{"id":343709,"date":"2026-03-21T20:42:10","date_gmt":"2026-03-21T19:42:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=343709"},"modified":"2026-03-21T20:42:10","modified_gmt":"2026-03-21T19:42:10","slug":"war-outside-propaganda-inside-tehrans-desperate-bid-to-reassure-a-shaken-base","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/war-outside-propaganda-inside-tehrans-desperate-bid-to-reassure-a-shaken-base\/","title":{"rendered":"War Outside, Propaganda Inside: Tehran\u2019s Desperate Bid to Reassure a Shaken Base"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Basij forces set up checkpoints and mount repressive measures in wake of attacks by Israel<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Three-minute read<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

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This year, the clerical dictatorship\u2019s Nowruz messaging did not sound like the voice of a confident state. It sounded like a regime trying to contain panic. Since the war began on February 28, Iran has endured sustained U.S.-Israeli attacks, the killing of senior leaders, and near-daily bombardment. But foreign strikes alone do not explain the tone of the regime\u2019s propaganda. The deeper wound was opened earlier, in the nationwide uprising that peaked in January 2026 and shook the clerical state to its core. Reuters described<\/a> it as the worst domestic unrest since the era of the 1979 revolution, while Amnesty called January 2026 the deadliest period of repression in decades of its research.<\/p>\n

A Nowruz of Absence<\/h2>\n

For the first time in decades, the new year opened without Ali Khamenei\u2019s image or presence, and under bombardment. The message attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei was meant to project continuity. Instead, it highlighted rupture. Mojtaba\u2019s Nowruz message<\/a> named the year one of a \u201cresistance economy under national unity and national security\u201d and denied Iranian responsibility for attacks in Turkey and Oman. But the very fact that the regime relied on a controlled written or mediated message rather than a visible, commanding appearance exposed how fragile the moment had become.<\/p>\n

The real audience for this messaging was not the Iranian public at large. It was the regime\u2019s own demoralized camp: the security services, Basij, judiciary, bureaucracy, and loyalist networks rattled by war, succession, and the memory of January\u2019s revolt. In the message attributed to Mojtaba, he explicitly urges domestic media to avoid serious discussion of the regime\u2019s weak points. A state that must order silence about failure is admitting that failure has become dangerous inside its own ranks.<\/p>\n

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Masoud Pezeshkian\u2019s Nowruz message<\/a> called for people to “wash away grudges and differences,” framed the new year as one of \u201cconsensus and solidarity,\u201d and appealed even to Iranians abroad to set aside hostility. At the same time, he insisted that the killing of top leaders had failed to break the system and that the state had quickly restored order. His role was to soften the regime\u2019s image with the language of reconciliation and calm while still reinforcing the same core claim: that the system remains stable, unified, and in control despite war and internal crisis.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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An #IRGC<\/a> commander called Karimi stated that 25 percent of the people arrested were members of the paramilitary Basij units, six percent were members of the IRGC and five percent were from relatives of #Iran<\/a>-Iraq war veterans.https:\/\/t.co\/O6D392urAs<\/a><\/p>\n

— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 6, 2023<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n