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HomeIran News NowIran Nuclear NewsRevealed: Iranian Regime’s Apprehension and Desperation for Nuclear Deal

Revealed: Iranian Regime’s Apprehension and Desperation for Nuclear Deal

iran parliament raisi letter leaks

A classified document obtained and disclosed by the Iranian dissident group “GhyamSarnegouni” reveals the Iranian regime’s apprehension regarding a possible firm stance of Western governments on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. It also highlights the desperate efforts of Tehran to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and benefit from the significant concessions granted by world powers in 2015.

The communication, originating from Iran’s Majlis (parliament) Research Center and addressed to the regime’s president Ebrahim Raisi, evaluates Tehran’s agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The letter emphasizes that statements made by IAEA chief Rafael Grossi regarding access, including the possibility of conducting interviews with individuals, raise concerns about potential security implications. The leaked letter further indicates that when viewed from the perspective of Western countries, the regime faced mounting pressure amidst recent unrest. Just a few days prior to sending the letter, Enrique Mora, the EU’s chief negotiator, explicitly stated in an interview that Tehran sees a nuclear deal as the most viable path to navigate the crisis resulting from ongoing protests.

Therefore, as outlined in the letter, reaching an agreement with the IAEA under such circumstances would signify that “Iran, under pressure, was compelled to offer concessions that it was not willing to make before the current protests and economic challenges.”

Below is the full text of this letter:

His Excellency Mr. Dr. Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi

Dear President,


I hope this message finds you in good health and high regard. I wanted to discuss the recent visit of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the agreements and negotiations that took place during this visit. A report titled “Reflection on the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency” has been prepared by the political studies office of the Majlis Research Center, and I would like to present it to you.


The Director General’s visit to Tehran to hold a meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency had a positive psychological impact on the prospects of a nuclear agreement. However, the new agreement has legal dimensions, interesting and perhaps concerning political aspects. In order to accurately assess the content of this bilateral agreement, it is necessary to review the joint statement and the interviews given by officials from both sides. However, there were discrepancies in the statements made by officials from the Atomic Energy Organization [of Iran] and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the dimensions of the agreement, making it difficult for experts to evaluate.

Agreed-upon aspects:

After examining the joint statement and the statements made by both parties, two general issues have been agreed upon. The first issue relates to the remaining safeguard issues concerning three sites claimed by the Agency. Iran has expressed its readiness to provide more information and access to address these issues. The second issue pertains to activities or limitations within Iran’s nuclear program in the past year. Specifically, the International Atomic Energy Agency seeks Iran’s voluntary cooperation for further verification and monitoring, including the resumption of surveillance cameras and increased inspection of the Fordow complex.

Regarding the first issue, two points should be noted. First, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is no obligation to present the termination of the case or the final report within a specific timeframe. The focus is on expediting the resolution of the remaining safeguard issues related to these three sites. Grossi, the Secretary-General, stated in his interview that he will present his assessment of the investigation’s process and results to the Board of Governors after completing the technical stages of “summary” and “evaluation.” It is important to note that this summary does not mean the end of Iran’s case but rather signifies Iran’s agreement to increase access to the IAEA, which does not necessarily lead to the closure of the case. Second, if it is true that accessibility also involves interviews with individuals, it may have security implications.

Regarding the second issue, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s request for a 50% increase in monitoring individual facilities is justified due to the increase in the abundance of materials under safeguards. Although there are differing opinions on the detailed calculations of the percentage increase in monitoring, the reinstallation of cameras serves as a precautionary measure. It was previously stated that the camera data would not be available to the International Atomic Energy Agency until the sanctions are lifted. However, considering that the agreement with the IAEA grants access to the data, this can be seen as an additional safeguard action, albeit delaying compliance with the strategic action law.

To determine whether this agreement violates Article 6 of the Strategic Action Law, detailed information is needed, and the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission can evaluate this issue by inviting a senior member of the Atomic Energy Organization. However, based on Iran’s general commitment in paragraph 3 of the statement, the possibility of violating the law is not ruled out. The phrase “Iran voluntarily allows the agency” indicates that Iran commits within the safeguards framework.

Strategic assessment:

Beyond the potential violation of the Strategic Action Law, the implications and strategic effects of the government’s decision to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency are very important. The agreement was reached at a time when Tehran was under pressure from the West due to the recent unrest. Enrique Mora, the coordinator of the JCPOA negotiations, clearly stated in a recent interview that a nuclear agreement is the best way out for Tehran to resolve the crisis caused by these disturbances. Therefore, from the Western perspective, reaching an agreement with the IAEA implies that Iran, under pressure, has been compelled to make concessions that it was previously unwilling to make.

Furthermore, Mora believes that Iran has not gained any specific points through extensive cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agreement itself is not the problem; rather, it is how we carry out our obligations and address our concerns that will determine the success or failure of the agreement. Some sources within Iran implicitly present three arguments to defend the agreement with the IAEA. First, they argue that the market effects are short-term, and relying on this factor to manage the market for more than a few days is not feasible. Additionally, from a technical perspective, the effect of the Central Bank’s license on non-bank transactions, such as purchasing export currency for petrochemicals and minerals, has a more significant impact on reducing the price of the dollar in the open market than the psychological effect of the agreement. However, the simultaneous implementation of these two issues has diverted attention from the role of the central bank in leading the market.

The second argument highlights the agreement’s impact on preventing the issuance of a resolution against Iran by the Council of Ministers. Although the issuance of such a resolution is not definitive and lacks consensus, the United States is reluctant to pursue this path due to concerns over Iran’s possible reaction. In the nuclear dimension, Iran has tried to avoid provocative actions that would force an increase in enrichment. Therefore, according to this logic, instead of offering concessions, Iran could have used the threat of nuclear countermeasures to prevent the issuance of a resolution. Moreover, European countries may miscalculate that if Iran, due to concerns about the resolution of the Board of Governors, has agreed to provide significant concessions regarding transparency and supervision to the International Atomic Energy Agency, then by threatening to activate the snapback mechanism and reintroducing resolutions in October 2023, more significant concessions can be obtained from Iran in both nuclear and non-nuclear domains.

The third argument revolves around the closure of the case regarding the alleged three sites. Achieving this would fulfill the most crucial remaining precondition for Iran to reach an agreement. However, Iran has not made any commitments regarding this issue. Past experiences of Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency over the past twenty years have shown that providing more technical information to the Agency without high-level political guarantees from the US and Europe to fulfill challenging commitments has had the opposite effect and has been used as leverage against Iran. Granting new access to the International Atomic Energy Agency may not only result in terminating the Iran dossier but may also complicate matters in the Board of Governors.


The concessions Iran has made to the International Atomic Energy Agency, such as data sharing, could be part of a limited agreement with the West, which would grant Iran certain benefits, such as managing foreign exchange resources or the oil market. However, these concessions have not received specific rewards, and the achievements resulting from this agreement are difficult to envision. It is worth noting that some individuals close to the American negotiating team did not expect Iran to make concessions without receiving compensation in the field of verification and monitoring. Therefore, it is necessary to manage the situation in a way that reduces the risks associated with this agreement and changes the Western perception that Iran is being compelled to make strategic concessions in exchange for overcoming internal challenges. Past experience has shown that dealing with the West in this manner, contrary to popular belief, not only fails to bring about an opening but also intensifies the pressure.

The bottom line is that criticizing the recent agreement with the agency does not mean rejecting negotiations in principle, especially considering that sworn enemies of the state are seeking new ways to intensify pressures and sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, it is essential to consider and implement appropriate arrangements and measures during negotiations to maximize the country’s benefits.