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In mid-August 2026, the Iranian regime’s parliament approved the generalities of a 33-article measure titled the “Plan to Counter the Infiltration of Intelligence Services and Foreign Governments.” On Sunday, August 16, lawmakers passed the outlines of the legislation, whose full text was later published by the state news agency ISNA. On August 24 however, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that the plan had been halted and removed from the parliament’s agenda. Framed as counter-espionage, the bill remains an admission of the regime’s illegitimacy and isolation: a clerical establishment so alarmed by its own citizens’ readiness to expose its crimes—especially on social media—and to work with the opposition that it attempted to criminalize those acts under the guise of national security.
The legislation arrives amid visible institutional decay. High-level targeting of senior officials, its supreme leader, elements of the IRGC command structure, nuclear scientists and others in recent regional fighting has revealed an extensive security meltdown and contributed to low morale inside the system. Corruption and infiltration at the highest levels have left the leadership unable to prevent betrayal among its own ranks. Rather than repair those failures, the state is taking revenge on ordinary Iranians. The core purpose is social suppression. It acknowledges that large numbers of people are already leaking information, documenting systemic wrongdoing online, and aligning with the organized Resistance, and it seeks legal tools to shut that activity down.
A government that retains even minimal legitimacy does not treat its population’s exposure of official crimes or contact with the opposition as existential threats. Even governments facing severe hardship do not respond by turning public criticism and dissent into broad criminal categories. Iran’s rulers do.
#Iran's Regime Turns Long-Running Repression into Law With “Counter-Infiltration” Billhttps://t.co/OXu3cOIt1k
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 10, 2025
The bill’s definitions (Article 2) sweep in a wide range of activity, including media work, cultural production, academic collaboration and online engagement, requiring registration in a new Interior Ministry system monitored by the Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Article 27 specifically targets activity in the virtual space and cultural domains: production of films, series, documentaries, theater, music, books and similar work that security agencies judge to have been produced under foreign “support, supervision, guidance, training or direction,” or that presents an “unjustified and false image of society and the achievements of the Islamic Revolution,” questions religious rulings, or is deemed to undermine independence or promote “anti-Islamic culture.”
Penalties include six months to five years of deprivation from social services, permanent bans, and fines tied to production costs. Article 22 criminalizes interviews or participation in discussions with media outlets the Intelligence Ministry has designated “hostile” or that are linked to Level One or Level Two foreign states. Article 18 prohibits conscious contact with foreign intelligence, security or military organizations and with any entities the Supreme National Security Council later places on a public ban list. Unregistered activity that is judged to harm national security can bring multi-year prison terms and professional bans of five to fifteen years (Article 12).
During a session held on August 13, several members of the Majlis, the #Iranian regime’s parliament, suggested passing the “#hijab and chastity” bill, as per Article 85 of the Constitution.https://t.co/Kfxhu0hWTm
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 14, 2023
The bill elevates “hostile” organizations and agents designated by the security services. In the text this includes media outlets the Intelligence Ministry publicly labels (hostile) as well as any entities the Supreme National Security Council later places on its official ban list. In official Iranian practice these categories have for decades centered on the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI), the principal organized Resistance with continuous activity spanning more than six decades. The regime’s sustained animosity toward the PMOI is also reflected in the heavy penalties the bill attaches to association with such designated groups.
Internal critics have reacted with visible alarm rooted in fear of social consequences. Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref stated that the plan “harms the scientific activity of the country” and that “if such a law is approved, a university professor will no longer dare to engage in scientific interaction with the world’s top universities
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a National Security Commission member, cautioned colleagues: “We should not close the society more than necessary, because society reacts to decisions and restrictions; we have seen examples of it in issues like the JCPOA and the issue of hijab.” Former lawmaker Jalal Jalalizadeh was more direct: if the bill becomes law, “Iran will practically become a large prison.”
As the so-called ‘cyberspace protection bill’ continues to be pulled from the parliament to the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, some #Iranian regime's officials are pointing fingers at the #MEK to accelerate a decision.https://t.co/9HCMT0t98q
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 23, 2022
These objections fit a pattern of earlier control measures—the Protection Bill aimed at restricting the internet and successive hijab-enforcement plans—that intensified rather than contained public defiance. For nearly half a century the clerical regime has relied on mass executions, relentless propaganda and international pressure against the opposition, particularly the PMOI. The current bill once again creates expansive criminal prohibitions and the most severe penalties for association with entities the security services designate as hostile.
Foreign military pressure may inflict damage; it does not remove the system. What the authorities fear is an explosive domestic population, increasingly pushed to the edge by oppression and economic crisis, that can be guided by and merge with an organized Resistance with more than six decades of experience.