{"id":252396,"date":"2021-12-02T05:02:28","date_gmt":"2021-12-02T10:02:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=252396"},"modified":"2023-02-02T21:57:31","modified_gmt":"2023-02-02T20:57:31","slug":"report-irans-terrorist-network-in-africa-and-its-implications","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/publications\/special-reports\/report-irans-terrorist-network-in-africa-and-its-implications\/","title":{"rendered":"Report: Iran\u2019s\u00a0Terrorist\u00a0Network\u00a0in Africa and Its Implications\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\"><img decoding=\"async\" title=\"excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism\" class=\"wp-image-234349 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism.jpg\" alt=\"excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism\" width=\"1004\" height=\"564\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism.jpg 800w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism-150x84.jpg 150w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/excessive-focus-on-nuclear-deal-risks-letting-iran-off-the-hook-for-terrorism-696x392.jpg 696w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1004px) 100vw, 1004px\" \/>On Sunday, November 28, 2021, authorities uncovered a series of coordinated plans for terror attacks by an Iranian <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.the-star.co.ke\/news\/2021-11-28-exclusive-police-uncover-terror-plans-by-an-iranian-national-in-kenya\/\" rel=\"noopener\">in Kenya<\/a>. Mohammed\u00a0Saeid\u00a0Golabi\u00a0is accused of being at the core of\u00a0plots against\u00a0targets on Kenyan soil.\u00a0<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The revelation of this terror plot is a bleak reminder that the mullahs&#8217; malign activities are not limited\u00a0by the borders of\u00a0Iran.\u00a0When the Iranian regime took power in 1979, it started the so-called &#8220;export of the Islamic Revolution,&#8221;\u00a0bringing\u00a0chaos to other parts of the world.\u00a0The preamble to the Iranian constitution says:<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><i><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;Given the content of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which was a movement for the victory of the oppressed over the arrogant, the constitution provides the basis for the continuation of this revolution at home and abroad, especially in expanding international relations with other Islamic and popular movements, to pave the way for the formation of a single world nation and to continue the struggle for the salvation of oppressed and deprived nations throughout the world.&#8221;\u202f<\/span><\/i><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Iranian regime has prioritized &#8220;exporting revolution&#8221; to countries with a Muslim population. African countries with their internal crisis and Muslim populations have been a\u00a0prime target.\u00a0The Iranian regime, either directly or through its Hezbollah terrorist proxy group, has expanded its influence across\u00a0the continent, mainly south of the Sahara. Iran&#8217;s <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/terrorism-a-fundamentalism\/inside-irans-army-of-terror-and-oppression-revolutionary-guards-irgc\/\" rel=\"noopener\">Revolutionary Guards<\/a> (IRGC) and Hezbollah have established a strong foothold in Africa, and their activities there\u00a0accelerated\u00a0in the early 2010s and reached a new height after 2018.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The regime&#8217;s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with the IRGC commanders on October 2,\u00a02019,\u00a0and\u00a0underlined the regime&#8217;s need to increase its presence in Africa. &#8220;Do not miss this vast geography of resistance. Do not miss this cross-border look. [We] should not be satisfied [only] with our region,&#8221; he said.\u00a0Other Iranian officials have confirmed their intention of\u00a0expanding their influence in Africa.\u00a0<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;Iran must make Africa a fundamental issue in its strategy in 2021. Let all the institutions take a leap forward and conduct jihadist and revolutionary management. [We should] take advantage of this existing usable capacity of Africa,&#8221; said Hossein Akbari, former Iranian ambassador to Libya, according to Fars News Agency.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Daily Telegraph on June 24, 2019,\u202f<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/2019\/06\/24\/tehran-sets-terror-cells-africa-western-sanctions-bite\/\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">wrote<\/span><\/a><span data-contrast=\"none\">: &#8220;Iran is setting up a network of terror cells in Africa to attack the US and other Western targets in retaliation for Washington&#8217;s decision to impose sanctions against Tehran, according to Western security officials. The aim of the new terror cell is to target the US and other Western military bases on the continent, as well as embassies and officials.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Telegraph then quoted an anonymous Western Official\u00a0as saying\u00a0that &#8220;Iran is setting up new terrorist infrastructure in Africa with the aim of attacking Western targets.\u00a0It is all part of Tehran&#8217;s attempts to expand its terrorist operations across the globe.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Iranian regime has long tried to portray itself as the state-sponsor of Shi&#8217;ite communities around the globe. So how could the Shi&#8217;ite regime in Tehran and Hezbollah pursue their malign goals in African countries where\u00a0the majority of\u00a0the Muslims are Sunnis?<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The mullahs in Tehran have proven quite adept at working with Sunni radicals when it comes to their common interests. In this piece, we try to shed light on the Iranian regime&#8217;s &#8220;strategic depth&#8221; in Africa and how it uses\u00a0it\u00a0to generate income and spread terrorism.\u202f\u202f<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"lyte-wrapper\" title=\"Who was Qassem Soleimani?\" style=\"width:853px;max-width:100%;margin:5px;\"><div class=\"lyMe\" id=\"WYL_v-OMZouIrcY\" itemprop=\"video\" itemscope itemtype=\"https:\/\/schema.org\/VideoObject\"><div><meta itemprop=\"thumbnailUrl\" content=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fv-OMZouIrcY%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" \/><meta itemprop=\"embedURL\" content=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/v-OMZouIrcY\" \/><meta itemprop=\"duration\" content=\"PT6M50S\" \/><meta itemprop=\"uploadDate\" content=\"2020-03-31T15:12:21Z\" \/><\/div><div id=\"lyte_v-OMZouIrcY\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fv-OMZouIrcY%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" class=\"pL\"><div class=\"tC\"><div class=\"tT\" itemprop=\"name\">Who was Qassem Soleimani?<\/div><\/div><div class=\"play\"><\/div><div class=\"ctrl\"><div class=\"Lctrl\"><\/div><div class=\"Rctrl\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><noscript><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/v-OMZouIrcY\" rel=\"nofollow\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fv-OMZouIrcY%2F0.jpg\" alt=\"Who was Qassem Soleimani?\" width=\"853\" height=\"460\" \/><br \/>Watch this video on YouTube<\/a><\/noscript><meta itemprop=\"description\" content=\"Qassem Soleimani was born on March 11, 1957, in Ghanat Malek village in Kerman. After his primary education, he went to Kerman and worked as a construction worker. In the final years of the Shah\u2019s regime, Soleimani worked for the water organization. He had no part in the people\u2019s struggle for freedom against the Shah. Qassem Soleiman came from Baft in Kerman. He was a simple plumber worker that had come to Kerman to find a job. After the 1979 Revolution and its atmosphere, this man, like others, with the same opinions joined the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). After the fall of the Shah, he entered the IRGC and was responsible for IRGC\u2019s training in Kerman. After Khomeini\u2019s fatwa to suppress the people of Iranian Kurdistan (1980), he was sent there and for two years he commanded the IRGC\u2019s raids on Kurdish villages. After the 1979 revolution the power circle in the South East of Iran, especially in Kerman was summarized in three evil people who executed Khomeini\u2019s inauspicious plans. On one hand, suppressing the opponents and on the other hand, preparing the ground for anti-Iran war with Iraq. Qassem Soleimani was one these three, together with the criminal mullah Ali Iranmanesh, regime\u2019s Friday\u2019s prayer and Director General of Education in Kerman to made preparations to send the students to the war front. The third person was Ghalanbar, who was the founder of the Intelligence Ministry in this area to suppress the freedom activist and the members of the MEK. At that time, I knew another person, Mohammad Hossein Tayi who was among the IRGC commanders. After a while in 1980, the IRGC in Kerman was sent to Kurdistan to suppress the people. I heard from him (Tayi) for the first time the name of Qassem Soleimani, that he was responsible for training the IRGC forces in Kerman. The IRGC\u2019s forces are among the cruelest forces engaged in this operation. The whole city knew they murder people under the pretext of thugs. After some years that I saw the pictures of the Kurdistan massacre, this memory was reminded to me. Qassem Soleimani raised to the top of the IRGC by committing such crimes. Qassem Soleimani was commander of the Quds garrison of Kerman. His responsibility included training and dispatching students to the Iran-Iraq warzone. A war in which many students were used as disposable soldiers for clearing the minefields. The result of this war for the people of Iran was more than two million dead, wounded or disabled, &#36;1 trillion in damage, 50 ruined cities, and 3000 destroyed villages. In 1982 and 1983 which are the years of Khomeini\u2019s warmongering, the regime faced limitation of forces, Qassem Soleimani together with Ali Iranmanesh sand young students to the war fronts. Qassem Soleimani was personally responsible in Kerman and South east provinces for this. Every morning at schools for one hour students were forced to participate in religious ceremonies and at the end, they had to subscribe for the front and some Basiji mercenaries were responsible to send students to the front. I remember exactly that number of these students were brought back in coffins the next year. In cities were rumors they were hit by chemical weapons and later we understood that they all choked in Chalamcheh front. One of my classmates, Hamid Sadeghi who trapped in this fall, one less than a week one of the casualties. The main person responsible for sending young students to the front was a Basiji mercenary named Mohammad Reza Rajizadeh. Khamenei appointed Soleimani in 1998 as head of the IRGC Quds Force. Soleimani\u2019s participation in suppressing and killing Kurdish people and the people of the southern and south-eastern provinces was seen by Khamenei as enough experience. What happened a year after Soleimani&#039;s presence in the Quds Force Huge explosions in Kenya and Tanzania with hundreds of deaths and wounded, which was also mentioned by Rafsanjani during Friday prayers to motivate regime troops. Under the command of Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force expanded its terrorist activities in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North, and South America. Central Asian countries and Muslim republics that separated from the former Soviet Union were also hit. Soleimani was under the direct command of Khamenei and was his closest confidant in the IRGC. He was Khamenei\u2019s special advisor who commanded the regime\u2019s expansion of terrorism and infiltration in countries in the region. Soleimani was a member of the regime\u2019s Supreme National Security Council, because of his closeness to Khamenei and his decisive role in the regime\u2019s decision makings and policies in the region. In addition to commanding the IRGC Quds Force, he was Secretary of the Strategic Policy Council of Iraq and was responsible for everything that was happening in Iraq.\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"lL\" style=\"max-width:100%;width:853px;margin:5px;\"><\/div><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify\">How Hezbollah\u00a0Established\u00a0its network in Africa<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">A profound <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.files.ethz.ch\/isn\/151792\/197_Wege.pdf\" rel=\"noopener\">study conducted<\/a> by Prof. Carl Anthony\u00a0Wege\u00a0from\u00a0the\u00a0Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) reveals a great amount of detail about Iran and Hezbollah&#8217;s network in Africa.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Hezbollah&#8217;s\u00a0revenue-generating network is located\u00a0\u201cprimarily in two spaces; one is an arc stretching from West Africa along the coast reaching down toward the Congo while the other is a circle encompassing the Horn of Africa,&#8221;\u00a0Wege\u00a0wrote.\u00a0He added that the\u00a0network that Tehran directly controls &#8220;can be visualized as a circle encompassing the Horn of Africa seeking to influence the Middle Eastern theater. Iranian arms smuggling infiltrations from that circle reach into Nigeria, Kenya, and the central African spaces.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The study notes that\u00a0&#8220;Lebanese diaspora communities emerged in West Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were initially made up primarily of Lebanese Christian immigrants who were historically encouraged by British colonial policy to settle in places like Sierra Leone.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">After the Sierra Leone\u00a0civil war ended in 2002, Hezbollah improved its position in the Shi&#8217;ite community. Eventually, it gained control of much of the illegal diamond trade previously dominated by\u00a0its rival,\u00a0Afwaj\u00a0al\u00a0Muqawamah\u00a0al\u00a0Lubnaniyyah\u00a0or AMAL\u00a0movement.\u00a0<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;In other parts of West Africa such as the Congo, other Shi&#8217;a traders in illegal diamonds became subjugated to Hizballah men through middlemen, broadening the revenue stream to finance the organization,&#8221; reads\u00a0the\u00a0ISPSW study. &#8220;Hezbollah successfully blended the illegal <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/CHRG-107shrg78621\/html\/CHRG-107shrg78621.htm\" rel=\"noopener\">diamond trade<\/a> with legitimate business enterprises; this also helped to disguise finances that supported Hizballah activities in Lebanon.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Hezbollah used the resulting flow of money from Congo in multiple corporate networks. Besides its smuggling, Hezbollah participates in organized crime to generate financial support. According to Prof.\u00a0Wege&#8217;s\u00a0report, &#8220;The two major elements of this type of criminality are Hizballah shakedowns of Lebanese merchants in the African diaspora and its cooperation with narco-trafficking organizations. A less significant factor is Hizballah&#8217;s involvement in various fraud schemes.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Iran&#8217;s arms smuggling network stretches across West Africa. Tehran has established strong connections with local governments and insurgent groups in countries like Ghana and Nigeria in the last few years.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The non-Islamic Southern regions are the basis for Nigeria&#8217;s oil-based wealth, while the Islamic North is economically much less developed. Thus, the Iranian regime has exploited this situation and influenced Nigeria&#8217;s Muslim community. Besides supporting the terrorist groups, the regime has been able to influence the local military officials since various Muslims sects from the Northern portion of the country ultimately came to dominate the Nigerian army.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Iranian regime&#8217;s main element in Nigeria is Ibrahim Zakzaky and his Islamic Movement of Nigeria. The IRGC\u00a0<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/iran-protests\/iran-plundering-backed-by-revolutionary-guards-and-khamenei-s-office\/\" rel=\"noopener\">has wasted<\/a> the Iranian people&#8217;s wealth to build barracks and training centers for Zakzaky&#8217;s militants in two northern Nigerian regions, Kano and Sokoto.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">\u00a0Sheikh\u00a0Zakzaki\u00a0has\u00a0sought to establish a branch of the Iranian regime in Nigeria\u00a0that functions much like\u00a0Hizbollah\u00a0in\u00a0Lebanon and allows him to\u00a0pursue his fundamentalist goals. Corruption, money laundering, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking\u00a0have expanded\u00a0the mullahs&#8217; strategic lines in Nigeria.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to Prof.\u00a0Wege, &#8220;In addition to potentially exploiting local Islamist radicals, Iranian assets have also tried to build an\u00a0arms\u00a0smuggling network in Nigeria and throughout Africa. In doing so, it was not always successful. Iran&#8217;s efforts to use Nigeria for covert arms distribution backfired in October 2010 when the Nigerian State Security Services, probably tipped by Western agencies, intercepted a ship in Lagos port of\u00a0Apapa.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Following this incident, Senegal and Gambia, both of whom previously had good relations with Tehran, took umbrage at the Nigerian discovery and broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 2011.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Before 2011, Iran had a very active\u00a0economic\u00a0relationship with Senegal. During the presidency of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2013\/06\/mahmoud-ahmadinejads-african-safari\/\" rel=\"noopener\">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad<\/a>, the Iranian regime gave Senegal a\u00a0Samand\u00a0car production line to expand its influence in that country. But despite a $100 million investment, the line remains inactive due to the country&#8217;s inability to supply electricity for it.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;Iran Khodro has invested about $100 million in Senegal, which does not bring any production or profit for this company, even for Iran Khodro. It incurs financial costs, and these costs are distributed over the production cars, increasing prices of cars,&#8221; Amir\u00a0Khojasteh, former MP of Hamedan, told Fars News Agency on October 1, 2019.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"lyte-wrapper\" title=\"IRGC Quds force, Iran regime clandestine military empire\" style=\"width:853px;max-width:100%;margin:5px;\"><div class=\"lyMe\" id=\"WYL_lHQHzmCXIus\" itemprop=\"video\" itemscope itemtype=\"https:\/\/schema.org\/VideoObject\"><div><meta itemprop=\"thumbnailUrl\" content=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FlHQHzmCXIus%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" \/><meta itemprop=\"embedURL\" content=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/lHQHzmCXIus\" \/><meta itemprop=\"duration\" content=\"PT1M44S\" \/><meta itemprop=\"uploadDate\" content=\"2019-04-29T07:31:18Z\" \/><\/div><div id=\"lyte_lHQHzmCXIus\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FlHQHzmCXIus%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" class=\"pL\"><div class=\"tC\"><div class=\"tT\" itemprop=\"name\">IRGC Quds force, Iran regime clandestine military empire<\/div><\/div><div class=\"play\"><\/div><div class=\"ctrl\"><div class=\"Lctrl\"><\/div><div class=\"Rctrl\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><noscript><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/lHQHzmCXIus\" rel=\"nofollow\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FlHQHzmCXIus%2F0.jpg\" alt=\"IRGC Quds force, Iran regime clandestine military empire\" width=\"853\" height=\"460\" \/><br \/>Watch this video on YouTube<\/a><\/noscript><meta itemprop=\"description\" content=\"Iran- April 28: Two international experts explained the threats and terrorist activities posed by Iran\u2019s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds force across the Middle East. Seth G. Jones chair, director, and senior advisor to the Transnational Threats Project, explained how the IRGC Quds Force is acting as the Iranian regime extraterritorial arm.\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"lL\" style=\"max-width:100%;width:853px;margin:5px;\"><\/div><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify\">Iran in the Horn of Africa<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The Iranian regime has been trying to expand its influence in the horn of Africa. Tehran is particularly interested in relations with East African countries, especially those lying along the Red Sea. Having a vast network in East Africa is part of Iran&#8217;s strategy to strengthen its foothold in the Middle East.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Tehran exploited its influence in East African countries such as Sudan and Kenya to direct subversive and terrorist activities. Its targets are North Africa in general and Egypt in particular, and pro-Western Arab states as well as Israel.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Dominating the Red Sea is very important for the Iranian regime since it could support its Houthi rebels in Yemen.\u00a0To dominate the<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-middle-east-56661069\" rel=\"noopener\"> Red Sea<\/a>, Tehran has been long investing in the crisis in Somalia and Sudan.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;The center of Iran&#8217;s efforts in this regard has been Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Somalia. Iran&#8217;s efforts began a generation ago following the 1989 Islamist coup by Hassan Turabi&#8217;s National Islamic Front in Sudan. Iran traded money for influence in Khartoum, and Sudan became a focal point for Iranian intelligence liaison with networks of Sunni Islamists,&#8221; Prof.\u00a0Wege&#8217;s\u00a0report adds about the Iranian-Somalian relationship.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to\u00a0Wege, &#8220;In 2008 Sudan&#8217;s role in Iran&#8217;s arms smuggling networks was enhanced by a mutual defense agreement signed by the Defense Ministries of both countries.\u00a0This expanded Sudan&#8217;s role as a regional center for larger Iranian arms trafficking operations. In these efforts, Hizballah members, acting on Iran&#8217;s behalf and often with the cooperation of Sudan&#8217;s\u00a0Abadba\u00a0tribe, transported weapons north through Egypt and into the Sinai where Bedouin smugglers would move them on into Gaza.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to Prof.\u00a0Wege, the Iranian regime prefers &#8220;instability in the Horn of Africa, even under the auspices of Sunni Islamists <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/english.alarabiya.net\/News\/middle-east\/2020\/07\/19\/Iran-linking-with-Somalia-s-al-Shabab-to-funnel-weapons-to-Houthis-Foreign-Policy\" rel=\"noopener\">like al Shabab<\/a>, to gain and maintain Iranian influence in the region.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify\">Kenya<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Despite its more developed security services,\u00a0Kenya\u00a0offers rich\u00a0terrorist\u00a0opportunities for the regime in Tehran.\u00a0Besides the recently foiled terrorist plot in Kenya, the Iranian regime has a long history of spreading chaos in that country.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Since the US embassy in Kenya acts as a counterpoint to the Iranian regime,\u00a0by\u00a0deploying substantial resources to promote stability in Somalia, the regime has tried several times to target the US embassy.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">When,\u00a0in January 2020, one US serviceman and two American private contractors were killed by the Somali militant group al-Shabab, fingers were pointed toward Tehran. This attack was considered to be the Iranian regime&#8217;s retaliation after the US killed the IRGC Quds Force Commander, Qassem Soleimani, in a drone strike on January 4.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;Iran&#8217;s intent to use the opportunities Kenya presented was demonstrated in 2012. Kenyan police arrested Sayed Mansour Mousavi and Ahmad\u00a0Abolfathi\u00a0Mohammed, both Iranian nationals, for smuggling more than one hundred kilograms of cyclonite (RDX) to a warehouse in Mombasa, Kenya,&#8221; Prof.\u00a0Wege\u00a0wrote about Tehran&#8217;s history of terrorist activities in Kenya.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">On April 15, 2021, the grey dynamics\u202f<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.greydynamics.com\/the-game-has-changed-iranian-terror-network-in-africa\/\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">reported<\/span><\/a><span data-contrast=\"none\">, &#8220;In 2015, Kenyan authorities arrested two terror suspects with alleged links to Iran&#8217;s Quds Force. A branch in Africa was established by Gen. Qassem Soleimani. One suspect admitted they had been plotting to attack Western targets. Previously in 2012, two Iranians were arrested and charged for planning a terror attack, leading to the discovery of 15 kilograms of RDX explosives.&#8221;\u202f\u202f<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The grey dynamics revealed that &#8220;Following the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal, through the orders of Soleimani, a terror cell network was set up by the specialized section (Unit 400) of the Quds Force run by\u00a0Hamed\u00a0Abdollahi. The cells themselves are allegedly run by Ali\u00a0Parhoon, another prominent member of the Quds Force. They uncovered this after arrests last April led to the revelation.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to the grey dynamics and some intelligence reports, &#8220;there are around 300 highly trained militants within the network throughout Africa. The primary aim is to target Western assets and interests in the region. These cells are reportedly spread across Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Gambia, and the Central African Republic. Hezbollah has also been training Nigerians for years. The 2018 Middle East Institute report stated that Iran had instructed Hezbollah to increase Nigerian training activities, as it seeks to facilitate a base of operations to launch attacks.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-width=\"550\" data-dnt=\"true\">\n<p lang=\"en\" dir=\"ltr\">Again the Iranian regime is designated &quot;the world\u2019s worst state sponsor of terrorism&quot; for being, &quot;directly involved in plotting terrorism through its IRGC &amp; Ministry of Intelligence and Security including plots in recent years in North &amp; South America, Europe, ME, Asia &amp; Africa.&quot; <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/ZhiRU499Bk\">https:\/\/t.co\/ZhiRU499Bk<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&mdash; Alireza Jafarzadeh (@A_Jafarzadeh) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/A_Jafarzadeh\/status\/1275813074092666881?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">June 24, 2020<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><script async src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify\">IRGC Quds Force&#8217;s Unit 400<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The IRGC has been exporting terrorism across the globe by using its elite Quds Force. For the past two decades, the IRGC has sought to shift the political structure of African countries in favor of the\u00a0regime, using the deep rifts caused by political crises and economic problems in African countries, using the capacity of opposition forces, and insurgents. The Quds Force unit 400, which has been tasked with implementing these policies in Africa, has often operated purposefully, investing in capacities resulting from ethnic, religious, and economic inefficiencies in East and\u00a0West African nations.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to an\u202f<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.egic.info\/terrorism-iran-irgc-article\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">article<\/span><\/a><span data-contrast=\"none\">\u202fby the Euro-Gulf Information Centre (EGIC), &#8220;This newly established Unit was specifically created to attack Iranian enemies&#8217; interests around the world aiming to protect the regime and advance its interests. The leadership of the IRGC-QF and the Unit 400 is directly responsible to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;Since 2011, the IRGC-QF operatives, through Unit 400, have been more active in the direct execution of the attacks rather than limiting themselves only to ordering and providing the means to carry out the attack,&#8221; EGIC adds. &#8220;It seems that since then Hezbollah and the IRGC have divided their responsibilities: Hezbollah operatives focus on tourists, while the IRGC-QF focuses on diplomatic staff, embassies and more high-profile targets.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to EGIC, &#8220;In some cases, they use inconspicuous locals that can operate under the radar of intelligence services, dual nationals with European, Canadian or US passports, diplomatic cover and sometimes criminals for the preparation and execution of the attacks.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Unit\u00a0400 is an elite unit that maintains maximum secrecy to its sensitive tasks. The IRGC Major General\u00a0Hamed\u00a0Abdollahi\u00a0is the head of this unit.\u00a0Abdollahi\u00a0has held several top military positions, including:<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8211; Commander of the <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/publications\/special-reports\/the-iranian-regimes-irgc-quds-force-1980s-present\/\" rel=\"noopener\">Quds Force<\/a> intelligence branch<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8211; Commander of the IRGC in Zahedan and Zabol in southeast Iran<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8211; Qassem Soleimani&#8217;s deputy at the IRGC&#8217;s 41st Division<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Majid Alawi is another senior commander of Unit 400. He joined Unit 400 in 2011 and has been using his knowledge to contribute to operational activities and attack plans, mainly in distant countries.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Unit 400 has a network of facilitators and proxies, including elements in organized crime syndicates. These individuals collect information, make preliminary logistical preparations, and\u00a0carry out operations\u00a0if necessary. These individuals sometimes are trained inside Iran and sometimes in the Quds Force&#8217;s training camps across the globe.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Unit 400 has various front companies that both provide cover and money for this terrorist entity to operate. Two companies,\u00a0Arash\u00a0Zoobin,\u00a0and Aria Navid, are used to secretly transfer weapons for Unit 400. Besides, the IRGC uses its vast network of front companies, religious or charitable organizations around the world to recruit facilitators.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">In December 2020, the US Department of the Treasury&#8217;s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sm1205\" rel=\"noopener\">sanctioned<\/a> Al-Mustafa International University, which acts as a front organization for facilitating Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force recruitment efforts.\u202f\u202f<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">According to the Treasury&#8217;s statement: &#8220;<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/terrorism-a-fundamentalism\/u-s-designates-an-irgc-official-and-university-in-yemen-for-spread-of-terrorism\/\" rel=\"noopener\">Al-Mustafa<\/a> International University, which has branches around the world, is used as a recruitment platform by the IRGC-QF for intelligence collection and operations, including recruitment for the IRGC-QF-led foreign militias fighting on behalf of Bashar Al-Assad&#8217;s regime in Syria.&#8221;<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">&#8220;The IRGC-QF uses Al-Mustafa University to develop student exchanges with foreign universities for the purposes of indoctrinating and recruiting foreign sources. Al-Mustafa has facilitated unwitting tourists from western countries to come to Iran, from whom IRGC-QF members sought to collect intelligence. The statement adds that recruits from Al-Mustafa International University have been sent to Syria to fight on behalf of IRGC-QF-led militias.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><img decoding=\"async\" title=\"iran-africa-influence2\" class=\"size-full wp-image-252398 alignnone\" src=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/iran-africa-influence2.jpg\" alt=\"iran-africa-influence2\" width=\"680\" height=\"384\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/iran-africa-influence2.jpg 680w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/iran-africa-influence2-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/iran-africa-influence2-150x85.jpg 150w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 680px) 100vw, 680px\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify\">Conclusion<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Export of terrorism and chaos across the world\u00a0followed\u00a0the Iranian regime&#8217;s\u00a0ascent\u00a0to power in 1979. The Iranian regime prolonged a deadly war with Iraq for eight years, and when it ended, the regime did not stop its regional adventurism.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">Every now and then, Tehran&#8217;s\u00a0terrorists\u00a0are arrested in different parts of the world. The recent arrest of Iranian spies in Africa, Europe, and the US and the trial of Tehran&#8217;s diplomat-terrorist\u00a0Assadollah\u00a0Assadi in 2020 indicate that mullahs use every opportunity to pursue their malign activities.\u00a0The information above about the regime&#8217;s network of terrorism in Africa\u00a0is\u00a0just the tip of an iceberg.\u00a0<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The regime has been using terrorism as leverage to force the international community to accept\u00a0its\u00a0demands.\u00a0Western powers should not allow that. By allowing Tehran to continue its malign activities in the region and maintain its network of terrorism and espionage, no one would be safe.\u202f<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span data-contrast=\"none\">The heart of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism beats in Tehran. To increase global security, world leaders should increase pressure on the Iranian regime, expel its agents from their countries, close their embassies and so-called cultural centers, and cut off any financial transaction with the Iranian regime.<\/span><span data-ccp-props=\"{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:240,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On Sunday, November 28, 2021, authorities uncovered a series of coordinated plans for terror attacks by an Iranian in Kenya. Mohammed&nbsp;Saeid&nbsp;Golabi&nbsp;is accused of being at the core of&nbsp;plots against&nbsp;targets on [&#8230;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":234349,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27,19],"tags":[287,129,205,211],"class_list":{"0":"post-252396","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-special-reports","8":"category-terrorism-a-fundamentalism","9":"tag-iran-terrorism","10":"tag-iran","11":"tag-irgc","12":"tag-quds-force"},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Report: Iran\u2019s\u00a0Terrorist\u00a0Network\u00a0in Africa and Its Implications\u00a0 - NCRI<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"On Sunday, November 28, 2021, authorities uncovered a series of coordinated plans for terror attacks by an Iranian in Kenya. 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