The Fissures of ‘Consensus’: Anatomy of a Political Crisis in Tehran

The political atmosphere in Tehran is rarely placid, but the recent tremors within the administration of Masoud Pezeshkian suggest a deeper, more corrosive fault line than the usual factional bickering. Just months into his term, the president’s stated goal of “national consensus” (vafaq-e melli) is being severely tested, not by external adversaries, but by a sudden, jarring internal revolt. The immediate cause: the controversial appointment of Esmaeil Saqab-Isfahani—a figure with deep ties to the extremist wing and the preceding Raisi administration—as Special Assistant to the President and head of the crucial Energy Optimization Organization.

The Appointment that Shattered the Détente

The official announcement of Saqab-Isfahani’s appointment on November 12, 2025, was the political equivalent of a spark on dry tinder. The reaction from the Pezeshkian’s own circle was swift and furious. Fayyaz Zahed, a prominent member of Pezeshkian’s Information Council and a vocal campaign supporter, resigned in protest. He had “cried” during the presidential campaign in support of Pezeshkian, but now publicly labeled the move a “distortion” of the consensus principle.

The fallout quickly expanded. Mohammad Mohajeri also resigned from the Information Council, later publishing a note requesting Pezeshkian to dissolve the entire presidential public relations structure. Mohajeri argued the existing bodies had “negative efficiency” and that “due to the large number of personnel and lack of planning, they are tripping over each other’s feet,” and suggested the number of personnel should be reduced, as Pezeshkian had proposed.

The IRGC-affiliated media reacted by attacking those who had resigned. The Revolutionary Guard’s mouthpiece, Javan, described the resulting internal conflict as “racial disorder in the reformist tribe,” asserting that the reaction was “beyond political criticism” and devolved into “shameful literature,” including the specific claim that “Saqab is someone who cried over Raisi’s death.”

#Raisi’s Death Cripples Khamenei’s Decade-Long Project to Maintain Rule over #Iran https://t.co/ibcs5oMwbB

— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 22, 2024

The Crisis of Governance and Fuel Prices

The turmoil was not confined to the president’s advisory council. Whispers of a far more consequential resignation—that of Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref—began to circulate in state-affiliated media like Sobh-e No. Sobh-e No reported on November 19 that Aref had submitted his resignation to Pezeshkian, who had not yet approved it, noting that Aref felt his role was “limited” and that major decisions were being made without coordination. The governmental news site Rouydad 24 explicitly suggested Aref’s possible departure should be seen as “part of the scenario for increasing the price of gasoline.”

The daily Ham-Mihan strongly linked the appointment to the public’s economic anxieties, writing that Saqab’s appointment had the most negative reflection of any of Pezeshkian’s picks. The paper warned: “If you are after raising the price of gasoline, gas, and diesel, then it no longer matters to the people who comes; whoever comes must continue this path of great betrayal to the economy and Iran.”

The government newspaper Setareh-e Sobh questioned the appointment’s rationale, noting that Saqab lacked “program and expertise” in the energy sector, despite the country facing a serious “energy imbalance” crisis. It stated that consensus “does not mean giving concessions to rivals and owners of power.” The government news site Rokna underlined the internal fracture, calling the situation the “Secret of the Pezeshkian Government’s Split” and stating that the event highlighted consensus from a negative perspective, “creating a rift in the fourteenth government.”

#Iran Elites Warn of Unrest as Fuel Hikes and FX Reset Ignite Infighting https://t.co/UNktmnSmzy

— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 10, 2025

The Shadow of the Supreme Leader

In the face of this escalating crisis, Pezeshkian himself offered a public appeal that revealed the limits of his office. Speaking in Qazvin on November 20, 2025, he called on officials to “not fight each other with these imbalances and these problems,” acknowledging, “If we are to point out flaws, all of us have flaws.” He then directed all efforts to the core priority: “Go with power toward what is the direction of the Leadership,” adding, “we are determined to do this.”

Pezeshkian also touched upon the dire state of the country’s infrastructure, noting that environmental and water mismanagement meant that the “disaster of a 30-centimeter subsidence means disaster.” Yet, he pivoted immediately to the political directive of the Supreme Leader.

The extremist wing immediately sought to exploit the crisis for ideological gain. Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan Daily’s editor-in-chief and Khamenei’s representative in the paper, blamed the government’s problems on the employment of “deviant individuals.” He argued that these “deviant claimants of reform” are now opposing the government and that Pezeshkian should “distance himself from this deviant group” and entrust the administration’s path to “revolutionary experts.”

A System That Can No Longer Close Its Rankshttps://t.co/HLZzsWenvs

— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 4, 2025

This dynamic confirms the analysis of Mohsen Mohebali, a former Foreign Ministry official, who stated on November 19 that on issues like the nuclear program, foreign policy is in a state of “impasse” and that the government is not the ultimate decision-maker. Blaming the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Mohebali stated: “The problem we have in Iran is that the Foreign Ministry and the government are not the decision-makers.”