HomeIran News NowIran Economy NewsWhy Does Pezeshkian Keep Telling Iranians How Bad Things Are?

Why Does Pezeshkian Keep Telling Iranians How Bad Things Are?

Hardline cleric and MP Hamid Rasaee (white turban, left of center) argues with the Iranian regime's president Masoud Pezeshkian as journalists and fellow lawmakers crowd around them in Parliament
Hardline cleric and MP Hamid Rasaee (white turban, left of center) argues with the Iranian regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian as journalists and fellow lawmakers crowd around them in Parliament

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On November 19, speaking to regime-linked university figures, the Iranian regime’s president described almost every pressure point the clerical dictatorship is facing—and then connected them directly to the prospect of unrest.

If gas and electricity are not managed, he said, Iran will have problems this winter “even if no war happens.” If energy shortages force factories to stop producing, workers will lose their jobs. And when workers lose their jobs, he warned, “they come into the street.”

Then came the part few heads of government would normally say out loud.

If businesses stop operating, the state cannot collect taxes. Tehran’s routes have been blocked. “I cannot sell my oil,” Pezeshkian said. Dollars do not come in. Taxes cannot be collected.

“Well, the result is protests, quarrels,” he concluded. “We are forced to manage.”

This is not the first time Pezeshkian has publicly described the regime as running out of room. What makes it remarkable is that he keeps doing so after being repeatedly told to stop.

On August 28, Mojtaba Khamenei instructed officials that preserving “unity and social cohesion” had to guide decisions across politics, security and the economy. “Every action” in those fields, he said, must take into account its effect on social cohesion.

The message followed weeks of criticism from hardliners furious at Pezeshkian for publicly discussing the costs of confrontation.

On August 10, after critics attacked negotiations, Pezeshkian asked them: “You say you won’t engage in dialogue—so what’s your alternative? Do you want to fight?” If Iran rebuilds what is destroyed and it is struck again, he argued, repeating the cycle is hardly a strategy. Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and other hardliners attacked him for presenting Iran as weak.

Eleven days later, he did it again.

“It is better to end the war today, when we are in a position of power and dignity,” Pezeshkian said on August 21.

Hardliners could hardly have missed the pattern.

So why keep talking?

Pezeshkian has no shortage of closed rooms where he could warn senior officials about gas shortages, falling revenues, or unemployment. If his only purpose were to inform the establishment, none of this would need to be said before cameras.

The answer appears to lie in the last word of his November 18 warning: protests.

Pezeshkian knows that some of the decisions ahead—energy rationing, gasoline policy, subsidy cuts, price increases, restrictions on consumption—could hit a population already under extraordinary economic pressure. He also knows what sudden economic shocks have done before.

He is trying to make the shock less sudden.

That explains the almost mundane detail in his November remarks. Lower the thermostat from 23 degrees to 18 or 20. Turn on two lights instead of four. Keep factories operating. Ask universities, mosques, the Basij and industry to cooperate.

This is not a growth program. It is an attempt to ration scarcity without producing an explosion.

Pezeshkian even supplied the political logic himself. Keep production running so workers remain employed. Keep workers employed so they do not go into the street. Keep businesses functioning so the government can still collect taxes. Reduce household consumption because the state cannot simultaneously guarantee energy for homes, industry and everything else.

He calls the objective increasing society’s “resilience.”

That word deserves attention. He is not promising recovery. He is asking society to endure.

And he appears to believe that pretending everything is under control would make that task harder. If gasoline suddenly becomes more expensive, electricity disappears, factories close, or subsidies are cut after months of official reassurances, the resulting anger could be much more dangerous than if people have first been told that the state is running short of money and energy.

The hardliners see precisely the opposite danger.

For them, saying Iran cannot sell oil, obtain dollars or sustain its economy tells Washington that pressure is working. Public pessimism damages morale, weakens deterrence and encourages the enemy.

Pezeshkian seems more worried about a different enemy: reality arriving at people’s doors before the state has prepared them for it.

There is self-preservation involved too.

Every time he publicly says that oil cannot be sold, dollars are scarce and the energy system cannot meet demand, he creates a record. If factories later close or protests erupt, nobody inside the establishment can easily say the president never warned them.

And he is speaking to rival power centers as much as to ordinary Iranians.

Hardliners can demand resistance, reject compromise and insist that the country absorb more pressure. But the government is blamed for the gas for factories, the money for pensions, the foreign exchange for imports, and the funds to support workers when businesses collapse.

The regime’s president did not end his economic diagnosis with recession, inflation or a budget deficit.

He ended it with people in the street.

Mojtaba Khamenei wants the establishment to project cohesion and strength. Hardliners want officials to stop advertising vulnerability.

Pezeshkian keeps advertising it anyway because he appears to believe the greater danger is an impoverished society being hit by another shock without warning.

And in explaining why he needs Iranians to use less gas, less electricity and endure more hardship, he has inadvertently explained where the regime itself believes the crisis could ultimately be decided:

not in the balance sheet, but in the street.