Four-minute read
A single week in late October exposed the clerical regime’s deepest fractures: state media conceding failure on the FATF blacklist; the Revolutionary Guard’s press chastising its president Masoud Pezeshkian for “weakness”; parliamentarians chanting for the prosecution of former president Hassan Rouhani; a pro-government daily detailing a near–one quadrillion-toman hole at Bank Ayandeh; and an international drug-trafficking case in Kenya implicating six Iranian crew. Taken together, the record shows a leadership torn between triumphalism and triage, with shrinking room to stabilize either the economy or the narrative.
FATF Backlash and Broken Promises
On October 25, 2025, Kayhan—a flagship of the regime’s most extremist camp—ran the front-page line “False promises of the westernist current—from JCPOA to FATF,” after Iran remained on the FATF blacklist. The paper argued that, despite “good faith” steps, “the Western mechanism kept us on the blacklist,” and even “despite approval of CFT in the Expediency Council,” Iran was not removed.
The state-run Charsough likewise acknowledged that FATF “did not accept” Iran’s Palermo accession, undercutting a year of assurances from the Finance Ministry’s Financial Intelligence Unit that adopting Palermo and CFT would get Iran off the blacklist.
The gap between rhetorical “good faith” and tangible outcomes underscores how Tehran’s isolation is now self-perpetuating: each failed overture empowers extremist factions who insist cooperation is futile.
#Iran’s Ruling Elite Consumed by Infighting Amid Economic Ruin and Public Ragehttps://t.co/0Wk9C2RtFP
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 22, 2025
Power Talk versus Poverty Talk
The Revolutionary Guard’s newspaper Javan attacked Pezeshkian for repeatedly saying, “We sleep on gold but are hungry,” warning that such language “builds a mindset of weakness.” Citing the Supreme Leader’s guidance, it demanded that senior officials “be narrators of strength, not weakness,” and urged the president to dedicate his public platform to “power, self-belief, and future-mindedness.”
On October 25, former MP Ebrahim Neko dismissed Pezeshkian’s economic claims as “campaign” talk: “Economy is a science… you cannot run an economic program with slogans.” The critique lands because it comes from inside the system and because hardline media simultaneously insist the president sell strength rather than describe scarcity.
On October 27, Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf publicly attacked Rouhani and former foreign minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif, claiming their statements harmed “strategic” ties with Russia “precisely as cooperation advances.” On the floor, MP Sabeti demanded the judiciary pursue Rouhani “so that… he reaches his proper place behind bars,” while other members revived the “trial” and “death to Fereydoun” chants. The campaign against Rouhani—who on October 23 questioned the legislature’s representativeness and said laws passed against the will of “80–90 percent” of the public are “laws whose spirit is corrupt”—shows factional warfare displacing policy.
#Iranian Officials Split Over Russia, Economics and Talks with Washingtonhttps://t.co/nvYXIFtKrH
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 18, 2025
A “Purulent Abscess” in Finance
On October 27, the state-run daily Jomhouri Eslami called Bank Ayandeh “a purulent abscess that has burst,” publishing staggering figures: 717 trillion tomans owed to other banks, 300 trillion in central-bank overdrafts, 100 trillion in losses in the first nine months of 2024–2025, and 500 trillion in accumulated losses. By the paper’s account, the bank’s debts and overdrafts approach one quadrillion tomans, and it alone is “responsible for about 7 percent of national inflation”—“making every Iranian family 7 percent poorer” year-on-year.
Parliamentarians hailed the bank’s resolution process as a “major success,” but the numbers indict years of supervision and money-creation practices. If even a single bank can move the national inflation needle by that magnitude, the regime’s claims of macro-prudence ring hollow.
The exposure also threatens broader financial contagion. Iran’s credit markets, already constrained by sanctions and systemic corruption, face renewed pressure as other politically connected banks await a similar fate.
#Iran’s Power Struggle Escalates as State Media Admits Setbacks, Snapback Tightens, and the Street Simmershttps://t.co/sxHEeUIuiK
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 12, 2025
Internet Controls and the Hollowed State
Meanwhile, revisionist insiders describe a system that cannot decide or deliver. On October 24, former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi called the situation a “47-year deadlock,” criticized Pezeshkian for deferring to the Supreme Leader, and acknowledged systemic censorship in the press. On October 27, Azar Mansouri said the government’s authority is “severely weakened,” citing failure to lift filtering and a lack of control over the Foreign Ministry.
Reported data point to more than 80 percent of Iranians using VPNs and over 50 percent on social networks; during the 12-day Iran–Israel war, the state imposed deliberate disruptions and, from June 16, a full shutdown. The economic drag—from e-commerce to investor confidence—is measurable even in official circles.
Voices like Abbas Akhoundi go further, saying Iran “lacks a real state.” The picture emerging from their remarks is of a government hollowed by competing centers of authority—from the Revolutionary Guard to the clerical councils—each claiming legitimacy but none able to govern coherently.
#Iran’s Cairo Agreement Triggers Factional Warfare and Exposes Khamenei’s Weakening Grip https://t.co/E69azy8DfH
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 17, 2025
Militarization under Sanctions
On October 27, the IRGC replaced hardliner Mohammad-Reza Naqdi as deputy coordinator with Hojjatollah Qureyshi, who is sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, and Canada over supplying drones to Russia. The reason for Naqdi’s removal was not announced, though the timing—amid widening factional disputes and military setbacks—suggests internal difficulties rather than routine rotation. Elevating a sanctioned procurement chief tightens the regime’s alignment with Moscow but deepens its exposure to Western sanctions, directly contradicting claims that the system seeks economic relief.
The same day, Kenyan authorities announced the seizure of $63 million in methamphetamine in the Indian Ocean and the arrest of six Iranian crew—another reputational hit tied to Iran-linked maritime smuggling cases documented in recent years.
Such developments reinforce a pattern: as international isolation grows, the regime doubles down on military appointments and covert trade routes, compounding its economic and diplomatic liabilities.
#Iran’s Power Struggle: A Fractured Regime Hiding Behind Bold Rhetorichttps://t.co/SzNeQLYdh4
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 16, 2025
The Bottom Line
Across state media, mosques, and the parliament floor between October 23 and 27, 2025, the clerical regime revealed its core contradictions: promising international financial reintegration while celebrating choices that guarantee isolation; demanding “narratives of power” while publishing catastrophic banking losses; and calling for unity while threatening a former president with prison.
The facts—its own words and numbers—speak to a system that cannot reconcile bravado at home with the costs abroad. The week’s events, laid out by the regime’s own press, show not confidence but a governing elite increasingly consumed by its internal war.