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Following the IAEA Board of Governors’ November 21 resolution condemning Iran for failing to cooperate with international nuclear inspections, the Iranian regime has adopted a dual messaging strategy, oscillating between threats and conciliatory remarks. This well-practiced “good cop, bad cop” approach aims to counter firm international policies while exposing Tehran’s fear of real consequences for its actions.
However, the regime’s contradictory reactions reveal a striking inconsistency: they seem to have forgotten that they are discussing a nuclear program they have spent decades portraying to the world as being solely for “peaceful purposes.”
Hours after the resolution’s adoption, Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced the immediate activation of advanced centrifuges and a significant increase in uranium enrichment. Kamalvandi characterized these moves as part of Tehran’s “compensatory measures” in response to what he called “a political, unrealistic, and destructive” resolution. A joint statement from Iran’s Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Organization reinforced this position, signaling the regime’s intent to escalate its nuclear activities further.
#Iran News: Larijani Claims Tehran Can Achieve Military #Nuclear Readiness in 24 Hourshttps://t.co/KtTUnFtBPs
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 19, 2024
Amid these threats, Ali Larijani, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, introduced a different tone. Larijani, a former parliament speaker and potential successor to Ali-Akbar Ahmadian as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, suggested on social media that the regime is open to negotiating a “new agreement” if the United States meets its demands, including “compensation for damages” and additional concessions. He also emphasized that Iran has already enriched uranium above 60%, framing this as a pressure point to force Western nations into compliance.
Ali Larijani explicitly framed his remarks as an ultimatum, suggesting that if the U.S. wants Iran to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, it must meet Tehran’s demands for “compensation” and other concessions to reach a “new agreement.”
Larijani’s remarks, however, align with the regime’s broader strategy of employing dual messaging to stall international pressure. His public overtures are designed to project a willingness to negotiate while maintaining Tehran’s defiant posture. As Larijani stated in an interview with Khamenei.ir, “If the West cannot accept the JCPOA, Iran is prepared for a new deal.” Such statements underscore a defensive approach rather than a genuine interest in diplomacy, revealing the regime’s fear of accountability.
Kazem Gharibabadi, the regime’s representative to international organizations in Vienna, warned that Tehran is prepared to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism is activated. “This is a decision that the system made years ago, and it was communicated in writing by the president of the Islamic Republic to European leaders,” Gharibabadi stated. He emphasized that snapback sanctions would provoke a swift and comprehensive response, describing such a scenario as a mutual threat to both Iran and Europe.
In light of @iaeaorg BoG resolution on the #Iranian regime's misconduct and failure to cooperate with the @UN watchdog, it's crucial to revisit over 3 decades of secretive activities and the NCRI's constant efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed pariah state.https://t.co/EiJenAsaiU https://t.co/lvD6qbumiY pic.twitter.com/qcXZLwOPO7
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 5, 2024
On Friday, November 22, Mohammad Reza Hamedi, the Friday prayer leader of Pardisan in Qom, publicly called on the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revise his purported fatwa against nuclear weapons. Hamedi argued that the geopolitical landscape has shifted and claimed, “If our enemies possess nuclear warheads in rows, we humbly request a reconsideration of the nuclear fatwa from His Eminence.”
On November 20, a day before the resolution was passed, Fereydoon Abbasi, a former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, warned on state television that the regime would increase uranium enrichment to 90%, weapons-grade level. “We must conduct neutron measurements at the highest levels in the country,” he said, adding, “We must develop a small reactor using high enrichment to achieve repeatable systems.” This statement aligns with a growing chorus of Iranian officials openly advocating for nuclear weapons capability as a “necessity” for the regime.
In contrast, Mohsen Naziri Asl, the regime’s ambassador to the IAEA, described the resolution as “unconstructive” but emphasized that Iran would act “responsibly” and avoid “provocative measures.” Similarly, Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi suggested that “the door to negotiations with the United States remains open.”
The IAEA’s resolution, adopted in response to Iran’s refusal to cooperate with investigations into undeclared nuclear sites, has intensified speculation about referring Tehran’s nuclear file back to the UN Security Council. The activation of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism would reinstate pre-2015 UN sanctions and mark a turning point in global efforts to hold the regime accountable.
Tehran’s contradictory responses to the IAEA resolution reveal a regime that is both emboldened by years of Western appeasement and terrified of real repercussions. The dual messaging is not a sign of strength but a defensive ploy aimed at delaying firm international actions. The IAEA’s resolution has exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities, signaling the urgency for the international community to move beyond failed strategies of engagement.
As the world approaches critical decisions on the regime’s nuclear program, a united and decisive stance is essential. Accountability for Tehran’s violations must become the cornerstone of global policy, dismantling the regime’s narrative of inevitability and forcing it to confront the consequences of its defiance. The time to act is now.
