{"id":347901,"date":"2026-09-08T19:13:16","date_gmt":"2026-09-08T18:13:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/?p=347901"},"modified":"2026-09-08T19:13:16","modified_gmt":"2026-09-08T18:13:16","slug":"saeed-kamali-dehghan-and-irans-information-security-playbook","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/iran-resistance\/demonizing-mek\/saeed-kamali-dehghan-and-irans-information-security-playbook\/","title":{"rendered":"Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Iran\u2019s Information-Security Playbook\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Saeed
ID Card for Saeed Kamali Dehghan from Fars News Agency<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Thirteen-minute read<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

In the clerical dictatorship, journalism has never been treated simply as journalism. It is part of the security environment. Newspapers are licensed and closed; reporters are arrested, interrogated and surveilled; communications are restricted; contact with real sources on the ground is monitored; and foreign correspondents operate through an accreditation system in which the intelligence establishment has a formal role. Reporters Without Borders documented that representatives of Iran’s ministries of Culture, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence maintain files on foreign journalists and their outlets, with critical reporting affecting access and visas. A foreign correspondent told RSF<\/a> that intelligence officials explicitly instructed him on the subjects he could not cross and even suggested language for his reports.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The system applies two pressures simultaneously. It restricts information leaving Iran while seeking to influence the information that reaches audiences abroad. RSF found that foreign agencies maintaining bureaux in Tehran faced close monitoring and the constant possibility of losing accreditation, while journalists of Iranian origin were particularly susceptible to state leverage because Tehran treats dual nationals solely as Iranian citizens. In 2026, Iran remains near the bottom of the World Press<\/a> Freedom Index, and speaking even anonymously to foreign media can bring arrest or threats. A bill advanced in August 2026 would go further still, potentially criminalizing unauthorized<\/a> contact with foreign news organizations and requiring notification to the Intelligence Ministry.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is why Tehran’s struggle over journalism should be understood as a <\/span>security function rather than a public-relations exercise<\/span><\/b>. Censorship prevents unwanted evidence from leaving the country. Surveillance identifies the people supplying it. State media establish the official account. International broadcasting projects that account outward. Covert online networks create apparently independent messengers. And when credible foreign journalists publish arguments favorable to Tehran, those arguments can be imported back into Iranian media carrying the authority of an outside institution. The purpose is larger than making the government look good. It is to control which accounts of Iran acquire legitimacy, which opponents are regarded as credible, and ultimately whether the Islamic Republic is understood abroad as a system that can be replaced or a reality that must be accommodated.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Tehran\u2019s Information War Against Iran\u2019s Resistance https:\/\/t.co\/8TciBvjgkE<\/a><\/p>\n

— Ali Safavi (@amsafavi) August 30, 2026<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n