The 2009 privatization of the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), the country’s largest telecommunications provider, was billed as a landmark in Iran’s economic reform. In reality, it became a textbook case of regime-driven corruption and a major expansion of the economic empire controlled by the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
A Controversial Privatization
Founded in 1971, TCI held a near-monopoly over Iran’s fixed-line telephony, DSL, and data services. Through its mobile subsidiary, MCI, it also commanded a significant share of Iran’s mobile telecommunications market. When TCI was privatized in 2009, a controlling stake—50% plus one share—was sold for $7.8 billion to the Mobin Trust Consortium. This marked the largest transaction in the history of Iran’s stock exchange.
However, far from being a move toward a free market, the deal transferred control of a vital infrastructure from the state to a consortium tied to Iran’s military and regime elite.
#IranProtests: Telecommunication Retirees and Oil #Workers Rally Amid Worsening Economic Crisishttps://t.co/OfwZuaAAfo
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 24, 2024
IRGC’s Economic Arm: Mobin Trust Consortium
The Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin) is no ordinary business entity. It was created in 2009 by a coalition of companies affiliated with the IRGC and regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These include the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the Mostazafan Foundation, and the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO/Setad). Rather than ushering in competition, the privatization simply shifted power from government ministries to shadowy regime-affiliated organizations.
The privatization was riddled with red flags. The only viable competitor in the bidding process, Pishgaman Kavir Yazd Cooperative, was abruptly disqualified on vague “security grounds.” This left the IRGC-linked Mobin Trust as the sole serious bidder—effectively turning the auction into a formality.
Corruption, Mismanagement, and Deaths
Beyond the flawed bidding process, other alarming issues emerged. Payment delays by the consortium raised concerns in parliament. Then came the suspicious deaths of Majid Solaimanipour, the CEO of TCI’s investment firm, and his wife, who were both reportedly killed by a “gas leak.” The circumstances of their deaths were widely viewed as suspicious.
Continuation of retired telecommunication workers protests amid growing popular anger against the Iranian regime https://t.co/b7srXKCU6Q
— People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) (@Mojahedineng) April 28, 2025
Retired TCI employees have also repeatedly protested mismanagement and accused Mobin Trust and its allies of plundering pension funds. These protests underscore a wider grievance: regime-affiliated institutions are enriching themselves at the expense of workers and retirees.
Telecom as a Tool of Repression
Control over TCI has also given the regime extensive powers over surveillance and censorship. With the IRGC’s influence over Iran’s telecommunications backbone, TCI became a key asset in monitoring internet activity, restricting access, and silencing dissent.
Exit in Name Only
In 2018, under pressure from Supreme Leader Khamenei and then-president Hassan Rouhani, the IRGC claimed it was divesting from the telecommunications sector. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation formally exited the Mobin Trust Consortium. Yet, this did not dismantle regime control. Other entities such as Setad (EIKO)—directly under Khamenei’s authority—remain in place, ensuring continued regime dominance in the sector.
March 17—Sanandaj, western Iran
Retirees of the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) resume rallies to protest corrupt management decisions and demand higher pensions and other basic needs.#IranProtestspic.twitter.com/qITgj63l16— People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) (@Mojahedineng) March 17, 2025
The TCI “privatization” was not about liberalizing Iran’s economy, but about consolidating regime power through economic capture. Entities like the Mobin Trust Consortium served as instruments for the IRGC and Khamenei to take control of strategic sectors under the guise of privatization. Instead of fostering competition, it empowered a network of unaccountable elites, enabled censorship and surveillance, and deepened corruption across Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure.