International Inspectors Are Unable to Verify Iran Regime's Compliance With Nuclear Deal
NCRI - The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has admitted that his agency is now unable to verify Iran's compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, less than two weeks before the US’s certification deadline.
Yukiya Amano said that the IAEA just doesn't have the means to ensure that the Iranian Regime is not engaged in nuclear-related activities that are banned under Section T of Annex I of the nuclear deal, including creating computer simulations of nuclear explosions and designing multi-point explosive detonation systems.
He said: “In other sections, for example, Iran has committed to submit declarations, place their activities under safeguards or ensure access by us. But in Section T I don’t see any (such commitment).”
This revelation, which is not at all shocking to those who have been following news of the deal closely, should give Donald Trump all the incentive that he needs in order to decertify Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal on October 15.
After all, the Corker-Cardin legislation, which binds the deal in the US, requires that the president must be certain that “Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement”.
If the IAEA can’t verify Iran's compliance with Section T, then Trump can’t confirm that Iran is “fully implementing the agreement”.
Also, Section T is vital to the nuclear deal (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of JCPOA) as explained by David Albright, a former weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security, and Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director-general of the IAEA, in a paper published in August.
Under Section T, the IAEA can (and should) demand access to military sites, where Iran likely did its nuclear weapons research, even without suspicions that Iran is violating the deal. How can you verify compliance if you allow the mullahs time to sweep everything under the rug?
Albright and Heinonen wrote that compliance with the terms of Section T is “analogous to verifying that allowed activities and equipment are not misused, as is common to many aspects of IAEA safeguards at declared nuclear sites”.
Earlier in September, Amano was attacked by a senior Iranian official for asserting that the IAEA could demand access to military sites.
Ali Akbar Velayati said that Amano “fabricated” this right, only days after the IAEA had previously verified Iran as compliant with the deal, which makes you think that they definitely have something to hide in those sites.