Three-minute read
As nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States continue in Rome, coordinated Friday sermons across Iran on May 23 exposed the Iranian regime’s defiance as a defensive reflex—less about strength, more about survival. From Isfahan to Tehran, the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives reiterated that the regime will not give up uranium enrichment under any circumstances. But beneath the bravado lies a regime acutely aware of its own fragility.
In Isfahan, Mojtaba Mirdamadi addressed U.S. President Donald Trump with hostile rhetoric: “Stop your nonsense… You’ve embarrassed yourself and your nation.” He declared, “Iran’s nuclear program is not negotiable—not by permission, not for dismantlement.” Citing Khamenei, he added, “I’m not optimistic about negotiations. Talks must not mean humiliation.”
In Karaj, Mohammad-Mehdi Hosseini Hamedani warned against internal voices calling for compromise, saying they “foolishly believe surrender to the U.S. will solve our economic problems.” Drawing a direct lesson from the downfall of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi—who gave up his nuclear program before being overthrown—Hamedani underlined why the regime views nuclear capacity as existential: “Look what happened to Libya. They completely surrendered.”
This comparison is telling. For Iran’s rulers, nuclear capability isn’t just a bargaining chip—it’s the ultimate insurance policy. The memory of Gaddafi’s fall looms large. Without the threat of nuclear retaliation, Tehran believes it would be militarily vulnerable and politically brittle. A climbdown under Western pressure would signal weakness, risk defections among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and proxy groups, and potentially embolden a volatile society already seething with unrest.
In Mashhad, Ahmad Alamolhoda, Khamenei’s representative and father-in-law to the slain president Ebrahim Raisi, did more than lash out at the United States—he issued ideological marching orders. He declared that a president in “line with the ideals of the Islamic Revolution” must view America as “a predatory wolf” and approach any negotiation—direct or indirect—with that hostility in mind. “If he wants to sit at the table, he must sit as a helpless lamb facing a ferocious wolf,” Alamolhoda insisted. This, he said, is what qualifies one to be “a president worthy of the Islamic Revolution.” His remarks sent a clear warning to Pezeshkian.
In Tehran, Kazem Sedighi, interim Friday prayer leader, focused his sermon on the regime’s strategic need to indoctrinate Iran’s youth through education. He criticized the current education system as a “worn-out legacy of the West” and called for a complete overhaul aligned with revolutionary values. “Books must be rewritten to reflect the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. We need to raise a generation prepared to bring forth the Imam of the Age,” Sedighi said. He emphasized that teachers must be ideological role models— “pure in speech, action, and belief”— tasked not just with instruction, but with shaping loyal soldiers of the regime. His remarks highlighted the regime’s acute fear of cultural dissent and its reliance on ideological conditioning to maintain control over a restive society.
In Sari, Mohammad-Bagher Mohammadi Laeeni voiced alarm over growing international support for the Iranian Resistance, specifically condemning the recent declaration by 560 UK parliamentarians backing regime change and the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization. “The British say Iran must dismantle even 1% uranium enrichment and erase its nuclear infrastructure,” he said with indignation. “At the same time, 550 members of their parliament openly support our enemies.” His reference was to the February 2025 cross-party UK statement endorsing the NCRI and Maryam Rajavi’s democratic platform. Laeeni’s anger reflected the regime’s acute sensitivity to rising international legitimacy for its most organized opposition force—a threat Tehran views as existential.
These hardline sermons were backed by state media. A Javan Daily editorial argued that enrichment is “central to Iran’s nuclear sovereignty” and a key lever against sanctions. Siasat Rooz went further, accusing the U.S. of sabotaging talks and warning that giving up enrichment would be tantamount to national suicide.
Together, these voices reveal a regime gripped by existential fear—cornered by escalating foreign pressure, an emboldened Iranian Resistance, and the looming threat of another nationwide uprising. Its defiant insistence on uranium enrichment goes far beyond asserting national rights; it is a calculated strategy of survival. For Tehran’s ruling elite, maintaining nuclear capability serves as a deterrent not only against external threats, but also against internal collapse—shielding a fragile regime from defections within its ranks and from a restless population poised for revolt.