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The Iranian regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian is now openly describing the link between worsening economic conditions and the risk of domestic unrest. Speaking to officials in East Azerbaijan, he said the Islamic Republic had “never” faced pressure of the current intensity in its 48-year history and described a sequence in which blocked trade routes and deteriorating services would leave people dissatisfied and eventually produce “social protests.”
That concern is being matched by a broader internal-security posture. Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee has been discussing legislation on “countering foreign infiltration” alongside Basij officials, while recent state-media messaging has emphasized neighborhood organization, mosque-centered networks and a more intelligence-oriented Basij presence.
Pezeshkian is also warning about divisions inside the ruling establishment. At the October 14 cabinet meeting, he told officials not to be distracted by “division-makers” who, he said, were continually insulting, accusing and weakening managers and senior officials. KhabarOnline reported his call for unity and cohesion under conditions of economic war. His complaint reflects a wider confrontation over war, negotiations and responsibility for the current crisis.
Pezeshkian lists Iran’s fault lines—power, water, gas, fuel, banking, budget, pensions—as a cleric is stabbed to death in Sari. Central Bank’s goal: just slow the #inflation rate. By @MansoreGolestan https://t.co/eBARBew5k6
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 15, 2026
War, negotiations and factional escalation
Parliament speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf made that disagreement unusually explicit, arguing that Iran cannot rely on either diplomacy or military escalation alone. He said the regime must “be ready for war, fight, and negotiate” simultaneously in order to establish what he called sustainable deterrence. Meanwhile, Executive Vice President Mohammad-Jafar Ghaempanah separately stressed that no negotiation can occur without a decision by the Supreme National Security Council and Mojtaba Khamenei’s final approval, underscoring how tightly any shift toward talks remains controlled from the top.
The dispute has spilled onto the street. At an anti-Rouhani and anti-Zarif gathering on October 14, participants chanted “Zarif, you American, you are our disgrace” and branded former president Hassan Rouhani an “infiltrator” and “British corrupt figure.” The demonstration sits within a broader campaign by hardline figures and media against Rouhani and Zarif over negotiations, relations with Washington and responsibility for past policy choices. KhabarOnline has previously documented rhetoric from hardline circles going as far as calls for the prosecution or execution of the two former officials.
The picture is of a regime under fierce pressure and increasingly at odds with itself. While the leadership calls for cohesion, rival factions are mobilizing supporters against one another and openly fighting over whether negotiations are a necessary response to mounting pressure or an unacceptable retreat.
Two more security personnel killed in Sistan-Baluchestan as Iran’s working-class subsistence basket hits 91.3 million tomans. Minimum wage now covers only ~8 days of household expenses—down from 15 in March. Regime calls the #economy “resilient.”
By @MansoreGolestan…— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 14, 2026
A “street trench” rally ends in a fight
The contradiction was visible in the northern city of Rasht. State media heavily promoted the October 15 “Janfadayane Iran” mobilization as a display of readiness, loyalty and cohesion. ISNA said organizers expected more than 40,000 participants, while Mehr described the event as a demonstration of public presence in the “street trench.”
Yet video from the event showed a physical confrontation. Reporting accompanying the footage said nearby residents objected to noise from the nighttime gathering and that the dispute escalated into a fight. The precise trigger has not been officially confirmed but the political contrast is clear: a state-organized event designed to demonstrate discipline and command of the street instead generated visible friction with local residents.
Another incident has deepened distrust inside the political class. An armed man was detained after an October 13 Baran Foundation event at Tehran’s National Library attended by former officials associated with Mohammad Khatami. Foundation figures say he intended to target former roads minister Abbas Akhundi and claimed links to a group seeking to eliminate several people. A security source subsequently confirmed the detention but said investigators had not established that the incident was organized or terrorist in nature.
Heavy fighting spreads in Iran’s Sistan & Baluchestan today—contradicting regime claims of “dismantling” armed networks.
Meanwhile, the regime is throttling #internet speeds (openly admitted by a govt spokeswoman), sentencing protesting workers to lashes, cutting student meal…— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 13, 2026
Economic pressure reaches basic food and welfare
The IRGC’s October 16 “Ba’ath” exercise—claiming of more than 400,000 livelihood packages and 700 dowry sets—was less a solution to poverty than a political display. Tasnim framed it as relief during “economic war,” while the regime used an institution central to repression and internal security to project an image of social care. But one-off handouts cannot offset collapsing purchasing power and triple-digit food inflation; for many households, they amount to only brief relief. The exercise therefore reflects growing concern that worsening subsistence pressures could fuel broader social unrest.
The scale of that mobilization coincides with worsening pressure in food production. Poultry-industry officials report that feed costs and production expenses have risen sharply, with producers increasingly unable to obtain corn and soybean meal at official rates. Earlier ISNA reporting documented corn prices several times above administered levels and soybean meal trading at multiples of its official price, conditions that producers say are reducing output and increasing the risk of further price increases.
The emerging picture is one of growing overlap between economic crisis management, factional conflict and security mobilization. The leadership is anticipating protest, tightening neighborhood structures, staging mass displays of street loyalty, and using the IRGC to distribute basic assistance, while its own factions openly attack one another over war and negotiations.