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Brenda Shaffer<\/em><\/a>, research director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University in <\/em>Arms Control Association<\/a>:<\/p>\n \u201cAn interesting aspect of this year\u2019s revelations on Iran\u2019s nuclear program is the fact that the information provided by the NCRI has been astonishingly accurate. In many political settings, oppositions abroad tend to exaggerate information in order to gain support for their causes against ruling regimes. The NCRI has shown restraint in its reporting on the nuclear program.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n *****\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n New York Times<\/a> senior science writer and Pulitzer Prize winner William J. Broad:<\/p>\n \u201cFrank Pabian, a senior adviser on nuclear nonproliferation at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, strongly disagreed. \u2018They (NCRI) are right 90 percent of the time,\u2019 he said of the council\u2019s disclosures about Iran\u2019s clandestine sites. \u2018That doesn\u2019t mean they\u2019re perfect, but 90 percent is a pretty good record\u2019.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0*****<\/em><\/p>\n Congressional Research Service<\/a>, Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status Updated December 20, 2019:<\/p>\n \u201cPrior to the NCRI\u2019s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but the IAEA had never found Iran in violation of its safeguards agreement.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n *****<\/p>\n Foreword:<\/strong><\/p>\n For over three decades, the ruling clerics in Tehran, who continue to harbor ambitions of inaugurating a regional Islamic Caliphate to this day, have been desperately trying to join the Nuclear Club. The mullahs view nuclear weapons as an insurance policy that grants them perpetual international impunity while reinforcing their illegitimate rule of terror at home and in the Middle East.<\/p>\n But throughout these complicated years, the regime’s nuclear designs have been seriously frustrated by the organized opposition. The National Council of Resistance of Iran<\/a> (NCRI), and its main constituent body the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), have been going the extra mile to uncover and raise awareness about the regime\u2019s illicit activities. The MEK’s sizeable social network has penetrated some of the most secretive enterprises of the regime, laboriously unearthing top secret information that has triggered global action. The resistance movement has thus shed the spotlight on troubling developments that could have otherwise morphed into some of the most enduring and serious threats against regional stability and global peace and security.<\/p>\n According to Massoud Rajavi<\/a>, the Chairman of the NCRI, \u201cWere it not for the Iranian Resistance’s efforts, today, nuclear-armed mullahs would have been anchored at the Horn of Africa.\u201d Indeed, had it not been for the Resistance’s countless groundbreaking revelations, today’s regional security architecture and strategic calculus would have looked considerably different.<\/p>\n Clearly, the Iranian Resistance lacks the cutting-edge or ultramodern technologies commanded by familiar Western intelligence agencies. But, its position as an indigenous opposition has afforded it the singular opening to make up for that deficiency by leveraging human intelligence sources on the ground. Of course, if and when these sources’ identities are exposed, state retribution would be swift and ruthless. The opposition’s sources are thus not simply bribed or enticed through other means to divulge such intelligence. Literally risking their lives, these daring individuals undoubtedly sympathize with the NCRI’s broader aims to establish a non-nuclear Iran that prioritizes democracy and prosperity for generations over the failed policies of a theocracy that have brought ruin to multiple generations of Iranians since 1979.<\/p>\n Despite the opposition’s notably impressive track record when it comes to divulging intelligence about the Iranian regime’s nuclear activities, including the very first revelation in June 1991, that was followed by the major revelation about the Natanz enrichment facility and Arak heavy water site in August 2002, which triggered the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Organizations (IAEA), detractors have on many occasions cast doubt on the NCRI’s underlying intentions or the information’s authenticity. At every turn, however, those doubts have been shown to be unwarranted, not least because most if not all of the information has thus far been corroborated by Western intelligence agencies and\/or formed the basis for steps taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Perhaps the most flattering substantiation has been produced by Tehran itself, as it orchestrates a well-funded demonization campaign against the NCRI\/MEK and their increasingly popular political agenda.<\/p>\n The mullahs routinely besmirch these organizations as a Fifth Column and “traitors” who have unleashed sanctions “against the Iranian people” by betraying “national secrets.” By all indications, however, the ruling regime, which monopolizes the free flow of information domestically, has failed to persuade the general population of the merits of its most strategic arguments, including the need for a nuclear program. As demonstrated in multiple nationwide uprisings in recent years, the Iranian people openly and vehemently decry the diversion of their national resources toward theocratic projects like the nuclear weapons program or meddling in regional politics instead of investing in the tanking national economy. In this way, the Iranian people regard the Resistance’s revelations as a patriotic duty that would hasten the downfall of the despised theocracy, a persistent nationwide demand that has gained serious momentum in recent years. That explains the Resistance’s competitive advantage for obtaining intelligence through human elements, intelligence that would otherwise be largely inaccessible to the international community.<\/p>\n The following chronology demonstrates the NCRI’s persistent and laudable attempts to prevent a nuclear-armed regime in Iran. It also shows how Tehran has tried in vain to deceive the world to get back on track. For the past few months in Vienna, world powers have struggled to entice the regime to rejoin the 2015 nuclear pact. But history should be a guide to the regime’s future modus operandi. Thus far, it has advanced its nuclear weapons program through denial, deception, and duplicity. Below should serve as a brief reminder:<\/p>\n \u00a0*****<\/em><\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, June 26, 1991<\/strong> \u2013 \u201cAt a private Capitol Hill luncheon Monday given by Rep. Mervyn Dymally (D-Calif.) and other members of Congress for Mohammed Mohaddessin, the foreign policy spokesman for Iran’s leading anti-Islamic movement, the People’s Mujahedin, Mohaddessin said Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons on a cash basis — and has the money to do it.\u201d<\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, February 15, 1992<\/strong> \u2013 \u201cInternational Atomic Energy Agency officials returning from a seven-day visit to Iran said the country’s activities appeared consistent with a peaceful nuclear energy program, a finding that Iranian officials said should clear the way for greater technical assistance from abroad\u2026 Iran invited the IAEA visit to dispel reports of undeclared nuclear facilities on its territory in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty it signed in 1970. The inspectors said one facility, described by Iranian dissidents<\/strong> as a key nuclear site at Moallem Kalayeh in the northern Elburz mountains, turned out to be a “motel-size” retreat where nuclear scientists travel for language training and recreation.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cKamal Kharazzi, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, said in a telephone interview from New York today that the new IAEA report “clarifies all of the allegations that Iran is looking for development of nuclear weapons… There is nothing secret in Iran.”<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n November 1991<\/strong> – during the Chinese president’s visit to Iran, the NCRI’s office in the United States held a press conference at the National Club of Journalists to reveal detailed information about the regime’s latest efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, including a plan to equip long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. Alireza Jafarzadeh told the conference: “Based on information obtained by the members of the Mojahedin from inside Iran, high-ranking officials of the Khomeini regime state that the main focus of their talks during the Chinese president’s visit to Iran was nuclear cooperation.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n March 10, 1992<\/strong> – Mr. Massoud Rajavi, head of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, sent a telegram to the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, warning of the Iranian regime’s accumulation of deadly weapons. Mr. Rajavi wrote: “In the last three years, the Iranian regime has bought $5 billion from China and $4 billion in weapons from the former Soviet Union, and it has billions of dollars in multi-year contracts with other countries to build nuclear facilities and buy other weapons.”<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n October 12, 1992<\/strong>: Mohammad Mohaddesin, head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, told during a press conference in Washington DC about the Iranian regime’s agreement with Kazakhstan to acquire nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n Associated Press<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> October 12, 1992<\/strong>: Iran has made a deal with the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan to buy four nuclear warheads, the leading Iranian opposition group said Monday. Mohammed Mohaddesin, director of international relations for the People\u2019s Mujahedeen, said Mujahedeen agents inside Iran obtained information about the deal. The warheads have been paid for but not delivered, he said.<\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, October 12, 1992<\/strong>: \u201cThe Bush administration was warned about this nuclear purchase last week by Mohammed Mohaddesin, an exiled Iranian dissident leader whose information has proved accurate in the past. His Iraq-based organization, the People’s Mujahedin, learned from its sources in Tehran that Iran had signed the agreement with Kazakhstan and paid for the warheads, which Iran may want to fit to Chinese-made Silkworm missiles, but that delivery had not yet taken place.\u201d<\/p>\n Following the revelations, increasing international pressure on the deal intensified and Kazakhstan’s nuclear warheads were eventually prevented from being transported to Iran and delivered to the Iranian regime.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n November 12, 1992<\/strong> – The Iranian Resistance revealed the names of several research centers on weapons of mass destruction in Iran. Reuters news agency reported: “Iran’s main opposition group and Middle East-based analysts say Iran is strongly developing a plan to build weapons of mass destruction. The Mojahedin have listed the names of the Iranian regime’s research and development centers as follows:<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n November 28, 1992<\/strong>: At the time when former Iranian regime\u2019s president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani was secretly visiting Saghand, Yazd<\/a>, the office of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK\/PMOI) issued a statement revealing the construction of a secret nuclear site next to the Atomic Energy Organization’s public facilities on the edge of the desert in Saghand, Yazd. According to the statement, the IRGC has chosen this place due to the existence of a uranium mine in the region.<\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, December 20, 1992<\/strong>: \u201cIran’s push to produce a nuclear bomb — known in Iran’s leadership circles as “the great secret plan” — is accelerating, with President Hashemi Rafsanjani devoting more time and resources to the project. The Iranian resistance group, the People’s Mojahedin, whose information has proved accurate in the past, detailed for us the latest information regarding the Iranian nuclear program that they’ve pieced together from their own contacts in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran\u2026 Yazd. One of the most recently built nuclear sites is located in the vicinity of Yazd in central Iran near a uranium mine. Little is known about this complex, which has been built over the last three years.\u201d<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n April 7, 1993<\/strong> – Mohammad Mohaddesin, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NCRI, cites intelligence from the Iranian regime in an exclusive interview with the New York Times, revealing a major arms deal between Iran and North Korea. “Since early 1993, the Iranian regime has provided $500 million to North Korea to invest in a Nodong-1 missile project and to receive other weapons,” Mohaddesin told the Times.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n January 9, 1995<\/strong> – The NCRI revealed new details about the Iranian regime’s nuclear projects in Isfahan, Karaj, Darkhovin, Moallem Kelayeh, and Bandar Abbas.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, 13 December 1995-<\/strong> Washington Times columnist Stephen Green writes that Iran is close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability because of Chinese assistance. With Chinese help, Green writes, Iran reportedly built a cyclotron uranium enrichment facility in Karaj, 25 miles south of Tehran, according to information from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the Mojahedin-e Khalq). Iran has 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities and maybe building the eleventh site south of Tabriz with Chinese help, Green writes. \u2014Stephen Green, “Nuclear Helping Hand for Iran,” Washington Times, 13 December 1995, p. A18<\/p>\n ***<\/strong><\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, 26 January 1999:<\/strong> The National Council of Resistance of Iran states that VX nerve agent is produced in the Construction Crusade’s War Engineering Research Center. \u2014 Soona Samsami, “Clerical Regime’s Quest for Biological Weapons & Germ Arsenal,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, 26 January 1999, p. 3.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n February 4, 1999<\/strong>: The representative office of the National Council of Resistance in Italy held a press conference with the Italian and international media attending at the Hotel Nazionale in Rome, revealing the Iranian regime’s program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The press conference was led by Ms. Mitra Bagheri, NCRI representative in Italy, and Mr. Antonio Stango, co-founder of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The NCRI said that the mullahs’ regime is rapidly advancing the mass production of biological weapons.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, February 1999<\/strong>: Iran’s opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents: “The Iranian regime….is now capable of producing at least three types of biological munitions, usable for germ warfare. Teheran is concentrating on increasing production to mass production levels, and safeguarding these biological weapons,” says Mitra Bagheri, the Italian representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. According to the Iranian opposition group, four different organizations\/facilities are now engaged in producing biological weapons: Special Industries Organization of Iran’s Ministry of Defense; Research Center of the Construction Crusade; Revolutionary Guards Corps research concentrated in the Imam Hossein University; and the Biotechnology Research Center. These sources have also supposedly identified an additional six unnamed BW research and production centers. \u2014 “Iran Opposition Says Teheran in Deadly Weapons Drive,” CNN, 4 February 1999, www.cnn.com; “Group Accuses Iran of Germ War Program,” Washington Times, 27 January 1999, p. A12; Arnold Beichman, “Arsenal of Germs in Iran?,” Washington Times, 26 January 1999, p. A17.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n August 14, 2002<\/strong> – The National Council of Resistance of Iran unveiled the Natanz nuclear site and the heavy water project in Arak during a press conference in Washington. The revelation of these projects was confirmed by the IAEA and triggered<\/a> worldwide condemnation and scrutiny that dramatically slowed down the clerical regime\u2019s pace for nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n February 20, 2003 \u2013 <\/strong>NCRI revealed<\/a> the Kala Electric Company<\/u> in Abali, near Tehran which was registered as a watch-making company, exposed that centrifuge machines were tested there; also the production of centrifuge parts in Isfahan.<\/p>\n February 23, 2003 – <\/strong>At three conferences, representatives of the NCRI in Washington DC, London, and Berlin said that the Iranian regime had stopped installing new machines in Natanz, but that new centrifuges were being produced in Isfahan and were being tested centrally in Abali, Tehran.<\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, December 19, 2002<\/strong>: Two recently disclosed sites, near the cities of Natanz and Arak south of Tehran, appear designed to help produce enriched uranium or plutonium, the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons. Until the facilities were revealed in August by the opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Iranian government had not disclosed their existence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an arm of the United Nations\u2026 A company called Kala Electric<\/a>, based in Tehran obtained materials and equipment for the project in Natanz, described by the resistance group as a fuel fabrication plant and by other experts as an enriched uranium facility. The Natanz project, which was started two years ago, is spread over 25 acres, with sections 25 feet underground and protected by eight-foot thick concrete walls. Kala Electric<\/u> officials traveled repeatedly to India and China last year, the resistance group said.<\/p>\n Wall Street Journal<\/strong><\/a>, March 18, 2005<\/strong>: The Iranian exile group solved that problem on the eve of Mr. ElBaradei’s visit to Iran. At a Washington news conference, it announced that Iran was testing centrifuge equipment at a front company it named as Kala Electric<\/u>. The NCRI, citing its sources inside Iran, gave the address as “Km 2.5 Ab-Ali highway, next to Kemi Daroo Company\u2026 When the IAEA was finally allowed a full inspection of Kalaye Electric<\/u> that August, it found that workers had completely remodeled one building, pulling up the flooring and repainting and retiling the walls. Still, when the inspectors’ samples came back they showed traces of enriched uranium, some to near weapons grade. “<\/p>\n Note: <\/strong>Upon visiting the “Kalaye Electric”<\/a> site in Abali in August 2003, the IAEA found traces of highly<\/a> enriched uranium.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n May 15, 2003<\/strong> – the NCRI revealed the Lavizan-Shian site<\/a> in Iran. This was the headquarters of the clandestine weaponization aspects of the regime\u2019s nuclear project. There, 17 types of experiments on various aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction were carried out. The revelation seriously undermined the regime\u2019s nuclear weapons project, though the extent of the impact would only be understood gradually, over a period of years. According to information gathered primarily by the MEK\u2019s intelligence network, the Nuclear Committee of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), chaired at the time by Hassan Rouhani, had predicted that the IAEA would visit the Lavizan-Shian site and would find out about the secret nuclear weapons activities there. Therefore, the committee decided to demolish and relocate the site, which had been operating for 15 years. The regime razed the building saying that Tehran Municipality owned the property and decided to turn this military site into a park. Until the IAEA’s visit in June 2004, the regime had cleaned up all traces in the site and had even removed the soil. Because of considerable delay in the inspection, Iran had the opportunity and the time to raze the entire site and remove soil.<\/p>\n New York Times (nuclear chronology)<\/strong><\/a>: June 2004<\/strong> – IAEA board says Iran’s cooperation with the agency was not full, timely and proactive. Satellite pictures show Iran razed a site at Lavizan in Tehran that U.S. officials say was related to atomic programme.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, 12 May 2006<\/strong>: UN inspectors find new traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment in Iran. The samples of highly enriched uranium are allegedly from the former research center at Lavizan-Shian. Anonymous sources are quoted as saying that the purity of the obtained samples appear to be close to or above the level used to make nuclear warheads. \u2014”Diplomats: Enriched uranium found in Iran,” CNN, 12 May 2006; “New HEU traces found in Iran,” Global Security Newswire, 12 May 2006.<\/p>\n Laurence Livermore National Laboratory<\/strong><\/a>, October 23, 2012<\/strong>: (Deferring sanctions) Iran further defers international sanctions by engaging in negotiations preceding key international events and deadlines, such as before IAEA or UNSC meetings. In these negotiations, Iran may provide smaller concessions to indicate the country\u2019s willingness to cooperate to derail criticism and pressure for sanctions. In January 2006, for example, Iran provided IAEA with access to sample certain equipment that had been removed from the Lavizan-Shian military site, in the hopes that this increment of cooperation might \u201cderail an American and European initiative to immediately send Iran’s nuclear case for judgment by the United Nations Security Council.\u201d81 Similarly on October 30, 2011 before the IAEA\u2019s November 8 report on Iran, Iran invited IAEA Safeguards Department head Herman Nackaerts to Tehran – after the IAEA report was published \u2013 for talks “aiming at a resolution of matters.” The invitation tried to signal transparency and may have given Nackaerts \u201ca chance to ask for a renewed trip to Parchin that included a visit to the suspected building.\u201d82 When the November IAEA report noted its concern with the possibly military dimensions of Iran\u2019s program, Iran canceled the invitation.<\/p>\n ISIS Report<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> June 10, 2020: <\/strong>Location 1: Lavisan-Shian, The first location discussed in the IAEA report is the Lavisan-Shian site. It was this site that was subject to such extensive razing as to make another visit not worthwhile.<\/p>\n In reference to this site, the IAEA reported in its June 5, 2020 report the possible presence in Iran between 2002 and 2003 of \u201cnatural uranium in the form of a metal disc, with indications of it undergoing drilling and hydriding, which may not have been included in Iran\u2019s declarations: the origins of this disk; and where such material is currently located.\u201d The statement about \u201cdrilling and hydriding\u201d appears to refer to the production of uranium deuteride (UD3), which is used in a neutron initiator Iran was developing in the Amad Plan.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> 27 May 2003:<\/strong> In a Washington press conference, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reveals the existence two previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facilities west pf Tehran. \u2014Howard LaFranchi, “US weighs a tougher Iran stance,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 2003, www.csmonitor.com.<\/p>\n Wisconsin Project<\/strong><\/a>: In a press release dated May 27, 2003<\/strong>, the NCRI claimed<\/a> that the Iranian government had also developed two additional enrichment facilities, both smaller than the Natanz facility. According to the NCRI, the first facility is located at Lashkar-Abad<\/a>, near Hashtgerd<\/a>, and the second is located five kilometers away, at Ramandeh village. The group claims that the Iranian regime intends to use the facilities as enrichment sub-stations or, alternatively, as back-up stations in the event of a military attack on the Natanz facility. The group also alleged that several front companies were being used to manage these and other AEOI facilities. The companies included: Hasteh Farayed Company, Kavoshyar Company, Energy Novin Company, Novin Puneh Company, Mesbah Energy Company, Kala Electric Company, Tavan Gostar Company, and Noor-Afza-Gostar Company.<\/p>\n Note<\/strong>: The Iranian regime first showed the IAEA a nearby site, intended to prove the NCRI wrong. However, they eventually showed the IAEA the real site.\u00a0In Agency’s visit in 2004, it was determined that the site was dedicated to Laser enrichment. NCRI proved accurate, and this revelation forced the regime to stop the activities in this site and close it down.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n July 8, 2003<\/strong> – During a press conference in Washington, the NCRI revealed a secret site of the regime in the Kolahdooz military complex<\/a> west of Tehran, where a uranium enrichment test center was nearing completion.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>9 July 2003: <\/strong>According to Mr. Jafarzadeh, the site\u2014known as the Kohladouz complex\u2014is under more direct military control than other sites that were previously revealed by NCRI and confirmed by the IAEA. In addition, Mr. Jafarzadeh states that information on the site came from the group Mujahedeen Khalq and that the complex is hidden among warehouses and workshops for building tanks and armored personnel carriers. \u2014Brian Knowlton, “Iranian Exiles Describe Newly Found Nuclear Site,” International Herald Tribune, 9 July 2003.<\/p>\n China Daily<\/strong><\/a>: <\/strong>Javad Dabiran, a member of the Iranian resistance council, presents a satellite picture of nuclear facilities in Natanz, Iran in this July 9, 2003<\/strong> file photo at a news conference in Berlin.<\/p>\n Note:<\/strong> The site was visited by the IAEA on 5 October 2003. The September 2, 2005 report of the IAEA<\/a>, states that “the Agency found no nuclear-related activities at Kolahdouz.” It turned out that by the time the inspections took place, the regime had moved the containers, and IAEA inspectors were taken to a similar area in the vicinity.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n October 7, 2003<\/strong> \u2013 NCRI official website published a story<\/a> titled \u2018Secret nuclear site in Isfahan region\u2019<\/p>\n October 14, 2003<\/strong> – NCRI representatives in London and Vienna unveiled the Iranian regime’s new nuclear base, located 15 km from Isfahan, in a military base.<\/p>\n CNN<\/strong><\/a>, 14 October 2003<\/strong>: U.S. officials and international inspectors are looking into an allegation by an Iranian opposition group that Iran is secretly building a uranium enrichment plant near the city of Isfahan\u2026 The NCRI said in news conferences in Vienna and London on Tuesday that Iran is building a nuclear-related facility just east of Isfahan.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, 14 October 2003<\/strong>: Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, in responding to an allegation that Iran had been hiding a nuclear facility near Isfahan, tells Reuters, “We have certainly not [hidden any facilities from the IAEA].” National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) opposition group head Firouz Mahvi says, “The site has been built to test centrifuges that enrich uranium.”<\/p>\n The Guardian<\/strong><\/a>, October 15, 2003: <\/strong>The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) said the Isfahan Fuel and Research Production centre was designed to run and test up to 180 centrifuges, which had yet to be installed. “The site will be completed in 2006,” Dowlat Nowrouzi, the NCRI’s London representative, said yesterday.<\/p>\n Note: <\/strong>The regime had built the workshop for the centrifuges, but after the revelation, further work was stopped there to avoid detection. The IAEA visited the location, but nothing was detected as the regime had stopped the activity upon being exposed. The NCRI revelation halted Tehran’s effort to expand the centrifuge program.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n November 19, 2003<\/strong> \u2013 The NCRI held a press<\/a> conference in Vienna, detailing the role<\/a> of military units and the Revolutionary Guards in uranium enrichment, dedicating several hundred million dollars in budget for this purpose.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n April 28, 2004<\/strong>: At a press conference in Brussels<\/a>, Mr. Mohammad Mohaddesin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, announced: \u201cIn order to keep its nuclear projects secret and to accelerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the mullahs’ regime has placed many of its sites under the control of military agencies and transferred many of its nuclear experts to these agencies.\u201d Mr. Mohaddesin told the press about the dedication of 400 nuclear experts to the Military Industries, exposing the new Center for \u2018Readiness and New Defense Technology\u2019 (Lavizan 2<\/a>)<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n Also read other NCRI studies: <\/strong><\/p>\n Study: Iran\u2019s Military Nuclear Program<\/a><\/p>\n Study: Iran\u2019s Nuclear Weapons Program<\/a><\/p>\n Timeline of Iran\u2019s Opposition Exposing the Regime\u2019s Terror Networks & Ballistic Missile Projects<\/a><\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n June 2, 2004 <\/strong>– The Secretariat of the NCRI issued a statement about the Iranian regime\u2019s pacing towards nuclear weapons production under the supervision of the Revolutionary Guards. According to the statement, the IRGC is carrying out this project through four military organs, namely the “Center for Modern Defense Training and Technology” (headed by Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi<\/a>), the New Warfare Headquarters, the Nuclear Research Department of Imam Hussein University (under the command of Brigadier General Fazaeli<\/a>) and special industries in The Military Industries Organization.<\/p>\n The statement also suggested: \u201cThe P2 centrifuge project, the evidence of which was first discovered in one of the regime’s military centers called the Lavizan garrison, is not within the scope of the regime’s Atomic Energy Organization, rather the responsibility has been handed over to the Special Industries Division of the Military Industries Organization. This project is under the supervision of Dr. Ali Pazirandeh<\/a> (Professor of Nuclear Physics, University of Tehran, who cooperates with special industries) and Dr. Mohammadi<\/a>, officials of the Defense Industries Organization and a specialist in the construction, assembly, and commissioning of Nazanz centrifuges. The Center for Modern Defense Training and Technology is under the supervision of Brigadier General Dr. Seyed Ali Hosseini Tash<\/a> and is one of the four military bodies involved in the nuclear weapons production project, which have been under direct control of the Revolutionary Guards since the beginning of this year.\u201d<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n September 10, 2004<\/strong> – At a press conference in Paris<\/a>, Mohammad Mohaddesin, the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, revealed for the first time the details about the Bandar Abbas nuclear site, the second-largest facility for converting uranium ore to yellowcake. Mr. Mohaddesin also explained about the regime\u2019s dedication of 16 billion dollars to nuclear technology, purchase, and smuggling of Deuterium<\/a> from Russia, as well as details of the Atomic Energy Organizations’ front companies.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n November 17, 2004<\/strong> \u2013 During a press conference<\/a> Mr. Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, unveiled a central site of the Iranian regime called the Center for Advanced Defense Training and Technology, which operates directly under Mohsen Fakhrizadeh<\/a>, one of the Iranian regime’s top nuclear experts. Mr. Mohaddesin also told reporters about the demolition of the Lavizan Shian site by the regime, following its disclosure via the NCRI.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, 17 November 2004: <\/strong>The exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), alleges that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan gave Iran weapons grade uranium and a design for a nuclear bomb. According to the same group, Khan had already given a quantity of HEU (highly enriched uranium) to Iran in 2001. Iran is purportedly also secretly enriching uranium at a military site previously unknown to the IAEA, even though it promised to halt all such work. \u2014Louis Charbonneau, “Iran Got Warhead Design, Bomb-Grade Uranium – Exiles,” Reuters, 17 November 2004<\/p>\n Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, November 18, 2004: <\/strong>On Wednesday, Mohaddessin used satellite photos to pinpoint what he said was the new facility, inside a 60-acre complex in the northeast part of Tehran known as the Center for the Development of Advanced Defense Technology. The group said that the site also houses Iranian chemical and biological weapons programs and that uranium enrichment began there a year and a half ago, to replace a nearby facility that was dismantled in March ahead of a visit by a U.N. inspections team.<\/p>\n NBC News,<\/strong><\/a> November 18, 2004:<\/strong> The group, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, or NCRI, also claimed that Iran received blueprints for a Chinese-made bomb in the mid-1990s from the global nuclear technology network led by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.<\/p>\n ***<\/strong><\/p>\n November 19, 2004<\/strong> \u2013 In another press conference<\/a> in Paris, Mohammad Mohaddesin, NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee Chair revealed the regime\u2019s new Laser Enrichment at the Center for Readiness and New Defense Technology (Lavizan 2<\/a>) and added that the equipment from razed Lavizan site has been moved to this site.<\/p>\n “In 2000, the Iranian resistance exposed the use of this method (laser enrichment) by the clerical regime, which was operating at a site in Lashkar Abad<\/a>, Hashtgerd, Karaj,” reporters were told in the conference. \u201cThe site used 22kg of natural uranium metal smuggled from the former Soviet Union. The laser enrichment project was subsequently halted at the regime\u2019s Atomic Energy Organization, and the project was transferred to two centers within the Ministry of Defense and the Revolutionary Guards.\u201d<\/p>\n ***<\/strong><\/p>\n December 2, 2004<\/strong>: In a press conference in London, Ali Safavi of the NCRI\u2019s Foreign Affairs Committee unveiled the Iranian regime’s program for long-range missiles and production of nuclear and chemical warheads, at Hemmat Missile Industries. A list of names and details<\/a> of the complexes involved in the project was made public.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>December 2, 2004<\/strong>: The National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI) opposition group has raised suspicions regarding two covert Iranian military sites where nuclear activities may be taking place, sparking IAEA’s interest to inspect the sites. UN diplomats state that the IAEA lacks the legal authority to search these sites as they may only monitor civilian nuclear programs, and the facilities in question were never declared as nuclear sites. \u2014Louis Charbonneau, “UN Lacks Right to Inspect Sites in Iran – Diplomats,” Reuters, 2 December 2004.<\/p>\n NTI<\/strong><\/a>, December 2, 2004:<\/strong> IAEA inspectors seek access to two secret Iranian military sites. Intelligence data suggests the Iranian Ministry of Defense may be working on atomic weapons there. The information is based on satellite photos indicating testing of high explosives, and procurement records showing the purchase of equipment that may be used for uranium enrichment. The two sites are the decades-old Parchin military complex, southeast of Tehran, and a newer facility, Lavizan II, built in northeastern Tehran. Information on the second site was provided by the Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI). \u2014William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, “Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Iran Sites,” The New York Times, 2 December 2004.<\/p>\n New York Times<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>December 2, 2004<\/strong>: The second site is a relatively new facility, called Lavisan II, built in northeastern Tehran, near the site of an older facility that was dismantled within the past year. The existence of the new facility was highlighted last month by an Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance.<\/p>\n NATO Parliamentary Assembly<\/strong>, Sub-committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, Nuclear Policy of Iran<\/strong> (DRAFT REPORT<\/a><\/strong>): Furthermore, the NCRI, the Iranian dissident organization, announced that Iran had been testing explosives at Parchin and Lavizan II military bases for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. IAEA inspectors. IAEA inspectors visited the Parchin military complex and found nothing suspicious. Nevertheless, it seems that some doubts still remain, as the IAEA is repeatedly seeking access to these sites to continue its investigation.<\/p>\n ***<\/strong><\/p>\n![\"Jun171991\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/Jun171991.jpg\" "\\"Jun171991\\"")
In June 1991<\/strong>, at a major news conference in Washington, DC Mohammad Mohadessin, Chairman of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee revealed for the first time the details about the Iranian regime’s plans to acquire a nuclear weapon. Mr. Mohaddesin told the international press about a $200 million budget and the details of the so-called “big plan” project in “Moallem Kalayeh” in Qazvin. The media described the revelation as a “political shock.”<\/p>\n![\"Oct121992\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/Oct121992.jpg\" "\\"Oct121992\\"")
Washington Post<\/strong><\/a>, October 18, 1992<\/strong> \u2013 \u201cA report published last month by the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Center revealed with what ease the Iranians had led the delegation astray. Among the sites, the international inspectors asked to visit was Moallem Kalayeh, a village about 100 miles north of Tehran. According to Western intelligence sources, the village is home to Iran’s most important nuclear center; parts are concealed below ground and the area is patrolled by special units of the revolutionary guards. According to the Wiesenthal report, though, the delegation never got there. Instead, they were led by their hosts to another village that had the same name.\u201d<\/p>\n![\"alireza-jafarzadeh-june-1991\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/alireza-jafarzadeh-june-1991.jpg\" "\\"alireza-jafarzadeh-june-1991\\"")
<\/p>\n![\"Sep111992\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/Sep111992.jpg\" "\\"Sep111992\\"")
September 11, 1992<\/strong> – At a press conference in Washington DC, the Iranian resistance revealed important documents about the Khomeini regime’s latest efforts to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons. Alireza Jafarzadeh said the Iranian regime, has hired at least 54 Chinese and Russian nuclear experts at astonishing rates and bribes. He also stated that the Iranian regime had allocated $ 800 million in 1992 to advance its nuclear weapons program.<\/p>\n\n
![\"Jan261999\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/Jan261999.jpg\" "\\"Jan261999\\"")
January 26, 1999<\/strong> \u2013 NCRI office in the United States held a major press conference at the Madison Hotel in Washington, DC, exposing the Iranian regime’s efforts to acquire chemical and biological<\/a> weapons. At the conference, Soona Samsami briefed reporters on the Defense and Strategic Studies Commission, using diagrams and maps of the Iranian regime’s weapons centers to explain the information revealed about the plan.<\/p>\n![\"iran-lavizan-shian-for-after\"](\"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/iran-lavizan-shian-for-after.png\" "\\"iran-lavizan-shian-for-after\\"")