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Tehran Makes Iranians Pay for Its Crackdown 

iran november 2019 uprising
Street clashes in Iran during the 2019 uprising

Three-minute read 

Iran’s gasoline policy exposes a broader political economy. When state finances tighten, the burden does not fall evenly across the system. Households are asked to absorb higher prices and reduced access, while the security and military institutions the regime treats as essential to its survival remain heavily funded. 

That pattern is visible in the 2026 budget. The Majlis Research Center’s own review puts ordinary expenditures for the IRGC Joint Staff at about 183 trillion tomans, the police at 124 trillion, and the Defense Ministry at 295 trillion, most of the latter tied to armed-forces social-security obligations. Together, those three lines alone amount to more than 600 trillion tomans before additional defense and security appropriations are counted. 

Meanwhile, the government has already moved in the opposite direction for motorists. From September 8, the price charged through emergency fuel-station cards doubled from 5,000 to 10,000 tomans per liter, while the 1,500- and 3,000-toman personal-card quotas remained unchanged. Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani claimed the proceeds would be spent on household livelihoods. 

Protect the Apparatus, Extract from the Public 

The important point is not that every rial spent on defense could simply be transferred to gasoline subsidies. It is that budget priorities reveal what the state regards as politically untouchable. 

Even after war altered the government’s fiscal assumptions, official discussions of revising the 2026 budget explicitly included “strengthening defense capability” alongside reconstruction and household support. In April, a member of parliament openly praised the strengthening of “defense and security” appropriations and described nightly pro-government mobilizations as part of the country’s frontline. 

Support for Tehran’s regional “Resistance Front” is likewise described by regime figures as a priority rather than an expendable cost. As recently as November 13, Tasnim carried remarks emphasizing the preservation of the regime’s power and support for the “Resistance Front” as priorities. Earlier, the state Endowments Organization said it had actively promoted financial contributions for the “Resistance Front” and was expanding cooperation with defense industries. 

The result is a hierarchy that is difficult to miss. Spending tied to military strength, policing and regime security is treated as strategic. Household subsidies are treated as adjustable. 

Gasoline Shows Who Absorbs the Adjustment 

The government’s own rhetoric makes the contradiction sharper. In May, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said pressure on the public was a “red line” and insisted no gasoline increase had been decided. In July, the government again said it had no plan to raise prices. 

Weeks later, the third-tier price doubled. 

The consequences were predictable. A senior parliamentarian warned through Tasnim that raising gasoline prices would spread through transportation costs into the price of other goods and ultimately place “more pressure on the people.” Another Tasnim analysis warned that an economic decision involving gasoline could become the “spark” that activates accumulated grievances among workers, retirees, drivers, teachers, employees and students. 

By November, Vice President Esmail Saqab-Esfahani was telling motorists that Iran had a genuine supply problem, that some station cards were being withdrawn and that travelers should calculate their round trips in advance and save fuel on their personal cards. 

The reaction itself became part of the story. Domestic reporting described longer fuel queues and public anxiety, while lawmakers complained that contradictory official statements had made the social atmosphere “agitated.” 

A Regime That Prices in Repression 

This is where the issue becomes political rather than merely fiscal. 

The regime is not behaving as though popular anger automatically constrains policy. Its behavior suggests that it believes coercive capacity can contain the consequences. That calculation helps explain why the security apparatus is protected even as economic adjustment reaches household budgets. 

The regime’s own media understand the danger. Vatan-e Emrooz explicitly invoked the November 2019 fuel protests, recalling how a gasoline decision became a nationwide crisis with severe “security and social costs.” It warned that today’s war and livelihood pressures have reduced society’s tolerance for shocks and that mishandled fuel policy could “awaken the same old sparks again.” 

Yet the economic pressure continues to move downward. 

That is the deeper logic of Tehran’s political economy: protect the institutions that defend the ruling order, preserve the regional and military projects the state considers strategic, and make households absorb a greater share of the cost of economic failure. 

The wager is equally clear. The regime appears to believe that if public anger erupts, the institutions it has protected can suppress it. 

Gasoline therefore tells a larger story than the price at the pump. Iranian households are being asked to finance adjustment precisely because the machinery that may ultimately be used against their resistance is one of the last things the regime is prepared to economize on.