Four-minute read
In recent weeks a severe political crisis has erupted within Iran’s ruling establishment as the state television network, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), systematically censors top state figures while airing calls to prosecute sitting leaders. The broadcaster’s partisan turn has exposed deep internal fault lines in a regime that is desperately trying to convey a message of strength and cohesion to the outside world. Yet its own leaders are at loggerheads, remaining sharply divided over the very mechanisms required to preserve their grip on power.
There is no independent press in Iran under the clerical regime. From the state radio and television network to newspapers, news agencies, websites, and other media outlets, the entire information sphere is controlled, directly or indirectly, by the ruling establishment and its security institutions. These outlets may reflect the competing positions of different factions within the regime, but they are not permitted to challenge the system itself. Journalists who cross the regime’s political and security red lines, expose suppressed realities, or give a platform to independent voices risk dismissal, prosecution, imprisonment, and other forms of repression.
The latest dispute over censorship at IRIB must therefore not be mistaken for evidence that some relatively free media space still exists in Iran. On the contrary, all sides involved belong to the same ruling structure. What is remarkable is that the regime’s crisis has become so severe, and its internal cohesion so fragile, that even the president, the foreign minister, the judiciary chief, and the speaker of parliament are being censored by the regime’s own state broadcaster. This is not a conflict between free journalism and state authority; it is a struggle among rival factions over control of the machinery of censorship and the policies needed to preserve a weakening dictatorship.
#Iran News:
Saudi Arabia Expels Iranian Media Team Following #Khamenei’s Threatshttps://t.co/SuYnBpeQ7i— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 29, 2024
The censorship reached a boiling point after IRIB muted key portions of an address by the regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian during a National Industry and Mine Day ceremony. The state newspaper Arman-e Melli reported on July 25, 2026, that television producers cut Pezeshkian’s remarks regarding private authorizations granted by leadership to pursue negotiations to end the “neither war nor peace” status. Similar censorship was applied to Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Eje’i when he called on all branches to support the president, as well as Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, whose live broadcast was abruptly cut short.
In response, the Government Information Council issued a scathing statement published by the semi-official news agency ISNA on July 24, 2026, asking: “What goals are IRIB officials pursuing in their selective treatment of the positions of the heads of the branches?” The council condemned the cuts as “unity-breaking behaviors by a political current” that carry “threatening consequences” for national security. Youssef Pezeshkian, an advisor and son of the president, publicly asked in remarks cited by Arman-e Melli on July 25, 2026: “Who in IRIB decides which part of the speeches of the heads of branches should not be broadcast? If we have such a wise person whose judgment is higher than the heads of branches, let us hand the administration of the country over to him.”
"The harder the #terrorist regime fights to survive through spectacle, the faster it hastens the very disintegration it dreads. The cameras keep rolling, the queues keep growing, and the endgame has begun," writes @MehdiOghbai. https://t.co/i1Z5vl4zKw
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 18, 2026
Clashes in the Cabinet
The feud spilled directly into executive governance during a Sunday cabinet session. According to the state-controlled daily Shargh on July 25, 2026, Pezeshkian “severely reprimanded” IRIB Chief Peyman Jebelli after Jebelli openly objected to a nuclear negotiations briefing presented by a senior minister. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani wrote on social media that “the national media is neither a judge nor a censor,” while Elyas Hazrati, head of the Government Information Council, publicly questioned whether IRIB stands with the nation or “with those who profit from rifts, tensions, and polarization.”
The broadcaster’s hardline programming has targeted Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, whose interviews with international media were blocked from domestic airing. Shargh reported on July 25, 2026, that an IRIB host disparaged Araghchi on air, reducing his standing to a “blogger” and accusing him of “being played by the US and Israel.” In an interview quoted by Ham-Mihan on July 25, 2026, Araghchi expressed frustration over what he called “the suppression of his regional achievements,” stating: “The Iraqis called me a hero, but IRIB censored it, while some here chant ‘death to the compromiser.'”
When Araghchi publicly admitted to domestic “security breaches” and Israeli infiltration, IRIB commentators launched further attacks against him. Writing in Arman-e Melli on July 22, 2026, political analyst Mohammad Mohajeri defended the regime’s foreign minister, asserting that denying infiltration harms the country. Mohajeri attributed the media campaign to “sanction profiteers,” asking: “Must individuals like Araghchi or Ghalibaf also be martyred so that their value and status become recognized?”
We were told to stop coverage for collapsed building in #Abadan, IRIB Chief says.https://t.co/8jJlt3JXE7 pic.twitter.com/jByjRNvBcZ
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 24, 2022
Calls for Assassinations and Institutional Failure
Beyond silencing state leaders, IRIB has provided airtime to extremists advocating violence. In an interview published by the news outlet Didar News on July 20, 2026, former diplomat Jalal Sadatian warned that television hosts and unvetted guests were openly advertising the assassination of foreign leaders like Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Sadatian added that state television programs were declaring that “those who oppose this work are Mr. Ghalibaf and Mr. Pezeshkian, and these two must be tried!”
Analyzing the legal and political fallout, state-affiliated political scientist Sara Nezami told Arman-e Emrooz on July 25, 2026, that censoring the president creates confusion and undermines public trust. Nezami stated: “If the possibility of expressing the complete views of the highest executive official of the country is not provided in the national media, the question arises as to how other currents and views can enjoy equal opportunity.”
The open conflict between the state broadcaster and government leadership exposes a deepening crisis of governance within the clerical dictatorship. As competing factions weaponize state resources against one another, the breakdown of institutional cohesion is being broadcast directly to the public, laying bare a system struggling to manage its internal divisions.