In June, the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, pulled the notorious Ebrahim Raisi out of the ballot box. Selecting Raisi as the regime’s new president was the last step by Khamenei to consolidate his regime.
During both sham presidential and parliamentary elections, Khamenei used his Guardian Council, an organization tasked with vetting candidates, to eliminate the candidates of the rival factions or those from his own faction who could pose the slightest challenge to his regime. The regime’s parliament approved Raisi’s cabinet, which consisted of thieves and internationally wanted terrorists, in line with Khamenei’s policy of consolidating his regime.
While many may consider Khamenei’s actions are coming from the position of strength, state media and regime officials acknowledge that Khamenei’s contraction policy is doomed to fail.
“The cabinet members were introduced to the parliament and received a vote of confidence from the parliament. What are the characteristics of this cabinet and what consequences will it have in society?” wrote the state-run Aftab News, quoting Hamidreza Jalaiepour from the rival faction.
“With the engineering of the [sham presidential] elections, people understood that the government was not pursuing a commitment to democracy and people’s dissatisfaction because of the crises of livelihood, health, the environment, and corruption. Rather, it seeks to consolidate the ruling system so that it can deal with and control the country’s crises with greater efficiency,” Jalaiepour acknowledged.
Khamenei and his regime face a restive society. Due to the regime’s 42 years of corruption, oppression, and now the Covid-19 outbreak that the mullahs’ refused to control, the public hatred is increasing. Two major Iran protests rattled the regime’s foundations in 2018 and 2019, with people calling for regime change.
Efficiently dealing with this restive society means more oppression. Jalaiepour acknowledges that Raisi’s cabinet “is not even consisted of the lower ranks of [Khamenei’s] faction. Instead of efficiency, this cabinet has two other features.”
According to Jalaiepour, these ministers are not chosen due to their “qualities and background, performance and ability.” He acknowledges that they are chosen due to their loyalty to the regime’s “propaganda program.”
“The government is well aware of the potential for popular unrests in society. Therefore, a cabinet has been introduced that is capable of controlling and dealing with popular protests and when protests happen, there wouldn’t be any voice of opposition in the government. In a nutshell, This cabinet is not efficient [to resolve crises], but it is handpicked,” Jalaiepour adds.
While acknowledging people’s boycott of the regime’s sham elections in 2020 and 2021, Jalaiepour that people expected the regime to offer a solution for the current crises in Iran.
According to Jalaiepour, Raisi’s government “is not an efficient government to control the three crises of livelihood, health, and drought. It is mostly a cabinet that “confirms the propaganda and ideology” of the [regime]. Therefore, the question is, what are the consequences of this government for the demanding and dissatisfied Iranian society?”
“But it seems that after the 2020 elections, we are witnessing the formation of public frustration with resentment and subsequent events such as the downing of the [Ukrainian] passenger jet, lack of perspective in running the country and serious economic interaction with the world, the devastating effects of drought, and unsustainable development in different parts of the country. In addition, the engineering of the 2021 elections, the introduction of the government unrelated to the real crises of the country, and, most importantly, the delay of several months in the import of foreign Covid-19 vaccines and the death of tens of thousands of Iranians, strengthens the process of the public frustration with resentment in Iranian society,” Jalaiepour warned regime officials.
Jalaiepour then warns that Raisi’s government should act immediately to control the “public resentment” as it is the most important factor to deal with.
In a nutshell, the regime is facing a restive society, and people want regime change. While the regime used the Covid-19 outbreak to quell this restive society and put protests on pause for almost a year, the recent protests in Khuzestan province and daily protests by people from all walks of life show the regime has failed in controlling the society. If the regime increases oppression, the public hatred toward the mullahs’ would increase. If it does not oppress people, protests rapidly spread across Iran. Thus, the regime is in a deadlock and has no way out.