{"id":238639,"date":"2021-04-26T13:10:29","date_gmt":"2021-04-26T18:10:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=238639"},"modified":"2023-02-01T04:57:40","modified_gmt":"2023-02-01T03:57:40","slug":"iran-regimes-60-percent-uranium-enrichment-is-proof-of-its-ongoing-deception","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/nuclear\/iran-regimes-60-percent-uranium-enrichment-is-proof-of-its-ongoing-deception\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran Regime\u2019s 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment Is Proof of Its Ongoing Deception"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"The<\/p>\n

The Iranian regime has announced that it is now enriching uranium to 60 percent purity<\/a>. This is a dramatic escalation over the level it had established prior to the negotiations that yielded the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). When the regime restored 20 percent enrichment last year, it was widely reported that this placed Tehran only a short technical step away from weapons-grade uranium.<\/p>\n

The lesson from this latest act of nuclear extortion, as well as all those that preceded it, ought to be that the JCPOA, as originally conceived, was full of flaws and failed to stop the regime from advancing its nuclear program. Although the benchmark of 60 percent enrichment was reached more than a year after the regime halted compliance with all the deal\u2019s provisions, the regime\u2019s early violations cast new suspicions on the extent of its prior commitment. The rapid announcement of reaching the 60 percent uranium enrichment, also suggests that the clerical regime had never abided by the JCPOA restrictions.<\/p>\n

When Tehran first decided to return to the enrichment levels<\/a> it had established before 2015, authorities were able to re-install advanced centrifuges and resume full-scale operations practically overnight.<\/p>\n

What did the JCPOA really accomplish in terms of restricting Iran\u2019s uranium enrichment if it left the regime with the ability to reverse its commitments at the drop of a hat? To put it another way, does it really count as extending the regime\u2019s breakout period to more than a year if it takes much less time than that for the regime to restore the shorter breakout time it was used to?<\/p>\n

These questions need to be raised at a high level among the signatories to the JCPOA. Up to this point, the European signatories<\/a> seem to be exerting pressure almost entirely in one direction: removing sanctions imposed on the regime by the United States.<\/p>\n

But given the regime\u2019s nuclear extortion, the EU and U.S. should increase pressure on the regime. If the earlier pace and severity of the clerical regime\u2019s violations were not sufficient to motivate the Western powers toward this outcome, then 60 percent enrichment certainly should have been the tipping point. There is simply no reason for the regime to possess uranium with this level of fissile purity, other than as a stepping stone on the way to nuclear weapons capability.<\/p>\n

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