Iran’s Kavir Plan Uncovered: Operational Details of Post-Amad Nuclear Weapons Effort

On Tuesday, June 10, 2025, the U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI-US) held a press conference to unveil new intelligence exposing the Iranian regime’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Alireza Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director of NCRI-US, detailed findings obtained by the PMOI network inside Iran, revealing the continuation of nuclear weaponization efforts under the covert “Kavir Plan,” initiated in 2009 by order of the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. NCRI-US Director Soona Samsami underscored that Tehran’s goal remains the development of the bomb, and called for urgent international action—including triggering the UN snapback mechanism, reimposing sanctions, halting uranium enrichment, shutting down all nuclear sites, dismantling the IRGC’s missile program, and enforcing snap IAEA inspections with no exemptions for military or civilian facilities.

This project, concealed under the guise of “desert security” in Semnan Province, has replaced the earlier “Amad Plan” dismantled in 2003. The Kavir Plan advances nuclear weapons development through SPND, Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, using satellite-launching missile programs as a cover. Since December 2024, four related sites have been identified, including Ivanaki, Shahroud, and expanded Semnan facilities. The NCRI has provided detailed intelligence on the region’s military zones, infrastructure, and counter-intelligence operations.

Ms. Soona Samsami: Tehran’s nuclear & missile programs must be fully dismantled—with no exemptions for military or civilian sites. Only snap inspections by the IAEA will prevent a disaster.#IranNuclearSecrets #IranNuclearThreat #FreeIran2025 pic.twitter.com/6eaRJXoa0G

— NCRI-U.S. Rep Office (@NCRIUS) June 10, 2025

The IAEA’s May 2025 report confirms that four current sites under investigation are linked to Iran’s earlier Amad Plan, reinforcing continuity in nuclear weapons development efforts. Intelligence shows that the Kavir Plan, initiated in 2009, has operationalized components such as warhead design, missile integration, and high-explosive testing, under the command of SPND. The program leverages a militarized infrastructure across Semnan Province, where missile and radar facilities are used to mask nuclear-related activities.

Technological advancements include work on solid- and liquid-fueled delivery systems and boosted nuclear warheads with ranges exceeding 3,000 kilometers. Counterintelligence operations involve drone surveillance, restricted airspace, and removal of roads from public maps to limit exposure. The coordination of various military, aerospace, and intelligence entities points to a highly compartmentalized, state-sponsored program designed for rapid weaponization.

In light of @iaeaorg BoG resolution on the #Iranian regime's misconduct and failure to cooperate with the @UN watchdog, it's crucial to revisit over 3 decades of secretive activities and the NCRI's constant efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed pariah state.https://t.co/EiJenAsaiU https://t.co/lvD6qbumiY pic.twitter.com/qcXZLwOPO7

— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 5, 2024

Exposing the Nuclear Weapons Development

Secret Project Codenamed the “Kavir Plan”

June 10, 2025

• The Kavir (Desert) Plan has replaced the AMAD Plan to develop nuclear weapons
• Since 2009, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has significantly enhanced Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons development

Executive Summary and Key Points:

• According to information obtained by the NCRI, a new nuclear weapons plan was initiated by direct order of Ali Khamenei in 2009 and placed under the authority of regime-affiliated institutions.
• The new nuclear weapons project, the Kavir Plan (“Desert Plan”), has replaced the Amad Plan, which the regime pursued up until the first decade of the 21st century.
• While the previous nuclear weapons project was concealed under the name Amad Plan, the new project is being pursued under the cover of “securing the Kavir (desert),” often referred to as the Kavir Plan.
• To mask the covert activities of Kavir Plan and advance the development of nuclear weapons, the regime has designated the desert region in the southern part of Semnan Province for this purpose.
• Under the Kavir Plan, nuclear weapons development is conducted under the guise of manufacturing satellite-launching missiles, and the power of the nuclear weapon was boosted, and the range of missiles carrying the warhead was enhanced.
• Since December 2024, the Iranian Resistance has revealed four sites associated with the Kavir Plan: the Ivanaki (Eyvanekey) site, the Noor-al-Din Abad Garmsar radar site, the Shahroud missile site, and the expansion of the Semnan missile site.
• The declared goal of “desert security” has provided an effective cover for the Kavir Plan and enabled the regime to covertly pursue nuclear-related projects, tests, and associated activities in Semnan.
• The four press conferences by the Iranian Resistance exposing the regime’s secret nuclear projects in the past six months demonstrate that Tehran’s dash to obtain nuclear weapons has intensified.
• The snapback mechanism must be immediately triggered, reinstating all UN Security Council resolutions sanctions, before it expires in October.
• All of the regime’s nuclear sites must be shut down and dismantled, which the IAEA inspectors must verify.
  

Exposing the Nuclear Weapons Development

Secret Project Codenamed the “Kavir Plan”

The source:

The enclosed information has been obtained by the Defense and Strategic Research Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), based on reports by the network inside Iran of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).

 The New Nuclear Weapons Project Known as “Kavir Plan”

According to new information obtained by the NCRI, a series of nuclear weapons development projects that the regime has been pursuing since 2009 is known as Kavir Plan (“Desert Plan”).

The new nuclear weapons project was initiated by direct order of Ali Khamenei in 2009 and placed under the authority of regime-affiliated institutions.

Some components of this complex—operating under the command of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), the body responsible for weaponizing the nuclear project—have been identified by the Iranian Resistance.

According to this intelligence, the Kavir Plan has replaced the Amad Plan, which the regime pursued up until the first decade of the 21st century.

• In 1999, in pursuit of nuclear weapons, the regime initiated a project to build five nuclear warheads. This project was named the Amad Plan.
• To this end, a contract was signed between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), headed by Gholamreza Aghazadeh, and the Ministry of Defense, headed by Ali Shamkhani. Under the contract, the AEOI would conduct uranium enrichment up to 3%, while the Ministry of Defense would conduct enrichment up to 90%.
• According to disclosures by the Iranian Resistance, approximately 400 specialists from the AEOI were transferred to the Ministry of Defense.
• This project continued until the Lavisan-Shian site, regarded as the command center and effectively the core of the nuclear bomb-making program, was exposed on May 15, 2003, by the NCRI. Following this revelation, the regime was forced to halt the project and reorganize its structure and personnel.
• The four sites currently under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), highlighted in the agency’s comprehensive report of May 31, 2025, are all linked to the Amad Plan.

According to specific intelligence, following Ali Khamenei’s orders in subsequent years, Kavir Plan replaced Amad Plan as of 2009 for nuclear weapons development.

While the previous nuclear weapons project was concealed under the name Amad Plan, the new project is being pursued under the cover of “securing the Kavir (desert),” often referred to as the Kavir Plan.

To mask the covert activities of Kavir Plan and advance the development of nuclear weapons (specifically, nuclear warheads for missiles), the regime has designated the desert region in the southern part of Semnan Province for this purpose. A large portion of this desert area lies within Semnan Province, with sections extending into Tehran and Qom Provinces.

To facilitate the advancement of the Kavir Plan, in 2009, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the regime declared Semnan Province a military zone and established numerous military sites within it. The declared goal of “desert security” has provided an effective cover for the Kavir Plan and enabled the regime to covertly pursue nuclear-related projects, tests, and associated activities in Semnan.

Simultaneously with the initiation of the Kavir Plan, the body responsible for building nuclear weapons was reorganized in the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and its status within the Ministry of Defense was elevated to that of an independent organization.

• Under the Kavir Plan, nuclear weapons development is conducted under the guise of manufacturing satellite-launching missiles. According to this plan, the power of the nuclear weapon was boosted, and the range of missiles carrying the warhead was enhanced.
• Since December 2024, the Iranian Resistance has revealed four sites associated with the Kavir Plan: the Ivanaki (Eyvanekey) site, the Noor-al-Din Abad Garmsar radar site, the Shahroud missile site, and the expansion of the Semnan missile site.

Map of Military Centers in the Kavir Plan

According to this project, the regime’s military and security apparatus has divided Semnan Province into three zones: Red, Yellow, and Blue.

1. Red Zone: This is the area containing military sites where civilian access is strictly prohibited. According to this classification, 9% of Semnan Province is considered a Red Zone.
2. Yellow Zone: This area is under military control and designated for artillery and missile firing. It is also a no-fly zone. Entry requires special permission from the relevant military authorities. Reports indicate that 27% of the province falls within the Yellow Zone.
3. Blue Zone: This is the area where civilian access is permitted. However, roughly half of this zone is also designated as an environmental protection area and is under specific controls.

Based on intelligence received, the approximate locations of the red and yellow zones on the provincial map have been indicated.

Explanation of Military Sites in Semnan Province – Red Zone

1. Rangin-Kaman Site (Ivanaki) – Northwest of the Province:
   This site belongs to the Ministry of Defense, operated by SPND, and is one of the regime’s sensitive and strategic locations.
2. Ghadir Site (Ghadir Long-Range Radar) – Northwest of the Province:
   This is a radar and anti-aircraft missile site for the region. It is under the control of the IRGC Aerospace Force.
3. Me’raj-1 Site Complex – Central Part of the Province:
   Located in central Semnan, this missile site has been named Me’raj-1. It is used for the development of nuclear warheads intended for installation on the liquid-fuel Simorgh missile. The site is under the control of the Ministry of Defense, and its commander is Colonel Janalinejad.
4. Imam Reza Training Center – Eastern Part of the Province:
   This center is situated at the Shahroud Missile Site, where the development of nuclear warheads for the Ghaem-100 missile (solid fuel) is being pursued. This site is under the control of the Aerospace Command of the IRGC, and its commander is Colonel Shafiee.
5. Semnan Air Defense Complex:
   This complex, which includes an airport, training barracks, and other facilities, was established during the previous regime. Colonel Babagheibi is its current commander.
6. Hasheminejad Logistics Base – Damghan:
   This logistics base belongs to the IRGC Ground Forces and is used for the storage of weapons and ammunition. Its current commander is Colonel Shenayi.
7. IRGC’s 10th Moharram Air Defense Unit:
   This missile defense site is located to the north of Shahroud County. Colonel Ghorbanian is its commander.

According to information from the Iranian Resistance, the first four locations listed are part of the Kavir Plan. (Site 2 serves as the aerial defense for this region.) Locations five through seven are related to other military activities in the province.

Counter-Intelligence Measures Regarding “Kavir Plan”

To maintain security over the Kavir region, a unit known as the Kavir Security Unit was established by the regime’s State Security Force (SSF). Since 2010, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has also set up an intelligence base named Sahib al-Zaman Base to gather intelligence in the area.

To conceal these sites’ activities, the regime’s various intelligence and security agencies—including the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Counterintelligence Division of the Ministry of Defense, and the Intelligence Division of the SSF—have defined a series of security frameworks to ensure the security of the Kavir region.

One of the Ministry of Intelligence’s strategies to protect information about the Kavir Plan involved removing the shortcut road between Semnan and the provinces of Yazd and Isfahan (used by the Aerospace Military Road and the Semnan Missile Site) from the country’s official geographic maps to prevent foreign nationals from accessing it.

The areas where these sites are located are monitored by light reconnaissance aircraft as well as drones. Individuals who approach these sites are identified using facial recognition cameras mounted on drones. Additionally, satellite equipment and satellite surveillance technology are employed to maintain informational dominance and comprehensive monitoring.

According to directives issued to intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies in desert provinces, by direct order of the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the movement of foreign individuals must be closely monitored. In particular, American and European tourists who travel to these regions for scientific research in the desert or for wildlife conservation and environmental protection must be subjected to intensified surveillance by intelligence agencies. For this reason, the IRGC Intelligence Organization has consistently arrested foreign nationals traveling in the region and subjected them to interrogation.

The Amad Plan: Development of Five Nuclear Warheads for Shahab-3 Missiles (1999–2003)

Key components of this project included:

• Lavisan-Shian Site – Command and control center for nuclear weapon development
• Gachin Site (Bandar Abbas) – Uranium extraction and yellowcake production
• Varamin Site (also referred to as the Tehran Site) – Uranium processing stages
• Fordow Site (codenamed Al-Ghadir) – Uranium enrichment using P2 centrifuges
• Sanjarian Site (codenamed Nourabad) – Development of shock wave generators for simultaneous detonation in a nuclear weapon
• Abadeh Site (codenamed Marivan) – Neutron testing and preliminary explosive tests for nuclear weapons
• Mahallati Site (within Aerospace Mechanics Industries) – Fabrication of the metal hemispheres of the nuclear weapon
• Meydan Project (in the deserts of Semnan and Kerman) – Underground nuclear explosion testing
• Boroujerdi Site (located within the Parchin Military Complex) – Final assembly of the nuclear weapon
• Hemmat Missile Industries Complex (Khojir region) – Mounting of nuclear warheads on Shahab-3 missiles

The Kavir Plan – Development of Boosted Nuclear Warheads for Missiles with a Range Exceeding 3,000 Kilometers (2009–2024)

Aspects of the Kavir Plan that have thus far been identified by the Iranian Resistance:

• SPND (Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research) – Headquartered in the Noor Building in Tehran. This organization commands the development of nuclear weapons.
• Shahroud Site – Engaged in the development of nuclear warheads for the Ghaem-100 missile, which uses solid fuel.
• Semnan Site – Focused on developing nuclear warheads for the Simorgh missile, which uses liquid fuel, as well as conducting other tests.
• Ivanaki Site – Responsible for various components required for nuclear weapons.

• Sanjarian Site – Involved in the development of shock wave generators for simultaneous detonation in a nuclear weapon

• Sorkheh Hesar Site – Conducts underground and geophysical testing related to nuclear weapons.
• Parchin Site (Project 6) – Engaged in the production of explosive materials and conducting tests associated with nuclear weapons.

Appendix – Aerial Photographs of Sites Related to Kavir Plan

Conclusion

As the comprehensive IAEA report of May 31, 2025, revealed after years of investigation, the regime’s nuclear project has pursued no goal other than the production of nuclear weapons from the very beginning. This is a fact that the Iranian Resistance has emphasized for over three decades.

Over the past three decades, the regime has not voluntarily reported any of its activities to the IAEA. Instead, they were exposed, most prominently by the NCRI and the PMOI/MEK network inside Iran, and only then did the regime admit to them.

The regime’s approach to the international community regarding its nuclear activities over these decades can be described as concealment, deception, obfuscation, delaying, and destruction of evidence. Tehran has done everything to hide its relentless effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

The regime’s policy remains one of stalling and delaying to prevent decisive action while moving forward with its weapons program. The time has come to end this.

This regime’s threat to global peace and stability is not limited to its nuclear program. The genocide inside Iran, as confirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur, and the export of terrorism and warmongering necessitate a decisive policy towards it.

The mullahs’ regime is at its most fragile state, facing an explosive society. Since Masoud Pezeshkian was appointed as the regime’s president in August, more than 1,300 prisoners—including women political prisoners—have been executed, and dozens are at imminent risk of execution. Regionally, the regime is at its weakest point in four decades, making it more desperate than ever to rely on the nuclear lever.

Four press conferences by the Iranian Resistance exposing the regime’s secret nuclear projects in the past six months demonstrate that Tehran’s dash to obtain nuclear weapons has intensified. Make no mistake. Nuclear weapons are the regime’s life insurance policy.

A realistic international response to this threat must include the following measures:

• The snapback mechanism must be immediately triggered, reinstating all UN Security Council resolutions related to the regime’s nuclear program and reimposing all sanctions, before it expires in October.
• Uranium enrichment must be completely and permanently dismantled.
• All of the regime’s nuclear sites must be shut down and dismantled, which the IAEA inspectors must verify.
• The regime’s missile program, an integral part of the nuclear warhead program, must be eliminated.
• No nuclear sites—military or civilian—should be exempt from intrusive, snap inspections in order to close them down.

Of course, beyond these measures, we have always emphasized, and experience has further proven, that the ultimate solution to the regime’s nuclear and terror threat is its overthrow by the Iranian people and their organized resistance.

As NCRI President-elect Mrs. Maryam Rajavi emphasized in her online testimony before the U.S. Congress earlier this year, there is no need for foreign boots on the ground or using taxpayers’ dollars.

The international community must recognize the Iranian people’s right to confront the IRGC and end the religious dictatorship. A democratic, non-nuclear Republic of Iran is entirely within reach, as articulated in Mrs. Rajavi’s plan for the transitional period.