In what appears to be one of the most damning admissions from within the clerical regime’s own ranks, an Iranian lawmaker has confirmed that approximately 20 million liters of fuel are smuggled out of the country daily—a scale of economic sabotage that not only highlights the depth of corruption but implicates figures inside the regime itself.
“The statistics show that approximately 20 million liters of fuel are smuggled every day,” said Mohammad Bahrami, a member of the regime’s Energy Commission. “Clearly, a range of individuals are involved, from ordinary people to some who hold official positions. There is no doubt about that.”
Bahrami stopped short of naming names, a familiar tactic in a system where “official accountability” is more often rhetorical than real, but nonetheless acknowledged that the smuggling is institutional. “To say there is no corruption in the fuel sector is simply not true,” he told ILNA. “Corruption is present. It is evident and undeniable.”
IRGC Controls #Iran’s Vast Network of Smuggling, Yet It Killed and Wounded Dozens of Fuel Carriers on Monday #IranProtests #HumanRights https://t.co/OibRn0hqbP
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) February 23, 2021
Bahrami also thanked the judiciary, calling it “one of the key arms in the fight against various forms of deviation and corruption.” But this praise rings hollow in light of the judiciary’s own record of protecting regime insiders while jailing whistleblowers, journalists, and ordinary citizens who expose systemic abuse.
This is not a failure of enforcement—it is a reflection of regime-engineered profiteering. The regime’s propaganda attempts to frame fuel smuggling as a crime committed by “a range of individuals,” but decades of opaque governance, cronyism, and deliberate economic mismanagement have turned fuel trafficking into a multi-billion-dollar enterprise run through institutional complicity.
Regime judiciary spokesman Asghar Jahangir tried to contain the fallout, declaring that “several individuals have been arrested, and numerous cases have been opened in various provinces.” But he too placed blame on others, saying that responsibility primarily lies with the executive branch’s Headquarters for Combating Smuggling of Goods and Currency.
"Over the years, the #IRGC has expanded its #economic activities, establishing numerous semi-private companies to circumvent sanctions imposed on the regime ruling #Iran and engaging in large-scale smuggling operations," writes @shahriarkia https://t.co/genvxrs91b
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 18, 2023
“The Headquarters has taken some steps in past years, but they have not been sufficient,” Jahangir admitted, justifying why the judiciary, under Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, “felt compelled to intervene.”
In a rare disclosure, Jahangir detailed a three-day operation in Hormozgan province, where the regime claims “over 3,969 illegal fuel tanks with a total capacity of 21 million liters” were uncovered, and “more than 600 kilometers of underground pipelines were destroyed.” But like most regime statistics, this too raises questions: How could an illegal infrastructure of such magnitude exist without the full knowledge—and protection—of local and national authorities?
Jahangir emphasized that “if it is proven that officials—those responsible for overseeing and safeguarding public assets—were involved either through direct action or negligence, they will face serious and decisive judicial measures.” He added, “If it is found that they acted deliberately or out of negligence, harsh and firm legal actions will certainly be taken.”
#Iran News in Brief
Jalal Rashidi Kuchi, a member of the regime’s parliament, expressed concerns about the consequences of raising #gasoline prices, stating, “Fundamentally, our approach to gasoline has been wrong. Even now, if we tamper with gasoline prices, people will take to… pic.twitter.com/hT5DpjIEU2— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 23, 2023
Yet despite the dramatic rhetoric, the regime has refused to name even a single senior figure under investigation. “Due to the preliminary nature of the cases, we are not legally permitted to disclose names,” Jahangir said—a familiar excuse in a system built on secrecy and impunity.
What is clear is that this is not simply a story of corruption, but one of regime survival mechanisms—where the state itself, under the pretense of governance, operates black market systems to fund repression, proxy wars, and internal client networks. Smuggling, in this context, is not a byproduct of weak enforcement; it is a structural tool of the clerical dictatorship.