Three-minute read
The clerical regime in Iran is facing another visible rupture at the top. The quiet removal of Mohammad-Reza Naqdi as Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC has generated speculation across state-controlled media about why one of the most loyal and long-serving security officials was dismissed. The shift comes as senior political figures exchange increasingly direct accusations, and state media openly warns of deepening fractures inside the ruling establishment.
A reporting by the state-run Fararu on October 28 revealed that the change in IRGC leadership had actually taken place at least a month earlier but was neither announced nor accompanied by the customary public ceremony. The IRGC’s official website had already begun referring to Hojjatollah Qureyshi as deputy coordinator as early as September, yet state media continued to introduce Naqdi by his former title as late as October 20. The delayed acknowledgment, conflicting internal references, and absence of a formal handover underscore that the transition was not conducted under normal conditions. The outlet noted that following the death of former IRGC commander Hossein Salami and the appointment of Mohammad Pakpour as his successor, multiple command reorganizations were expected — but the opaque handling of Naqdi’s removal suggests internal sensitivities rather than routine reshuffling.
Khamenei’s Weak Position Exposed as #Iran's Rival Factions Escalate Infightinghttps://t.co/Z7U9xguQdl
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 4, 2025
Silent Removal Raises Questions
The move came only days after Ali Larijani issued a handwritten directive to heads of major media organizations. Dated in late October, the letter emphasized the “critical conditions” facing the system and instructed editors to participate in what he called “strengthening the armed forces.” In regime context, insiders read the message as a warning about suspected infiltration and internal vulnerability within the IRGC.
The timing of the letter and Naqdi’s removal has led to speculation within regime outlets that the change is directly tied to concerns about internal security failures during the recent 12-day regional conflict — a period in which multiple senior IRGC operational figures were removed or sidelined. The clerical regime has not acknowledged any “infiltration” problem, but repeated personnel changes at high command levels have made the issue impossible to ignore inside its own ranks.
From Parliament to the Marketplace, Crisis Layers Converge Across #Iranhttps://t.co/AozMSSDCQJ
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 28, 2025
Factional Attacks Intensify in Public
The leadership change coincides with open infighting among senior regime figures over the legacy of the nuclear deal, recent regional diplomacy, and the direction of foreign policy. On October 26, Saeed Jalili, the regime’s former nuclear negotiator and a close representative of Ali Khamenei, used a public speech to denounce renewed attempts to re-engage with the West. He described those advocating diplomatic openings as akin to “someone on the night of February 11—the day the 1979 revolution declared victory— deciding to join SAVAK,” a direct accusation of disloyalty.
Meanwhile, Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf warned that political actors who “sacrifice national interest for factional gain” would be confronted. The implied targets were both the revisionist-leaning bloc and former officials of previous administrations.
The attacks have been reciprocal. Azar Mansouri, head of the so-called reformist front, responded by writing that “Liyakhov was not just a name in history,” invoking the Tsarist general who shelled the Iranian parliament in 1908 — a pointed comparison aimed at extremist factions seeking to silence dissent even within loyalist circles.
From FATF to Bank Meltdown, #Iran’s Power Factions Clash on Every Fronthttps://t.co/FgEBKUNGBg
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 27, 2025
Pezeshkian Acknowledges Internal Breakdown
The regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian, in speeches on October 27, repeatedly returned to the theme of disunity. He stated that without internal alignment, “the country cannot move forward,” adding: “If disharmony exists, you speak one way and I speak another, and the country does not advance.”
Pezeshkian also noted that 85 percent of state resources are consumed by administrative overhead — a rare acknowledgment from a sitting president that the government’s own structure is obstructing economic function.
In response, critics inside parliament accused the government of lacking any operational plan to address inflation, food prices, or market instability. One member declared on October 26: “What is your program? We see no program.”
Another warned that the current hardship imposed on families “cannot be justified by appeals to patience or unity.”
#Iran’s Power Struggle: A Fractured Regime Hiding Behind Bold Rhetorichttps://t.co/SzNeQLYdh4
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 16, 2025
Vulnerability and Memory of Past Crises
The infighting has revived commentary from figures long absent from public debate. Former Majlis Speaker Ali-Akbar Nategh-Nouri stated on October 27 that the pressure and political violence of the 1980s left him “on the verge of depression.” His remarks implicitly evoked the regime’s own fear: that the internal climate could shift from factional confrontation to broader instability.
The convergence of these developments — the silent IRGC command reshuffle, public attacks among factions, and repeated calls for unity from both extremist and revisionist figures — points to a governing system that is increasingly unable to maintain its own internal cohesion.
The uncertainty surrounding Naqdi’s removal underscores the deeper issue. Whether it reflects suspicion of infiltration within the IRGC or the result of high-level power struggles, the consequence is the same: the regime is acting defensively, reorganizing inward, and treating internal actors as risks. This shift comes at a time when the clerical establishment is facing simultaneous pressure from economic decline, public frustration over living standards, and shrinking regional leverage. In this environment, even routine command changes acquire political weight. The system is no longer projecting coherence; it is managing itself as a security threat.