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HomeIran News NowFearing Uprising, Iran’s Regime Rushes Khomein Funeral and Covers Up Explosions

Fearing Uprising, Iran’s Regime Rushes Khomein Funeral and Covers Up Explosions

State-staged funeral for the Khomein shooting victims, orchestrated by the regime to claim ownership of the tragedy and suppress rising public outrage
State-staged funeral for the Khomein shooting victims, orchestrated by the regime to claim ownership of the tragedy and suppress rising public outrage

Three‑minute read

The clerical dictatorship in Tehran is facing a convergence of crises unprecedented in its history—military defeats, economic disintegration, regional setbacks, and explosive public anger at home. The state’s response is neither strength nor coherence, but obfuscation and performance: it hides its wounds, rushes to control narratives, and desperately tries to keep the morale of its crumbling enforcement apparatus from collapsing entirely. The recent killing of a family of four in Khomain is a telling example—less a misfire than a mirror of a regime too fragile to withstand a truth it cannot contain.

This external erosion has been matched by escalating signs of breakdown within. On July 17, security forces in Khomain opened fire on two civilian vehicles, killing four members of a family, including a five-year-old child. The official story framed the incident as a mistake—forces guarding a military facility allegedly found the cars “suspicious.” But the regime’s reaction was telling. Within hours, it took control of the funeral arrangements. The victims were labeled “martyrs” and buried in the city’s “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” under the shadow of official flags, military salutes, and the presence of high-ranking police commanders.

The haste was not due to sorrow but fear. The shooting had ignited a wave of public fury, drawing comparisons to other recent state killings of civilians, including children. The clerical dictatorship feared that, if left unattended, the rage could escalate into a nationwide outcry akin to the 2022 uprising. By owning the narrative—claiming the victims as loyalists and orchestrating the burial with patriotic theater—the regime sought to preempt dissent. The grieving father of the slain children, shown in a widely circulated video, recited pro-regime lines, calling the security forces “angels” and warning against criticism. But the video, stiff and eerily staged, was interpreted by many as coerced damage control.

Even state loyalists saw through it. The performance was too neat, too rapid. The regime buried the bodies before the public could absorb the crime. It tried to bury the consequences too.

While these spectacles unfold, a pattern of unexplained explosions continues to spread across Iranian cities. Since the end of the war, over two dozen incidents have been reported, many in or near sensitive sites—military zones, judicial buildings, or infrastructure.

Official explanations follow a script: faulty gas lines, poor safety, bad luck. Yet the timing and pattern of these incidents—coinciding with the regime’s deepest strategic vulnerabilities—suggest something far more deliberate. Just days after explosions rocked key areas in and around Tehran, the death of Sheikh Ali Ta’ib was announced on July 10. A former representative of the Supreme Leader at the IRGC’s Tharallah base and brother of senior intelligence figure Hossein Ta’ib, his passing was quietly handled, raising more questions than answers.

Only days later, on July 15, Brigadier General Gholamhossein Gheybparvar, former head of the Basij and deputy commander of the Imam Ali security command, was also declared dead. State media claimed his death was due to “chemical injuries sustained during the Iran–Iraq war,” a claim that raised eyebrows given the suspicious timing—more than four decades after the fact and just days after a wave of unexplained explosions across Iran. These post-ceasefire announcements, coming in rapid succession and under vague circumstances, reinforce a broader pattern the regime appears increasingly desperate to conceal.

The clerical dictatorship stands at a crossroads. If it retaliates against suspected foreign attacks, it risks triggering a war it cannot sustain. If it does nothing, it signals impotence to its own rank and file. That, in turn, threatens desertion or defection from the very security forces it relies on for survival. This is why internal propaganda targeting the Basij and IRGC rank-and-file has intensified. Regime media outlets now speak of a need to “boost spiritual confidence,” to “reward sacrifice,” and to “revive revolutionary morale.” None of this would be necessary if those forces were not in visible psychological retreat.

The economic collapse only deepens the regime’s exposure. Inflation remains above 50%. The rial continues to tumble. Water is being rationed. Electricity is routinely cut. People are advised to install their own pumps—advice that mocks the millions too poor to comply. Meanwhile, waves of Afghan deportations—tens of thousands per week—are framed as security measures but are in fact efforts to create scapegoats for the worsening domestic crisis.

What ties all this together is the regime’s fear of eruption. It is no longer governing; it is managing volatility. Every funeral is now a potential spark. Every explosion is a test of whether people will believe another “gas leak” excuse. Every military strike it cannot respond to deepens the perception that the system is hollowed out.

This is why Tehran moves quickly—not to reassure, but to contain. It is terrified not of foreign enemies but of its own people. And that, more than any battlefield loss, is what signals a regime in irreversible decline.

NCRI
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