{"id":239238,"date":"2021-05-07T09:52:51","date_gmt":"2021-05-07T14:52:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=239238"},"modified":"2023-02-01T04:56:36","modified_gmt":"2023-02-01T03:56:36","slug":"iran-elections-2021-what-to-know-about-the-upcoming-sham-presidential-elections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/iran-election\/iran-elections-2021-what-to-know-about-the-upcoming-sham-presidential-elections\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran Election 2021: What To Know About the Upcoming Sham Presidential Elections"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Executive Summary<\/h2>\n

Iran’s regime will hold its sham presidential<\/a> elections on June 18. While many try to portray the mullahs’ sham elections as a sign of the regime’s democracy, it is necessary to take an in-depth look at the procedures and rules of the so-called elections in the regime. We intend to shed light on different aspects of the regime’s sham presidential elections. This piece is part of our several articles covering the Iranian regime\u2019s sham presidential elections.<\/p>\n

Presidential Election in Iran under the mullahs\u2019 rule<\/h3>\n

Article 115 of the regime\u2019s Constitution and Article 35 of the election law set the threshold for Presidential candidates to Muslim males, faithful to the \u201cIslamic Republic\u201d, and with practical belief and commitment to the principle of the velayat-e faqih (absolute clerical rule). The unelected and handpicked Guardian Council recently added further exclusions in a tactical adjustment to further disqualify and curtail potentially troublesome candidates from the self-proclaimed \u201cReformist\u201d camp in the upcoming elections.
\nThe Guardian Council has 12 members, six clerics, and six jurists. Khamenei<\/a> appoints the six clerics, and the Judiciary Chief, whom Khamenei appoints, picks the six jurists. So, in effect, all Council members are chosen by the Supreme Leader.<\/p>\n

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The Guardian Council routinely disqualifies numerous candidates, especially women, based on the regime\u2019s exclusionary electoral process and Khamenei\u2019s assent. Only loyalist males who have demonstrated their absolute allegiance to the supreme leader, as the sole indisputable source of power in the regime, are permitted to run.
\nIn 2013 and 2017, the Council disqualified two-term presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, based on their falling out with Khamenei, even though they were deemed qualified to run and serve as President in previous terms.
\nThe Iranian regime\u2019s Presidency is deemed to be ineffectual and has little impact on Iran\u2019s domestic and especially foreign policy. Former President Mohammad Khatami famously described his role as president as that of a mere functionary. All such policy is set out by the Supreme Leader through various agencies controlled by his office, and the executive branch is challenged by parallel IRGC controlled power centers. And yet the Presidency in Iran affords the winner a commanding role in state organizations and agencies that sit atop a corrupt oligarchy controlling Iran\u2019s national wealth, including control of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry that fuels Iran\u2019s corrupt rentier regime.
\nThe presidency as an institution introduces instability in the rule of the supreme leader and stands in contrast to its absolute rule. In 12 past presidential elections, the regime has had seven presidents. Five of these former presidents have faced expulsion, ostracism, house arrest, and even murder (AbolHassan Bani-Sadr, Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and one has to see what might happen to Rouhani after the end of his term).
\nThe supreme leader as the vicegerent of God on earth, and answering only to the Almighty, has total power and no accountability. Whereas the president, though seemingly elected by popular vote, must be confirmed by the supreme leader. The presidency and the electoral process are strictures forced upon Khomeini\u2019s concept of the absolute rule of the theocratic leader by domestic political pressure of the Iranian people\u2019s century-old movement for freedom. As such, the electoral process under this regime is highly stage-managed and controlled to bring results that both factions can accept while not violating the absolute authority of the regime\u2019s supreme leader, which underpins the system and is a redline. In short, elections in Iran are a travesty of the electoral process.<\/p>\n

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1.Time table:<\/h3>\n

The regime\u2019s 13th presidential election<\/a> will be held on June 18, 2021. Registration of candidates is set for May 11 to May 15, 2021. The Guardian Council reviews their qualifications for 10 days and announces the final list of candidates on May 26 and 27, 2021. Campaigning begins from May 27 until June 17, 2021.<\/p>\n

What is the difference between this election and previous ones?<\/h3>\n

Elections in Iran are a farce. Since Khamenei succeeded Khomeini in 1989 as a much weaker Supreme Leader, he has faced skeptical regime loyalists that split into power-sharing factions. The factions vie for turns at assuming the presidency to profit their beneficiaries. The farcical nature of the elections is highlighted by the several-fold multiplication of ballot numbers in election headquarters where both factions are present, to imply popular participation in the vote. In the last election cycle, nearly five million fraudulent votes were stuffed into ballot boxes in some precincts, and the regime\u2019s election headquarters announced a four-fold 73% participation rate that was a ludicrous lie.
\nThis highly corrupt, restricted, and tainted electoral process is even further controlled by the regime through numerous ways and means, the exclusionary list of candidates being only the first step. The process of electoral “engineering” involves both factions trying to outmaneuver the other by various machinations, through control, vote-buying, intimidation, and outright ballot box stuffing.
\nThe election results tend to reflect the balance of power among the regime factions. In 2005, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei decided to consolidate his rule by securing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election through electoral “engineering”. In 2009, Ahmadinejad won via the same process despite widespread public outcries.
\nKhamenei failed to push through his own choice in the 2013 and 2017 elections however and Hassan Rouhani became president. Khamenei principlists tend to rely on voter intimidation and overt fraud, whereas the opposing faction relies on hollow promises on improving the lives of the citizens. Both factions vie for an increasingly paltry segment of the electorate who are openly challenging the regime\u2019s authority in the streets with chants of \u201cWe won\u2019t vote anymore, so many lies have been heard.\u201d
\nThe uprisings in December 2017, January 2018, November 2019, and January 2020 have changed the conditions for both factions in the upcoming elections:<\/p>\n

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  1. Six months after the June 2017 elections, during the December 2017 and January 2018 uprisings, the Iranian people clearly rejected both regime factions with a prevalent slogan throughout the protests: “Hardliner, Reformer, the game is now over.” Regime officials regularly sound alarms about voter apathy and election boycott and many are warning of unprecedently low turnout.<\/li>\n
  2. Khamenei’s decision to retrench and consolidate his regime: In May 2020, Khamenei announced his desire for a “young Hezbollahi Government”. In his speech on March 21, 2021, he set several criteria for his ideal president, signaling again a preferred candidate:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n