{"id":238490,"date":"2021-04-24T08:09:22","date_gmt":"2021-04-24T13:09:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=238490"},"modified":"2023-02-01T04:57:56","modified_gmt":"2023-02-01T03:57:56","slug":"iran-regimes-expanded-uranium-enrichment-needs-firm-response","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/nuclear\/iran-regimes-expanded-uranium-enrichment-needs-firm-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran Regime\u2019s Expanded Uranium Enrichment Needs Firm Response"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Iran<\/p>\n

Concerns over the Iranian regime\u2019s potential nuclear weapons capability have naturally intensified following the regime\u2019s announcement that it had expanded uranium enrichment to 60 percent<\/a>. For some policymakers in the countries that signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, those concerns increase the urgency of restoring the landmark nuclear agreement to full force. But this is exactly the wrong conclusion to derive from the regime\u2019s provocations. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union should instead respond by increasing pressure on the mullahs\u2019 regime.<\/p>\n

Tehran has openly admitted that the 60 percent enrichment is intended as a show of force. The regime\u2019s latest nuclear advance is supposed to give the impression that Tehran has the technical capability to overcome obstacles, but if it succeeds in this goal then it should clarify to European policymakers that more obstacles are needed \u2013 not fewer \u2013 in order to conclusively prevent the regime from rushing to nuclear weapons capability at some point in the future.<\/p>\n

The stated purpose of the JCPOA<\/a> had always been to lengthen Tehran\u2019s \u201cbreakout period,\u201d or the length of time it would take for the regime to construct a nuclear weapon if it decided to suddenly halt compliance with all international restrictions. The agreement\u2019s restrictions on uranium enrichment, stockpiles of nuclear material, and other such activities supposedly extended that period to over a year, but the pace of the regime\u2019s violations over the past year shows how flawed the assessment was in the first place.<\/p>\n

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After Tehran announced at the beginning of 2020 that it no longer considered itself bound by any of the JCPOA\u2019s provisions, nuclear facilities began reinstalling advanced enrichment centrifuges so quickly that it seemed almost as if they had never even been taken offline. Indeed, some of the agreement\u2019s detractors had publicly worried that this would be the case since Tehran was permitted to switch off and dismantle certain devices without actually removing them from the country or accepting any other serious impediments to their reinstallation. This situation may help to explain why the regime was able to resume 20 percent enrichment more quickly than had been predicted, then raise that level to 60 percent practically overnight when a show of force was deemed necessary.<\/p>\n

But an even more substantial explanation can be found in statements that regime officials have made through the regime\u2019s state media. All the way back in November 2019, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, boasted in an interview about having established \u201ca countermeasure\u201d to prevent facilities like Natanz from being \u201ctrapped in the enrichment deadlock.\u201d Though he declined to elaborate on the nature of the deception, Salehi described this arrangement as allowing the regime to continue its enrichment activities while giving Western powers the impression that they \u201cwon the negotiation.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Iran: Fake News or Regime\u2019s New Tactic on its Nuclear Program<\/div><\/div>
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