In a revealing statement, a senior official of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) inadvertently exposed the regime’s extensive use of propaganda and psychological warfare to manipulate public perception. Ali Mohammad Naeini, the spokesperson and Deputy Head of Public Relations for the IRGC, acknowledged, “All these rumors and ignoring the conditions are aimed at influencing society, and if we do not conduct timely and effective media operations, we will face problems. Just as in the case of the downed Ukrainian plane, the issues surrounding the morality police, and other instances where we did not have a proper media operation, the enemy exploited these conditions.”
Naeini’s comments refer to the IRGC’s attempt to cover up its role in downing the Ukrainian passenger plane PS752 on January 8, 2020. The plane was shot down by IRGC missiles, killing all 176 people on board. Initially, the regime tried to conceal its involvement, blaming technical failures or other external factors. However, under immense global pressure and widespread outrage on social media, the IRGC eventually admitted responsibility. This admission led to a significant global backlash and domestic protests, further damaging the regime’s already fragile reputation.
Similarly, Naeini’s mention of the “morality police” refers to the nationwide protests that erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. Amini, a young Kurdish woman, died in custody after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating the country’s strict dress code. The news of her death sparked a massive and prolonged uprising across Iran, with people from all walks of life demanding regime change. The protests, which lasted for several months, shook the entire regime to its core, demonstrating the growing discontent among the Iranian people.
In the War for Narratives #Iran’s Regime Takes to Wikipediahttps://t.co/pk4KubH1wl
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) January 17, 2024
This statement highlights the regime’s recognition of its failure to control the narrative during critical events. Naeini emphasized the importance of having a well-planned media operation, referencing a recent IRGC equipment unveiling event where, according to him, the regime successfully executed a media strategy with positive feedback.
Perhaps most telling is Naeini’s acknowledgment of the diminishing effectiveness of the regime’s systematic censorship strategies. He admitted, “The enemy today has launched a hybrid war against the Islamic Republic of Iran in economic, political, psychological, and cultural dimensions, with the most crucial battlefield being the cognitive one. If the enemy does not achieve success in the cognitive domain, they cannot achieve any victory.”
This admission reveals a growing concern within the regime about its ability to influence public perception amidst increasing external and internal challenges. The IRGC’s Deputy Head of Public Relations stressed the vital role of media operatives in advancing the regime’s goals, drawing parallels with his own experience in propaganda during the Iran-Iraq War. Naeini pointed out that, despite having fewer tools at their disposal during the war, the regime’s media operations were effective. However, he acknowledged that the current media landscape is far more complex, requiring more sophisticated strategies and tools.
Naeini’s reference to the extensive distribution of false information through regime-controlled media outlets, proxy networks, lobbying groups, unofficial platforms in Western countries, and a vast cyber army, underscores the regime’s reliance on propaganda to maintain its influence. He suggests that if this massive network of disinformation operates more effectively, it would alleviate many of Tehran’s challenges.
Ruhollah Mo'men Nasab, parliamentary special advisor on the so-called "internet users projection bill" and former commander of the cyber army reveals how #Tehran has been using @Twitter for #propaganda.
#Iran #InternetFreedom pic.twitter.com/kHzjtlEFvR— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) March 29, 2022
In recent years, independent media and global observers have become increasingly aware of Iran’s deception operations and propaganda tactics. For decades, the regime has successfully misled Western governments about the true nature of its nuclear and missile programs, targeted its strategic enemies both in the region and globally, and sought to demonize its primary threat—an all-encompassing alternative movement both inside and outside of Iran.
Iran’s propaganda machine has infiltrated major Western media outlets, manipulated Wikipedia pages, polluted social media platforms, and launched cyberattacks through various hacker groups to achieve its objectives. These operations are part of a broader strategy to control the narrative, obscure the truth, and maintain the regime’s grip on power.
The regime’s recent acknowledgment of the importance of media operations, particularly in the cognitive realm, underscores the centrality of propaganda in its survival strategy. However, as more independent voices and media outlets expose these tactics, the effectiveness of Tehran’s disinformation campaigns may continue to erode, further challenging the regime’s ability to sustain its narrative and control over the Iranian people and international perception.
