposition group. The large building project will stir suspicions that the Iranian regime is planning to make its nuclear development safe from any air attack.
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October 11, 2013 – The Iranian Resistance held a press conference in Paris to expose the latest intelligence about the Iranian regime’s relocation of a nuclear defense site to deceive the international community and sidestep any potential visit by the UN nuclear watchdog. Mr. Mehdi Abrishamchi, head of the NCRI Peace Committee told reporters: “The religious fascism in Iran has called for a new defense research organization called Sepand, which is the center for research and design of the nuclear bomb project.”
The Peninsula, October 2013: The Paris-based NCRI, citing information from sources inside Iran, said a nuclear weaponisation research and planning centre it called SPND was being moved to a large, secure site in a defence ministry complex in Tehran about 1.5km away from its former location.
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November 18, 2013: At a press conference in Paris, Mr. Mehdi Abrishamchi, the NCRI Peace Committee Chair revealed the existence of another undeclared nuclear site. With the code name “012”, the site is located 10 km from Mobarakeh city, in the center of Markazi province of Iran.
Express Tribune, November 18, 2013: The Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran said its sources in the country had confirmed the existence of the military site, codenamed “012”, but the group said it could not be certain of what was happening inside the highly secure area… The site was located inside a 600-metre (650-yard) tunnel, contained four galleries and was heavily guarded, he said… The NCRI said its information was based on “multiple intelligence assets… inside Iran,” including “dozens of sources within the clerical regime,” Abrishamchi said.
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October 8, 2014 – At a press conference in Paris, Afshin Alavi, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee member said the nuclear weaponization research and planning center called the Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) was shifted in July to a secure site in a defense ministry complex about 1.5 km (1 mile) from its former location. “Managers and key services were relocated to secret locations, while some administrative officials were left in place to deceive IAEA inspectors,” said dissident leader Afchine Alavi.
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November 7, 2014 – The NCRI office in Washington DC held a press conference to reveal new details of the clerical regime’s nuclear cover-ups at the Parchin military facility and the secret installation of explosive tanks at the facility. Mrs. Soona Samsami told reporters in Washington about a special chamber to conduct testing of high explosives linked to setting off a nuclear explosion as well as a second chamber that was also built, with its present location unknown. Both structures were constructed by a company affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
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Foxnews, January 13, 2015: Twenty-one commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are the top scientists running Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program, says the man who exposed Iran’s nuclear weapons program in 2002. On top of that, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate published last week saying Tehran shut down its weaponization program in 2003 failed to mention that the program restarted in mid-2004, said Alireza Jafarzadeh, an Iranian dissident and president of Strategic Policy Consulting.
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February 24, 2015 – At a press conference at the National Club of Journalists in Washington, the Iranian Resistance exposed the new nuclear site of the Iranian regime and revealed new details about Lavizan 3 underground nuclear series.
Washington Post, February 25, 2015: The National Council of Resistance of Iran said underground labs in suburban Tehran have been used since 2008 to enrich uranium. It said the plant, named Lavizan-3 after the neighborhood where many officers and their families live, is reached through tunnels leading from under a building ostensibly used to process passports and identity cards.
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May 28, 2015 – By holding two press conferences in Paris, the Iranian resistance revealed new dimensions of the extensive cooperation between the Iranian regime and the North Korean government producing nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, as well as the dispatch of expert delegations that took place until late April 2015.
Reuters, May 28, 2015: Citing information from sources inside Iran, including within Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Paris-based NCRI said a seven-person North Korean Defense Ministry team was in Iran during the last week of April. This was the third time in 2015 that North Koreans had been to Iran and a nine-person delegation was due to return in June, it said.
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September 4, 2015 – The NCRI announced in a statement: Tehran is working with North Korean experts to deceive the United Nations nuclear inspectors visiting suspected Iranian sites. According to the statement, the Iranian regime has been working for some time to find ways to hide the military dimension of its nuclear projects from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), seeking Pyongyang advice. Several North Korean officials have set up workshops in Tehran and have remained there even after the signing of the nuclear deal.
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December 2, 2015 – The NCRI disclosed the Iranian regime’s secret committee to deceive IAEA on PMD Probe. The Iranian Resistance has examined an example of the regime’s deceptive plans in response to the IAEA, citing the regime’s scheme to address the so-called EBW detonators, trying to pretend the explosive detonators were intended for the oil and gas industry.
According to extensive research by the Iranian Resistance from dozens of sources, the National Iranian Drilling Company, which is responsible for drilling oil and gas wells, has not yet received a single sample of the detonator made by the Ministry of Defense, and the regime’s responses to the IAEA are false. The regime has also sought to deny documents related to the IAEA, specifically linking research on this type of detonator to the Physics Research Center (formerly known as the Atomic Weapons Authority).
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April 21, 2017 – The NCRI representative office in Washington DC held a press conference at the Willard Hotel to reveal new aspects of the clerical regime’s nuclear bomb program and Tehran’s continued efforts to design and build an atomic bomb after the JCPOA was signed.
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October 13, 2017 – The NCRI representative office in Washington published a new 52-page book entitled ” Iran’s Nuclear Core: Uninspected Military Sites, Vital to the Nuclear Weapons Program” about the facilities and headquarters related to the nuclear military project and the regime’s military sites.
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October 16, 2020 – The NCRI representative office in Washington disclosed new information about a new center and continued activities of the regime’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).
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March 2, 2021 – The NCRI published new information about the Iranian regime’s Abadeh nuclear site.
Foxnews, March 4, 2021: As part of its findings, the NCRI said the site was first built by companies controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was part of a project named Marivan, which it said involved a group called METFAZ that was engaged “in the research and construction of nuclear high explosive-devices.”