{"id":233324,"date":"2021-01-18T14:08:35","date_gmt":"2021-01-18T19:08:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=233324"},"modified":"2023-02-01T05:21:37","modified_gmt":"2023-02-01T04:21:37","slug":"iran-eus-appeasement-policy-and-its-consequences","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/human-rights\/iran-eus-appeasement-policy-and-its-consequences\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran: EU\u2019s Appeasement Policy and Its Consequences"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Iran-EU-relations-15122020-2\"<\/a><\/p>\n

The international response to recent crises has made it clear that the myth of Iranian moderation is alive. Much of the European countries remain amenable to the idea of negotiating with some representatives of the Iranian regime, on the assumption that they also represent a faction that is at odds with hardliners like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC<\/a>). But that assumption is groundless, and Tehran\u2019s continued exploitation of foreign interlocutors should make it clear that the assumption is harmful to global security.<\/p>\n

When the current president of the regime, Hassan Rouhani, was elected in 2013, many Western policymakers embraced it as a sign that substantial reform was pending in the country. Some even portrayed the election as a sort of delayed triumph for the 2009 protests that erupted four years earlier after the disputed reelection of Rouhani\u2019s predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Those protests were brutally suppressed, and the people\u2019s demands were rejected out of hand. Rouhani\u2019s election came as a surprise because the intervening four years produced no meaningful changes which suggested that the stage had been set for moderate leadership.<\/p>\n

This should have been recognized as a clue that Rouhani\u2019s moderate credentials were illusory. But even among those who failed to recognize the preexisting signs of his adherence to hardline principles, there should have been a rapid loss of faith in moderation after his first year in office failed to demonstrate follow-through on any of his promised reforms. Yet some in the West contented themselves with the belief that Tehran was moving toward compromise in the nuclear sphere, and that once this was achieved it would herald broader change.<\/p>\n

A nuclear deal did finally arrive on the scene in 2015, but it was rightly derided by serious critics of the Iranian regime for giving away sanctions relief to the mullahs in exchange for limited, short-term restrictions on nuclear enrichment, and no further transparency on the past military dimensions of the nuclear program. But while the preamble of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action promised that it would contribute to a more peaceful environment in the Middle East, its implementation coincided with the ongoing escalation of Iran\u2019s regional meddling.<\/p>\n

Domestic conditions in Iran didn\u2019t show any signs of progress during Rouhani\u2019s first term, either. Instead, the era seemed to soon be defined by increased repression of political dissent and free expression in general.<\/p>\n

Near the end of Rouhani\u2019s first term, a leaked audio recording from 1988 made it widely known that his first Justice Minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi<\/a>, had played a major role in that year\u2019s massacre<\/a> of 30,000 political prisoners. Pourmohammadi would go on to publicly declare that he felt proud to have helped carry out \u201cGod\u2019s command\u201d by executing the main targets of that massacre, members of the People\u2019s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI-MEK<\/a>). Although he was removed from his position ahead of Rouhani\u2019s second term, he has otherwise faced no consequences, and he was promptly replaced by Alireza Avaiee<\/a>, another participant in the same massacre.<\/p>\n

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Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi defends Iran's 1988 massacre<\/div><\/div>
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