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Even by the Iranian regime’s own measurements, the economy is contracting at an extraordinary pace. Figures attributed to the Statistical Center and carried by Tasnim show gross domestic product falling 10.1 percent year-on-year in spring 2026 with oil and 4.6 percent without it. Industry and mining contracted 14.7 percent and services 4.8 percent. Whatever the limitations of official statistics in Iran, the figures amount to an admission from inside the state apparatus that the underlying economy has deteriorated sharply.
The government has offered no convincing path out. It’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, said on September 21, 2026, that pressure to increase wages merely produces higher inflation and leaves salaries worthless. “They apply pressure and constantly increase salaries, then from the other side inflation rises and salaries lose their value,” he said, claiming that officials were still searching for a solution.
Even lawmakers are describing the consequences in harsher terms. MP Hajipour said surging inflation and rents had “broken people’s backs,” while the head of the poultry-farmers’ union said egg exports had plunged from roughly 55,000 tons last year to about 15,000 tons so far this year, blaming bureaucratic controls and regulatory failures.
Zahedan Gunfire Shadows Basij-#IRGC Parade Amid Sanctions, Police Abuse and Division
by Amir Taghatihttps://t.co/R9vljTNE3I— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 18, 2026
Economic Anger Moves into the Street
The social consequences are increasingly visible. On September 22, the official IRNA news agency reported a protest by employees of Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences over delayed payments, wages and working conditions. Protesters chanted “Enough promises, our table is empty,” while workers said some compensation was months overdue.
In Khuzestan, the confrontation has become more severe. Videos from protests by unemployed youth from Moran, Omeyshiyeh and surrounding communities show police pursuing demonstrators with batons while gunfire can be heard. Residents say they have spent years demanding local hiring at sugar-industry facilities developed around lands historically belonging to their communities. One unemployed protester said even employed workers could no longer cover basic expenses, while those without jobs had virtually nothing. Reports said phones were confiscated and images deleted during earlier clashes.
These protests form part of a broader pattern of labor and retiree unrest across Iran in which demands over wages, pensions and employment increasingly collide with anger at the institutions responsible for administering the economy.
"Iran is entering the final days of September under simultaneous pressure from soaring living costs, a weakened #currency, fuel shortages and problems across industrial supply chains," @MansoreGolestan writes.https://t.co/N7NEb86C1o
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 19, 2026
“I Fear Internal Issues More”
The clearest expression of the establishment’s anxiety came not from an opposition source but from a state-organized gathering broadcast inside Iran. Commentator Bijan Abdolkarimi warned: “I fear internal issues more than I fear external issues and foreigners.”
He pointed to two dangers: a cultural divide and what he called a “huge class gap.” Referring to the January uprising, Abdolkarimi acknowledged that many protesters belonged to “the hungry section of society” and were not simply opposition activists or foreign agents. The admission cuts directly against the authorities’ repeated effort to explain mass unrest primarily through foreign conspiracies.
At the same time, the Basij’s mobilization is continuing to spread geographically. IRNA reported on September 22 preparations for another mobilization in Shush, where officials stressed “unity and national cohesion” and warned against “public hopelessness” under economic pressure.
"Iran’s accumulating #economic pressures moved visibly into the streets on September 20, 2026, as retirees demonstrated in several cities while the rial again weakened sharply," writes @shahriarkia.https://t.co/scTS9SL15B
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 20, 2026
Propaganda and Infighting Intensify
The security response also extends into the information sphere. IRIB chief Peyman Jebelli described how state broadcasting mobilized its television, radio and news networks after the gasoline-system hacking “so that sedition would not emerge.” He said IRIB was no longer merely an observer of events but had become an “event-maker” and “field-maker” actively involved in shaping them.
Meanwhile, factional conflict inside the establishment is widening. MP Kamran Ghazanfari confirmed that some lawmakers were again pursuing a motion declaring Pezeshkian politically incompetent, explicitly citing the country’s economic, political and cultural conditions. Another lawmaker attacked both Pezeshkian and former president Hassan Rouhani for language deemed too weak, while the state-aligned Arman newspaper complained that scarcely a day passes without attacks on officials and that nighttime regime rallies themselves have featured chants calling for the death of rival figures.
The picture emerging from the establishment’s own statistics, media and political debates is therefore increasingly stark: output is shrinking, purchasing power is collapsing, workers and unemployed youth are protesting, and internal disputes are deepening. At the same time, the authorities are enlarging Basij mobilization and openly using state broadcasting to prevent discontent from becoming what they call “sedition.”
The telling admission is Abdolkarimi’s: the danger feared most is increasingly inside Iran itself—a society under severe economic pressure with a long record of turning social grievances into nationwide political unrest.