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Why the Iranian Regime Chose‌ War and Economic Siege Over an Ideal Deal

Boats navigating the Strait of Hormuz, southern Iran
Boats navigating the Strait of Hormuz, southern Iran

Four-minute read

In the long, grinding aftermath of the 2026 Iran war, a rare diplomatic opening appeared. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding offered Tehran something extraordinary: an immediate halt to military operations on all fronts, commitments to respect Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, a pathway to lifting sanctions (including UN and unilateral measures), reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under negotiated terms, and a 60-day framework for broader nuclear talks.

Yet the regime has treated this opening less as a lifeline than as a threat. Why reject—or allow to wither—a deal that, by the admission of its own former president, stacked the table so heavily in Tehran’s favor?

Mohammad Khatami Reappears

Mohammad Khatami, the so-called “reformist president” from 1997 to 2005, made the case with unusual urgency. In remarks published through his official channels in mid-to-late August, he described the memorandum as without parallel: “Since World War II, no document signed by a U.S. president has given this many advantages to the other side and imposed this many commitments on itself.” He warned that losing the opportunity would produce “extraordinary problems” for the Islamic Republic and praised Pezeshkian for signing it “courageously and self-sacrificingly,” calling the document a source of pride for the system after it received parliamentary support and higher approval.

Khatami is no outsider. A mid-ranking cleric and long-time loyalist, he served as minister of culture under Ruhollah Khomeini, directed wartime propaganda efforts, and later cultivated an international image suggesting the clerical system was capable of internal reform. His presidency tested the boundaries of the establishment while ultimately reinforcing its core, the absolute supremacy of the velayat-e faqih. He previously described the guardianship of the Islamic jurist in near-sacred terms, rejecting fundamental challenges to the constitution as an act of betrayal. His current intervention is a classic exercise in regime management, representing a calculated attempt to salvage institutional legitimacy and secure economic breathing room without challenging the foundational structure of the state.

Thriving on Crisis

That structure, however, feeds on crisis. For a leadership that consolidates power through external enmity and internal mobilization, genuine de-escalation functions like the cup of poison Ruhollah Khomeini reluctantly swallowed to end the Iran-Iraq War. Peace would expose the establishment to the very domestic storms it has long suppressed. Without a perpetual foreign threat, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps loses much of its security mandate and institutional rationale. Furthermore, without the cover of a wartime emergency, Mojtaba Khamenei’s consolidation of hereditary power might never have materialized.

Mojtaba assumed the supreme leadership in March 2026 after his father, Ali Khamenei, was killed in the opening strikes of the war. The Assembly of Experts elevated the younger Khamenei amid chaos and military pressure; his own severe injuries kept him largely out of public view for months. Hereditary continuity of this kind is more easily imposed and defended under the banner of national survival than in ordinary political competition or amid competing power centers. Sustained peace would reopen those internal contests.

Lethal peace

The regime’s own language reveals the logic. Khomeini, deep in the Iran-Iraq War in 1983, framed any step backward as the path to defeat. Ali Khamenei repeated the theme for decades: “Taking one step back against arrogant powers will lead them to take one step forward.” Any retreat, he argued, initiates an unending chain of further demands and eventual surrender. Other officials have long warned that yielding on the nuclear file would only invite pressure on missiles, regional proxies, and then human rights. The pattern is consistent: identity and internal cohesion are forged against the external enemy.

Recent statements illustrate the preference for confrontation. Mohsen Rezaei, newly installed as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and a close hardline ally, has publicly questioned the utility of remaining bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after U.S. and Israeli strikes. “Why shouldn’t we pursue an atomic bomb?” he asked, arguing that Trump’s actions created “nuclear insecurity” and heightened global desire for weapons. Rezaei has also warned neighboring states against joining expanded U.S. economic pressure, threatening severe retaliation, including disruption of alternative Gulf shipping routes. Iranian officials and sources close to the regime have separately signaled readiness to strike U.S. military targets in Europe—bases in places such as Bulgaria or Cyprus—if the conflict escalates further, and have contemplated attacks on undersea infrastructure.

These are not the words of a confident power assessing optimal outcomes. They are the reflexes of a system that equates survival with perpetual friction. The memorandum offered sanctions relief, economic reconstruction pathways, and an end to active hostilities on terms that the regime’s officials themselves called historic. By allowing it to stall—over Hormuz implementation, nuclear details, or simply by failing to capitalize—the leadership has chosen continued naval blockade, intensified sanctions, risk of renewed bombardment, and deeper domestic hardship.

Power Built on the Enemy

How fragile must a regime be when even a one-sided diplomatic windfall is treated as existential danger? The answer lies in its foundational bargain: legitimacy derived less from performance or consent than from the permanent mobilization against foreign adversaries. Remove the crisis, and the questions that have repeatedly shaken Iranian streets—over living standards, rights, and the costs of isolation—return with greater force. For those who rose or consolidated power amid war, ordinary politics looks more perilous than the siege itself.

The Iranian people have paid the price of this calculation for decades. The latest choice only confirms that the regime prioritizes its own continuity over any realistic path out of isolation and suffering.