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Seven years after a sudden gasoline-price increase helped ignite the November 2019 uprising, the fear of another uncontrolled eruption is again visible inside Iran’s own political and media establishment.
This time, the warning comes from the regime’s president himself.
Speaking on October 12 about gasoline reform, Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that the current price structure was economically unsustainable but warned that abrupt intervention would “upend the whole society.” His prescription was gradualism: move slowly enough that society can “tolerate” the change.
The language is remarkable because November 2019 demonstrated precisely what Tehran now fears: a seemingly economic decision becoming political almost overnight.
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Iran: 2019 Uprising, Tehran’s Stance on the #MEK’s Role in the 2019 #Iran Protests#WeStand4FreeIranhttps://t.co/njB5YR8Z6p pic.twitter.com/v8febkpaHp— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 1, 2020
The Economic Cushion Is Much Thinner
The material conditions surrounding today’s debate are substantially harsher.
According to September figures from Iran’s Statistical Center, published this month by state media, consumer prices were 89.8 percent higher than a year earlier, while annual inflation reached 73.6 percent. Food prices were even more punishing: food inflation stood at 121.8 percent year-on-year, with annual food inflation at 108.8 percent. For poorer households, which spend a far larger share of their income on food, the blow is proportionally greater.
At the same time, the gasoline imbalance that officials have been warning about has not disappeared. Tasnim reported this week that daily consumption has reached roughly 135 to 147 million liters, against production of about 121 million liters—leaving a persistent gap of 15 to 20 million liters a day.
The government therefore confronts the same political trap from opposite directions: keeping gasoline artificially cheap worsens fiscal and supply pressures, while raising its price risks hitting households whose purchasing power has already been shredded.
That is why November 2019 keeps resurfacing.
In the beginning of the 3rd month of Iran uprising, the brave women men and youths of Iran held demonstrations, strikes, and protests in more than 50 universities and 50 bazaars across the country, renewing their pledge with the martyrs of the November 2019 uprising#IranProtests pic.twitter.com/MQVMJc95JV
— Maryam Rajavi (@Maryam_Rajavi) November 15, 2022
The Warning Began Before October—and It Was About This Same Crisis
Some of the clearest regime-media warnings appeared in August. They matter now because they were not anniversary retrospectives; they were written during the same gasoline-policy debate that remains unresolved in October.
Since then, Tehran has introduced a third gasoline rate, Pezeshkian has publicly warned that sudden intervention could destabilize society, and the government has continued scrambling over imports, consumption and subsidies. In other words, the August warnings described the crisis now unfolding.
State media warned at the time that the lesson of 2019 was unmistakable: raising fuel prices beyond society’s capacity to absorb them could turn an economic decision into a “political and social crisis.” One commentary went further, saying the issue was not whether gasoline might reach a particular price but whether society could endure even another small increase.
Jamaran framed the issue explicitly as one of national security. It argued that a future protest would not necessarily repeat November 2019 because Iranian society had undergone major economic, political and communications changes since then. Economic grievances, it warned, could now connect much faster with social and political demands.
Five years ago, #Iran's November 2019 uprising erupted in over 190 cities—an outcry against tyranny and injustice. Despite the regime’s brutal crackdown, the #MEKResistanceUnits stood tall, leading the charge for freedom. Their sacrifices still ignite Iran’s fight for democracy. pic.twitter.com/sstpdflCP2
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 15, 2024
Another widely circulated establishment warning was even blunter: society, it said, was in a more critical condition than in 2019, and the existing situation needed only a “spark.” The point was not that gasoline had to provide it. If fuel did not become the trigger, something else could.
That is the most consequential change since 2019.
The Fear Is No Longer Just About Gasoline
Recent statements suggest officials themselves understand that economic pressure is only one component.
On October 25, Pezeshkian said that recent unrest was driven largely by social problems and urged officials to recognize “the pain of young people” and the problems confronting the population. He tied cooperation directly to whether citizens trusted the state.
✊November 2019 Uprising: The Heroic Role of Women in Iran’s Fight for Freedom
The November 2019 uprising exemplified the Iranian people’s determination to overthrow the oppressive regime. Sparked by a sudden hike in fuel prices on November 15, 2019, protests rapidly spread… pic.twitter.com/mAPOTzrLEi
— Women's Committee NCRI (@womenncri) November 14, 2025
The same weekend, Alireza Aghayousefi, head of Iran’s Psychology and Counseling Organization, issued an unusually stark assessment in an interview with ILNA. Asked how far Iranian society was from a psychological “state of emergency,” he answered: “I don’t think we are very far.”
ILNA described a society being worn down by inflation, economic insecurity, fear about the future, and the prolonged condition of “neither war nor peace.” Aghayousefi warned that social conditions were moving toward anomie—the erosion of norms and social cohesion—and that prolonged uncertainty was producing psychological exhaustion.
That is what makes comparisons with November 2019 increasingly difficult for the regime to avoid.
In 2019, gasoline was the immediate trigger, but the uprising drew its force from accumulated economic frustration and deep political alienation.
#Iran: During November 2019, at least 1,500 protesters were massacred. The #Iranian resistance published the names and the identities of 828 martyrs of the November 2019 uprising. The list of names can be seen in the following link: #IranProtests https://t.co/SgF4gc96H3
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 1, 2021
Today, by the regime’s own statistics and commentary, inflation is crushing household purchasing power, fuel supplies are structurally imbalanced, young people are described as angry and hurting, public trust has deteriorated, and even officials responsible for social health are warning of exhaustion and declining cohesion.
Tehran’s problem is therefore no longer simply how to avoid repeating one disastrous gasoline decision.
It is how to govern a society in which far more potential triggers now sit on top of far deeper grievances.
In November 2019, gasoline supplied the match.
The fear running through today’s establishment commentary is that seven years later, the combustible material is everywhere.