Today, January 31, the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Office (NCRI-US) has released new intelligence revealing Tehran’s ongoing efforts to develop nuclear warheads. The information, sourced from the Defense and Strategic Research Committee of NCRI, based on reports from the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) network inside Iran, highlights the regime’s covert nuclear weapons program.
Iran’s Nuclear Warhead Development at Shahrud Site
The intelligence details the Iranian regime’s focus on developing nuclear warheads for solid-fuel missiles with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers at the Shahrud missile site. This effort is being directed by the Organization for Advanced Defense Research (SPND), the entity established to consolidate Iran’s nuclear weapons activities.
The Shahrud site is a heavily militarized zone operated by IRGC Aerospace Force experts, with restricted access to local citizens. Unauthorized entry into the prohibited area leads to immediate arrest. Personnel vehicles are prohibited inside the site, with transportation provided exclusively by IRGC Aerospace Force vehicles.
Shahrud Site Activities
- Houses a missile testing site and launchpad
- Camouflaged as a satellite program
- Uses the Ghaem-100 missile as its primary nuclear warhead carrier, replacing the Shahab-3 missile
- Developing independent satellite communication for tracking nuclear warheads
- Ghaem-100 is a solid-fuel, mobile missile modeled after a North Korean design
For over three decades, the ruling clerics in #Tehran, who continue to harbor ambitions of inaugurating a regional Islamic Caliphate to this day, have been desperately trying to join the #nuclear club.https://t.co/EiJenArCtm
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 18, 2023
Key Figures Involved
- Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam: IRGC Brigadier General who approved the Ghaem missile and oversaw Shahrud’s development before his death in a 2011 test launch.
- Brigadier General Ali Jafarabadi: Successor to Moghaddam, leads the Ghaem-100 project and works with two experts from Imam Hossein University.
- Salman Farsi Space Command, launched by IRGC Aerospace in 2011, oversees Shahrud’s nuclear-related activities.
SPND Facility at Semnan
The intelligence also exposes the expansion of nuclear weapons activities at the Semnan facility, another key site under SPND’s control:
- Tests Simorgh missile, ostensibly for satellite launches
- Largely underground facility, expanded under the guise of space operations
- Khomeini Space Launch Terminal established as cover
- Expanded from two facilities in 2005 to eight
- Facilities connected via underground tunnels
- Simorgh missile modeled after a North Korean design
NCRI-US press conference reveals intelligence on Tehran's nuclear warhead development. January 31, 2025. #Iran #NuclearThreat pic.twitter.com/epIEnRqOW1
— NCRI-U.S. Rep Office (@NCRIUS) January 31, 2025
Expansion of Semnan’s Nuclear Capabilities
- SPND Geophysics Group focuses on high-explosive detonation testing, key for nuclear weapons
- Conducts underground tests in Semnan desert areas
- Key specialists: Mohammad Javad Zaker, Hamed Aber, Farhad Moradiani Khosrowabad
- Covers activities through ties to Iran’s International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology and university geophysics departments
Sorkhe Hesar Site Near Tehran
- SPND operations expanded at Sorkhe Hesar
- First revealed in 2020, activities have increased significantly since
SPND’s Efforts to Conceal Nuclear Work
- Directorate for Nuclear Treaties was created within SPND to mislead international oversight
- Operates under Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
- Feigns compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while developing nuclear warheads
- SPND Geophysics Group closely coordinates with this directorate
"These reports, compiled from dozens of sources and thoroughly validated, indicate that in recent months, SPND has intensified its efforts to construct nuclear warheads at both the Shahrud and Semnan sites," the @NCRIUS said in a report exclusively obtained by @FoxNews,"… pic.twitter.com/CMldpG95Av
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) January 31, 2025
Iran’s Strategy to Buy Time for Nuclear Development
According to a confidential internal memo obtained by NCRI-US, Tehran is deliberately stalling negotiations with European nations and engaging in indirect talks with the U.S. to maintain the current status quo. The regime aims to extend negotiations for six months to bypass the sunset clause in UN Security Resolution 2231, which would render key restrictions obsolete.
NCRI-US Representative Soona Samsami emphasized that Iran has consistently used negotiations as a tool to buy time and complete its nuclear weapons program. She cited Hassan Rouhani’s 2006 admission that Iran deceived European negotiators while secretly advancing its nuclear work. Ali Akbar Salehi, former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, also admitted in 2019 that Iran had deliberately misled the IAEA about its nuclear infrastructure.
Recommended Actions for the International Community
- Activate the snapback mechanism to reinstate the six UN Security Council resolutions against Iran.
- Shut down all nuclear-related sites, including uranium enrichment facilities, and grant IAEA unrestricted access.
- Impose severe consequences for further violations; diplomatic engagement without accountability has only emboldened Iran’s deception.
At the end of the briefing, NCRI-US Deputy Director Alireza Jafarzadeh answered questions from reporters, reinforcing the urgent need for international action to prevent the clerical regime in Iran from achieving nuclear weapon capability.
