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Response to Michael Rubin: Why Iran’s Future Lies with Resistance, Not Royal Nostalgia

Supporters of the Iranian Resistance in the United States held a rally in Washington, D.C., on March 8, 2025
Supporters of the Iranian Resistance in the United States held a rally in Washington, D.C., on March 8, 2025

In a powerful rebuttal to Michael Rubin’s recent critique of the People’s Mojahedin Organization (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Ali Safavi exposes the glaring contradictions, omissions, and ideological bias behind Rubin’s arguments. Safavi highlights Rubin’s dismissal of MEK’s response to the Israel-Iran conflict as baseless, pointing to Maryam Rajavi’s June 18 address to the European Parliament, where she reiterated the NCRI’s long-standing “third option”: regime change by the Iranian people themselves—not war or appeasement.

The article dismantles Rubin’s selective narrative that praises Reza Pahlavi despite acknowledging his political irrelevance and lack of leadership. In contrast, the NCRI and MEK, with a 60-year history of resistance and over 100,000 martyrs, have demonstrated concrete commitment, structure, and international support. Safavi defends the MEK against decades-old propaganda—refuted by international courts—and underscores its proven intelligence track record, including exposing Iran’s secret nuclear sites.

Rubin’s attacks, Safavi argues, reflect a preference for illusion over action. As Iranians reject both monarchy and theocracy, the NCRI and MEK stand as the only organized, democratic alternative. In a dictatorship where polling is impossible, the regime’s violent obsession with crushing the MEK speaks louder than any survey ever could.

Originally published on Ali Safavi’s Substack on July 2, 2025; the following is a republished version:

Analysis or Propaganda? A Response to a Deliberate Distortion

Michael Rubin’s rush to judgment in his latest tirade against the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) is not only premature—it is riddled with contradictions, historical omissions, and political and ideological bias. It disregards both the strategic clarity laid out by NCRI President-elect Maryam Rajavi and the enduring, proven leadership of the organized Iranian resistance. Rubin’s pathetic and futile attempt to discredit the MEK while lionizing a nostalgic but irrelevant son of a deposed and detested dictator is less analysis and more political theater.

Rubin accuses the MEK of responding with “crickets” to the recent Israel-Iran conflict, claiming they issued only “pro-forma statements.” Yet had he waited just days, he would have witnessed Maryam Rajavi’s compelling address to the European Parliament on June 18, 2025, where she declared: “The Iranian problem, in its entirety, goes far beyond the regime’s nuclear program. At its core, the issue of Iran is the fundamental conflict between the Iranian people and their resistance on one side, and the religious dictatorship on the other. The only viable solution remains the overthrow of this regime by the people of Iran and the Iranian Resistance.”

This was not silence. It was strategy. Rajavi reaffirmed the movement’s longstanding “third option”neither war nor appeasement, but regime change by the Iranian people and their organized resistance. Meanwhile, the MEK’s Resistance Units inside Iran have carried out over 3,000 acts of defiance in the past year alone—risking their lives to challenge the regime at its core. Rubin simply omits this because it doesn’t fit his narrative.

Even more striking is Rubin’s contradictory portrayal of Reza Pahlavi. In his anti-MEK rant, Rubin showers him with praise as Iran’s most promising opposition figure. Yet just days later, he laments that Pahlavi’s passivity, lack of organizational discipline, and fear of failure risk rendering him permanently irrelevant:

“If he makes a move and Iranians do not rally to him, his power and relevance dissipate immediately and permanently.”

This cognitive dissonance reveals Rubin’s real motive: no matter how inconsequential Pahlavi may be, Rubin still prefers him over the one force with structure, vision, and actual sacrifice. But soundbites do not make a leader. Symbolism is no substitute for service. Perception does replace reality. Pahlavi’s opportunistic remarks—typically timed to coincide with uprisings or foreign crises—have been ignored by the Iranian people not out of ignorance, but because they recognize them for what they are: empty gestures from someone who has never shared their struggle, nor has he done anything concrete to fight the ruling theocracy.

Leadership requires more than rhetoric. It requires taking risks, enduring hardship, and making sacrifices. The NCRI has demonstrated those qualities for over four decades. And the MEK for sixty years. They have paid a staggering price: more than 100,000 martyrs, including 30,000 political prisoners massacred in 1988, most of them MEK members. These were not accidental casualties—they were executed for refusing to renounce their ideals. That kind of sacrifice cannot be mimicked in exile, nor can it be replaced by royal nostalgia.

Rubin claims the MEK allied with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but fails to mention that this was Khomeini’s war—a conflict he deliberately prolonged to consolidate his grip on power. The MEK relocated to Iraq in 1986, a full six years after the war began. By then, Khomeini had rejected repeated ceasefire offers, sacrificing over a million lives and inflicting billions of dollars in economic devastation on Iran. The MEK’s move was not out of allegiance to Saddam, but born of necessity—to halt the bloodshed, bring peace, and continue their resistance against a regime that had eliminated all political space. It was also a strategic decision to undermine and ultimately destroy Khomeini’s war machine—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—the principal instrument of his domestic tyranny and regional aggression. The MEK’s resistance played a pivotal role in forcing Khomeini, as he bitterly admitted, to ‘drink the chalice of poison’ and accept the ceasefire—a humiliating retreat that marked a turning point in his regime’s narrative of divine invincibility.

Meanwhile, Rubin fails to mention that Reza Pahlavi has never condemned the atrocities of his father’s regimemuch less the SAVAK, his notorious secret police, which was responsible for the torture and execution of hundreds of political prisoners. In fact, SAVAK’s flag and the head of its Third Directorate are now a regular feature at his supporter’s sparsely attended rallies, as are former regime functionaries who continue to glorify that dark chapter of Iran’s history. This silence and symbolism alienate ordinary Iranians who still bear the scars of the Shah’s repression.

Rubin recycles discredited propaganda about the MEK being a “cult,” echoing the talking points of both the Shah’s regime and the Islamic Republic. These claims have been systematically rejected by U.S., UK, and EU courts, which all ruled that there was no legal basis to list the MEK as a terrorist group. Meanwhile, the MEK’s intelligence work, including 133 nuclear revelations, have consistently proven accurate—most notably their 2002 revelation of the Natanz nuclear site, which was later confirmed by the IAEA and changed the trajectory of international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Rubin claims the MEK lacks popular support but cites no credible evidence—because there is none. Iran is a dictatorship where independent polling is impossible. What we can measure, however, is the regime’s reaction: daily propaganda attackspriority crackdowns on Resistance Units, and mass arrests of MEK sympathizers. That is not how a regime treats an irrelevant group. Meanwhile, Maryam Rajavi’s 10-point Plan for a democratic, secular, non-nuclear Iran has won the endorsement of 225 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 4,000 lawmakers in 50 countries, including majorities in 34 national legislatures, and 137 former world leaders.

These are not symbolic endorsements. They are evidence of a growing international consensus around the NCRI as the only viable, organized, democratic alternative to both the mullahs and the monarchy.

Rubin derides the MEK’s international gatherings as extravagant yet fails to grasp their significance. These are not vanity events; they are strategic summits, attended by bipartisan political leaders from both sides of the Atlantic. Like every successful resistance movement—from the ANC to Solidarity—MEK understands that international legitimacy matters. Their gatherings are a lifeline for Iran’s internal resistance and a message to the regime: your days are numbered.

In the end, Rubin’s critique is not an argument—it’s a preference. He prefers an irrelevant prince over an organized resistance. He prefers nostalgia over strategy. He prefers the illusion of unity over the hard work of building it.

But the Iranian people aren’t waiting for a monarch to return. For them the turban and the robe are the flip side of the throne and the cloak. They are rising, resisting, and organizing. And it is the MEK and the NCRI who have stood with them—in blood, in sacrifice, and in vision.

The Iranian people don’t need a knight on a white horse. They need a future. And that future belongs to the resistance they are building—one protest, one sacrifice, one step at a time.

NCRI
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