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Iranian Nuclear Chief Admits Regime Exploited JCPOA to “Close File,” Blames PMOI for Derailing Secret Strategy

Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, speaks to Shabake Khabar during a televised interview on February 2, 2025
Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, speaks to Shabake Khabar during a televised interview on February 2, 2025

Four-minute read 

On June 1, 2025, in a televised interview on Iran’s state-run Shabake Khabar, Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), made remarkably candid admissions regarding the regime’s nuclear strategy. Speaking just days before a critical session of the IAEA Board of Governors, Eslami outlined how Tehran had long viewed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 not as ends to nuclear transparency—but as tools to buy time and ultimately “close Iran’s nuclear case.” 

“We had an important achievement in the JCPOA and that was year ten,” Eslami declared. “Year ten is when Resolution 2231 comes to an end and the nuclear case of Iran is officially closed. What remains are merely some so-called limitations,” he said, referencing the sunset clauses built into the agreement. 

But in an unfiltered moment, he revealed what has since become the regime’s core frustration: the exposure of its clandestine work by the Iranian Resistance, particularly the PMOI (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)—whom he derided with the regime’s slur, “monaafeqin” (hypocrites). 

“That’s why they—using the anti-revolutionaries and monafeqin—create hype. Every time you see a new location pop up, a website names some corner or site and the noise begins. They do it to make sure we don’t reach year ten and can’t benefit from its opportunity,” Eslami said. 

Mounting International Pressure 

Eslami’s comments came just before the release of a highly critical IAEA report, which detailed Tehran’s continued obstruction, lack of transparency, and stockpiling of highly enriched uranium. According to the report, the regime remains the only non-nuclear weapons state in the world enriching uranium to 60% purity, a level alarmingly close to weapons-grade. The agency also cited Iran’s ongoing refusal to clarify the origin of nuclear material at undeclared sites. 

The report warned that Iran’s selective cooperation and reduction of inspector access significantly undermine the agency’s ability to verify the peaceful nature of its program. 

Worse still for the regime, the IAEA report revived concerns of triggering the JCPOA’s “snapback mechanism,” a provision allowing UN sanctions to be automatically reinstated if Tehran is found to be in serious breach of the deal. If activated, snapback would reimpose all pre-2015 UN sanctions, including the arms embargo and restrictions on missile development, without the need for a Security Council vote or veto. 

The specter of snapback looms large over the regime. In recent weeks, European powers have signaled growing frustration. Austria’s domestic intelligence agency added fuel to the fire when it issued a rare public intelligence report on Iran’s nuclear activities, noting Tehran’s lack of cooperation, suspicious enrichment levels, and potential military dimensions. 

The regime’s response was immediate and alarmed. IRGC Brigadier General Abdollah Ganji asked: “Have you ever heard of Austria’s intelligence service publishing a nuclear intelligence report on Iran? The IAEA releases a report about 60% enrichment and at the same time the Mojahedin expose a nuclear site in Semnan? This is coordinated.” 

Meanwhile, Noor News, a site affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council, warned of a shift: “The biased IAEA report signals a return to costly games. Is the Islamic Republic reconsidering its cooperation with the IAEA? The next decisions may enter a phase that the West won’t like.” 

In a joint statement, the regime’s Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Organization warned that if Western countries “seek to misuse Iran’s forbearance,” the Islamic Republic will adopt “appropriate retaliatory measures,” holding those states responsible for the consequences. 

Diplomacy as a Cover 

In the same interview, Eslami described Iran’s global diplomatic apparatus as part of a coordinated campaign to counter the agency’s findings and shift momentum. 

“Our ambassador at the IAEA is tasked with this mission. The Foreign Ministry is conducting wide-reaching diplomatic activity. We are coordinating with China, Russia, and several other countries for a joint statement,” he said. 

Eslami reaffirmed the regime’s hardline position on uranium enrichment: “Enrichment is the foundation of our nuclear industry and the red line of the Islamic Republic. No one can say Iran doesn’t have the right to enrich. It’s not anyone’s business,” he stated. 

He also revealed that Iran has actively used its 60% enriched uranium, claiming that isotopes were produced “in the presence of the IAEA”—a claim unlikely to ease concerns about breakout capability. “Even last year, we used a portion of our 60% stockpile to produce the isotopes we needed,” he said. 

A Regime Afraid of Its Own Game 

Eslami’s remarks—meant as a defiant defense—ultimately reveal a regime cornered by its own long-running strategy of delay, deception, and denial. By admitting that the goal was to reach the JCPOA’s tenth year to “close the file,” he confirmed what critics have said for years: Tehran never intended a permanent resolution, only an expiration date. 

Now, exposed by the Iranian Resistance, confronted by detailed IAEA findings, and facing the real possibility of UN sanctions snapping back into place, the regime is on the defensive. Its coordinated diplomatic push and threats of “reconsidering” cooperation show not strength, but deep anxiety about the consequences of its own intransigence. 

Whether through resumed international unity or domestic dissent, the regime appears to fear one thing above all: accountability—for a program it tried to conceal, a strategy it can no longer control, and a confrontation it may no longer be able to avoid. 

NCRI
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