Tuesday, July 8, 2025
HomeIran Opposition & ResistanceDemonizing MEK-News and ArticlesFrom Christ to the IRGC: How Iranian Operatives Exploited Sweden’s Asylum System

From Christ to the IRGC: How Iranian Operatives Exploited Sweden’s Asylum System

AI-generated illustration depicting a spiderweb with the emblem of Iran’s clerical regime at its center, symbolizing the regime’s extensive and covert network of influence and infiltration.
AI-generated illustration depicting a spiderweb with the emblem of Iran’s clerical regime at its center, symbolizing the regime’s extensive and covert network of influence and infiltration.

Three-minute read

The clerical dictatorship in Iran is executing a sophisticated, multilayered intelligence operation designed to penetrate democratic societies, exploit humanitarian asylum frameworks, and systematically defame, dehumanize, and neutralize its principal organized opposition, particularly the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). Recent revelations from Sweden expose how regime agents, under the cover of asylum and religious conversion, orchestrate psychological operations, threats, and influence campaigns, endangering both the Iranian diaspora and national security in host countries.

Background:

The MEK, having lost tens of thousands of its members under Iran’s brutal repression—through firing squads, torture chambers, and mass executions—became a symbol for many Iranians seeking political asylum in the West. It has been pivotal in exposing the regime’s human rights abuses, culminating in more than 70 condemnations by the United Nations General Assembly. Given this legacy, Tehran now manipulates its notoriety against the broader Iranian exile community by deploying agents to associate genuine asylum seekers with fabricated extremism.

Mohammad Heidari (right) and Shayan Tousynezhad (left), photographed handling equipment before an anti-MEK protest in Stockholm
Mohammad Heidari (right) and Shayan Tousynezhad (left), photographed handling equipment before an anti-MEK protest in Stockholm

Two individuals, Mohammad Heidari and Shayan Tousynezhad, initially presented themselves as persecuted Christian converts to secure asylum in Sweden. Subsequent investigations, corroborated by Doku’s detailed reporting, revealed their deep entanglement with Iranian intelligence networks. Their actions illustrate Tehran’s broader strategy of embedding operatives into exile communities to spy, intimidate, manipulate public discourse, and discredit the Iranian resistance.

Case Analysis:

Heidari and Tousynezhad simultaneously operated under dual identities. Publicly, they displayed overt signs of Christian faith, winning sympathy and support from Swedish institutions and communities. Privately, they ran pro-regime propaganda campaigns via social media, celebrated Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) slain members, threatened political dissidents with death, and organized protests against the MEK outside Swedish courts during the high-profile trial of Hamid Noury, a former Iranian official convicted of crimes against humanity.

Their activities were not isolated. They collaborated with the “Be Ma Bepayvand” network, funded and directed from Tehran, and amplified narratives through the Habilian Association — a proxy NGO tied to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC intelligence units. Their content consistently mirrored official regime rhetoric, targeting Iranian dissidents as enemies and legitimizing acts of terror.

Mohammad Heidari portrayed as a Christian convert in Sweden, featured in local media coverage
Mohammad Heidari portrayed as a Christian convert in Sweden, featured in local media coverage

Violation of Asylum Status:

One of the gravest violations revealed is the fact that these individuals, after claiming life-threatening persecution by Iranian authorities, voluntarily returned to Iran. This action directly contravenes the fundamental premise of political asylum, which requires that return to the home country is impossible due to credible fears of persecution.

The Doku report states: “We have since suspected that he [Mohammad Heidari] is back in Iran; according to information we received, the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen) deported the family during a dramatic night several months ago. When we spoke over a crackling line, he confirmed that he is now in Iran.”

Confirming Mohammad Heidari’s real identity is difficult. While the Swedish population register lists him as Mohammad Heidari, Doku found four different name variations in Migration Board records. On Facebook, he appears as “Heidari Behnam,” and other sources refer to him as “Behnam Haidari” or “Behnam Hidari.” He also used the email address “behnam.himan” when applying for student funding.

Moreover, Shayan Tousynezhad: “After the Court of Appeal upheld Hamid Noury’s life sentence at the end of 2023, Shayan Tousynezhad traveled to Iran. There he participated in a gathering at a university in Tehran together with Hamid Noury‘s son and a documentary filmmaker associated with the regime’s supreme leadership.”

Left: Social media announcement promoting a panel discussion at Sharif University in Tehran featuring Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury alongside other individuals linked to MOIS.Center: Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury photographed together. Right: Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury participating in a meeting.
Left: Social media announcement promoting a panel discussion at Sharif University in Tehran featuring Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury alongside other individuals linked to MOIS.
Center: Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury photographed together.
Right: Shayan Tousynezhad and Majid Noury participating in a meeting.

These admissions not only question the original asylum claims but also provide material evidence of duplicity and direct collaboration with regime elements. Asylum frameworks are predicated on the principle that return to the country of origin is incompatible with personal security. Their re-entry exposes a calculated abuse of democratic humanitarian systems.

Strategic Objectives of the Iranian Regime:

  1. Dehumanization of Dissidents: By portraying exiled MEK members as “terrorists” and “enemies of Iran,” operatives aim to isolate them socially and politically.
  2. Psychological Operations: The regime seeks to create a climate of fear among the diaspora through targeted threats, disinformation, and violent intimidation.
  3. Narrative Warfare: Iran systematically produces content legitimizing its crackdowns, both to confuse international audiences and weaken political will for sanctions or pressure.
  4. Intelligence Gathering: Embedded agents collect information on exile activists, their networks, and their vulnerabilities.
  5. Influence Operations: By infiltrating religious and civic organizations, the regime undermines trust within democratic societies and leverages asylum laws as shields against detection.
Left: Shayan Tousynezhad (facing camera) wearing an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emblem during a public gathering.Center: Official IRGC emblem. Right: Shayan Tousynezhad posing with a firearm in a social media post, openly praising the IRGC and using hashtags supporting the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader.
Left: Shayan Tousynezhad (facing camera) wearing an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emblem during a public gathering.
Center: Official IRGC emblem.
Right: Shayan Tousynezhad posing with a firearm in a social media post, openly praising the IRGC and using hashtags supporting the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader.

Proven Patterns of Complicity:

Historically, dozens of documented cases show that individuals or groups dedicating disproportionate resources to attacking the MEK, rather than confronting the regime itself, have inadvertently, or by design, furthered Tehran’s objectives. Evidence often reveals that such actions correlate strongly with the regime’s psychological operations and, in many instances, have unveiled direct collaboration with Iranian intelligence structures.

The Iranian regime’s weaponization of asylum procedures and infiltration of exile communities illustrates a profound and deliberate threat to both human rights and national security in democratic countries. The pattern by which certain operatives engage in relentless attacks against the regime’s principal opposition group, while neglecting to oppose the regime’s crimes, is no coincidence. It is a tactic. Understanding and addressing this phenomenon is crucial to preserving the integrity of asylum protections, defending democratic societies, and standing with genuine victims of oppression.

NCRI
Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.