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Inside Iran’s Power Pyramid: Who Shapes Decisions and Who Implements Them?

Written by Shahriar Kia
Iranian regime's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei
Iranian regime’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei

Introduction

Following the Iran-US war and the killing of Ali Khamenei, the regime’s Supreme Leader, the central question inside the Iranian system is how the power pyramid has been reconfigured, where the real center of decision-making now sits, and through what channels major political, security, and military decisions are formulated and transmitted.

The transition did not occur under normal conditions. The war inflicted a serious blow on the regime’s security and intelligence structure, exposing weaknesses in command protection, counter-infiltration, intelligence integration, and national-security coordination. Concurrent disagreements inside the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), known through public statements, showed that the problem extended beyond the intelligence bodies into the formal coordination mechanism itself.

Mojtaba Khamenei therefore did not inherit a coherent and consolidated apparatus after the leadership transition. On the one hand, he faced the need to consolidate his own authority; on the other, he had to deal with the consequences of the war’s security failure and the existing disagreements within the formal national-security decision-making mechanism.

From this perspective, the movement of key figures at the top of the system, changes in the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, and new appointments in the IRGC command should not be examined merely as a set of personnel changes. The central question is whether these developments are components of a broader reconfiguration of the architecture of power, and what relationship Mojtaba Khamenei is creating between the Leader’s Office, the Supreme National Security Council, the intelligence bodies, the military command and the internal-control structure.

This report seeks to address part of that question by examining the positions of Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, Mohsen Rezaei, Hossein Taeb and Ali-Asghar Hejazi, together with the changing balance within the Supreme National Security Council, and to provide an initial picture of the new power pyramid and the decision-making mechanism taking shape inside the regime.

Executive Summary

The cumulative developments following the war and the leadership transition suggest that what is taking place at the apex of the system probably goes beyond the replacement of individuals. Mojtaba Khamenei has confronted a structure whose security effectiveness was called into question during the war and in which disagreement also existed within one of the principal formal centers of national-security coordination.

The main assessment of this report is that Mojtaba Khamenei is shaping a new political-security architecture in which there is greater differentiation among several core functions: decision-making in the Leader’s closest circle, formal national-security coordination, the work of specialized intelligence bodies, counter-infiltration and intelligence integration, and social control and the management of internal threats.

Within this framework, Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr’s move from the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council to Mojtaba Khamenei’s side, together with Mohsen Rezaei’s placement at the head of the Council’s secretariat, may indicate the emergence of a division of labor: Zolghadr in a circle closer to the decision-making center, and Rezaei at the head of the formal mechanism for coordination and implementation of decisions.

By contrast, Hossein Taeb’s return to command of the Basij, despite appearances, does not necessarily signify the restoration of his former security position and may instead indicate that his role is being concentrated on social control and the management of internal threats.

Before the War: Two Different Models for Managing the Regime’s Security

The roots of the current reconfiguration should be sought before the leadership transition and even before the war. At that stage, two different approaches existed within the regime’s security structure regarding how security power should be organized and exercised.

The Mojtaba Khamenei-Hossein Taeb Model

The first model was based on the network of Mojtaba Khamenei and Hossein Taeb. During the period when Taeb headed the IRGC Intelligence Organization, he and Mojtaba Khamenei enjoyed considerable influence within the IRGC’s intelligence structure.

The defining feature of this model was its network-based character. Power was not necessarily exercised through a single formal center; rather, it relied on a network of cadres, relationships and influence across different parts of the security apparatus, particularly the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The recruitment, reassignment and promotion of security cadres also formed part of the means by which this network was expanded.

In other words, under this model, power was exercised through influence inside the institutions and through the creation of networks of loyalty and connection.

The Ali-Asghar Hejazi Model – Deputy Head of the Leader’s Office and Deputy for Political and Security Affairs

In contrast stood the model associated with Ali-Asghar Hejazi. Hejazi emphasized the need to establish a centralized, supra-institutional system at the level of the Leader’s Office.

Under such a model, the purpose was not for the Leader’s Office to replace the Ministry of Intelligence, IRGC Intelligence or the intelligence-protection bodies. Rather, a center at the apex of the system would exercise oversight across these bodies, receive and compare their intelligence, identify contradictions and intelligence gaps, and present the final picture of threats and infiltration directly to the Leader.

The fundamental difference between the two models was therefore as follows:

The Mojtaba-Taeb model relied on network-based influence within the security institutions, particularly IRGC Intelligence, whereas the Hejazi model sought centralized, supra-institutional oversight from the level of the Leader’s Office across the full range of intelligence and protection bodies.

This difference, in effect, reflected two distinct approaches to protecting the apex of the system.

The War: From an Internal Structural Dispute to a Crisis of Security Architecture

The blows sustained during the war took the issue beyond competition between these two models.

Once intelligence penetration made it possible to strike commanders and sensitive centers, the issue was no longer simply whether Taeb’s network-based model was more effective, or Hejazi’s centralized model was preferable. The existing security architecture as a whole came under question.

Fundamental questions emerged: To what extent did the IRGC Intelligence Organization have situational awareness? How effectively had the intelligence-protection apparatus detected infiltration? What information did the Ministry of Intelligence possess? At what point was intelligence from the different bodies being integrated, and which institution was responsible for presenting the final threat picture to the apex of the system?

From this perspective, the war did not simply expose the weakness of one particular organization; it highlighted a problem of coordination and of the architecture of the entire security system.

Consequently, a simple return to the Taeb model or an unchanged continuation of the Hejazi model could no longer necessarily answer the crisis. The need arose for a structure capable of addressing the weaknesses exposed in counter-infiltration, protection, intelligence integration and coordination among the various institutions.

Leadership Transition and Disagreement in the Supreme National Security Council: A Second Crisis at the Apex of the System

Before the post-war security reconstruction had been fully consolidated, the killing of Ali Khamenei and the transfer of the leadership to Mojtaba Khamenei created another rupture.

Mojtaba Khamenei now had to manage two issues simultaneously: consolidating his personal authority and completing the reconstruction of the security apparatus.

A further factor, however, added to the complexity of the situation: disagreement within the Supreme National Security Council.

Public statements about disagreements inside the Council indicated that the problem was not confined to the intelligence and protection bodies. There was also no complete consensus within one of the principal formal centers of national-security coordination over how to deal with the conditions of war, peace and national-security policy.

Mojtaba Khamenei therefore inherited a structure that had been damaged at the lower level in the areas of security and counter-infiltration, while at the higher level it was also marked by disagreement in the formal mechanism of national-security coordination and decision-making.

This situation may be one of the principal reasons for the simultaneous reconfiguration of the Leader’s Office and the Supreme National Security Council.

Emergence of a “Third Model”: Functional Differentiation of Power

In light of these developments, the structure now taking shape can be examined as a ‘third model’: neither a simple return to the former Mojtaba-Taeb network nor an unchanged continuation of the centralized Leader’s Office structure centered on Hejazi.

A likely feature of this model is greater differentiation among several core functions:

First Level – Political Apex and Decision-Making

Mojtaba Khamenei stands at the apex of this structure, with a circle of political, security and military advisers forming at the closest level around him.

Second Level – The Close Decision-Making Circle

At this level, Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr becomes important. His transfer from the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council to the position of political adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei may indicate a move from management of a formal institution into the direct decision-making circle.

Third Level – Formal National-Security Coordination

At this level stand Mohsen Rezaei and the Supreme National Security Council. The principal function of this level may be to coordinate the various institutions and turn decisions taken at the apex of the system into executable policy.

Fourth Level – Specialized Intelligence Bodies

The Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC Intelligence Organization and the intelligence-protection bodies continue to have their own specialized missions and chains of command.

Fifth Level – Social Control and Management of Internal Threats

The Basij under Hossein Taeb may focus its principal responsibilities on social organization, neighborhood networks, gathering grassroots intelligence, and confronting uprisings and internal crises.

The Unknown Link – Counter-Infiltration and Intelligence Integration for the Leader

It remains unclear which individual or institution integrates intelligence from the different bodies, assesses contradictions among reports, and presents the final threat picture directly to Mojtaba Khamenei.

Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr: Moving from a Formal Institution to the Inner Circle of Power

The reassignment of Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr is one of the most important indicators of the new reconfiguration.

The direction of his movement is towards greater proximity to the apex of the pyramid. Zolghadr has left the position of secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, but he has not been removed from the power structure; rather, he has been moved to the side of the Leader himself as Mojtaba Khamenei’s political adviser.

From this perspective, the move cannot necessarily be regarded as a demotion.

If Zolghadr’s increased importance after the war was connected to the project of reconstructing the national-security structure, his presence alongside Mojtaba may mean that the experience and knowledge gained during that phase are now being brought directly into the new Leader’s decision-making circle.

For this reason, the title ‘political adviser’ alone is not sufficient to measure his actual weight. The key indicators will be the degree of his access to Mojtaba Khamenei, his role in preparing and shaping decisions, and his practical relationship with the Supreme National Security Council and other institutions.

Mohsen Rezaei: Rebuilding the Authority of the Formal National-Security Mechanism

Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council should be examined in connection with this same reconfiguration.

There were disagreements within the Council, and the change in its secretariat took place in that context. Rezaei’s arrival is therefore more than a simple administrative change.

The essential difference between Rezaei and Zolghadr does not necessarily lie in their positions, but rather in political weight, experience and the ability to exert influence. Mohsen Rezaei has a long record of IRGC command and connections with different generations of commanders and can therefore carry greater weight in dealing with military, security and political institutions.

On this basis, the transfer of the secretariat from Zolghadr to Rezaei, while Zolghadr simultaneously moves into Mojtaba’s direct circle, may indicate a division of labor:

Zolghadr near the decision-making center; Rezaei at the head of the formal coordination center.

If this hypothesis is correct, the Supreme National Security Council will not necessarily be the principal center in which strategic decisions are produced. Its role may instead be to bring the institutions together, resolve operational disagreements, and translate decisions taken at the apex of the system into coordinated national policy.

In that case, Rezaei’s appointment may represent an attempt to strengthen the authority of the secretariat and reduce friction and disagreement within the Council.

Disagreement Within the Council and the Government’s Reduced Room for Maneuver

This reconfiguration may also alter the internal balance within the Supreme National Security Council.

Under the previous arrangement, Pezeshkian and the government had greater scope to bargain and exert influence in relation to Zolghadr. The arrival of a figure with Mohsen Rezaei’s military background and political weight may, however, narrow the government’s room for maneuver.

Under such circumstances, the Council could increasingly become a mechanism that links the apex of the system with the formal institutions and coordinates major decisions among the government, the IRGC and other bodies.

The reduced weight of the government within the Council should therefore also be seen as part of the resetting of the relationship between the leadership apex and the formal national-security mechanism, rather than as an issue separate from the reconfiguration of the power pyramid.

Rezaei’s arrival may also alter Saeed Jalili‘s position within the Council. Previously, Jalili’s opposition could be interpreted and contained as a factional dispute because of his political rivalry with Pezeshkian. Rezaei’s presence may reduce that relative isolation and increase the weight of positions closer to the apex of the system.

The roles of Ghalibaf and other actors should likewise be assessed within this same framework: not as separate analytical axes, but according to how the new changes increase or reduce their weight in the actual decision-making process.

Hossein Taeb: Return to Power or Confinement to a Defined Mission?

Hossein Taeb’s appointment to command the Basij may at first glance appear to mark the return of one of the security figures closest to Mojtaba Khamenei. A comparison between his new position and his former role, however, presents a different picture.

Heading the IRGC Intelligence Organization provided access to major files involving security, counter-intelligence, the opposition, infiltration and internal developments within the system.

Command of the Basij, although highly important for internal control and social mobilization, occupies a different role within the security hierarchy.

Taeb’s current mission may be concentrated primarily on four areas:

Organization of the Basij, social control, grassroots intelligence networks, and confronting uprisings and internal crises.

From this perspective, Taeb has returned to a highly important mission, but this mission does not necessarily mean that he has returned to his former level of supra-institutional security oversight.

The direction of Taeb’s movement is therefore different from Zolghadr’s:

Taeb has moved from the upper level of the intelligence apparatus to an important operational command; Zolghadr has moved from managing a formal institution to the side of the Leader himself.

This difference is one of the most important indicators of the division of labor within the new structure.

Ali-Asghar Hejazi: The Most Important Uncertainty in the New Structure

Ali-Asghar Hejazi is the most complex variable in this reconfiguration. Three decades of presence at the closest levels of the Leader’s Office, access to confidential files, and connections with the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC, intelligence-protection bodies, the judiciary and other centers of power have made him one of the most important repositories of the regime’s security memory.

The central issue, however, is not whether Hejazi remains present in the Leader’s Office or is consulted. The decisive question is whether he still possesses the same supra-institutional authority he held in the past.

Conclusion:

The overall developments can be viewed as part of a single process.

The war exposed the weaknesses of the existing security architecture. Disagreement within the Supreme National Security Council showed that the problem was not confined to the intelligence bodies and that divisions also existed at the level of coordination and decision-making. The killing of Ali Khamenei combined these crises with the issue of leadership transition. Mojtaba Khamenei is now simultaneously reconfiguring the Leader’s Office, the decision-making circle and the formal national-security mechanism.

On this basis, the most important development should not be understood simply in terms of who has replaced whom. The central change may lie in the relationship between the center that produces decisions, the formal coordination center, the intelligence bodies and the internal-control structure.

Mojtaba Khamenei is building a system in which security power is less concentrated in the hands of one individual or one network and different functions are divided among several centers, while the Leader’s close circle assumes responsibility for connecting and directing these components.

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