Four-minute read
The Iranian regime is facing an unprecedented convergence of crises — financial collapse, economic freefall, social discontent, and intensifying political infighting. From the bankruptcy of a major private bank to the looming surge in fuel prices, from deepening poverty to factional warfare over nuclear policy and international treaties, the signs point to a system cracking under the weight of its own contradictions.
A Bank Vanishes, Confidence Fades
On October 23, 2025, Central Bank governor Mohammad-Reza Farzin announced that “there will no longer be Bank Ayandeh.” After “two decades of imbalance and unhealthy performance,” the troubled private lender is being liquidated; its assets absorbed by the Deposit Insurance Fund, and all depositors transferred to Bank Melli, the state’s flagship bank. Farzin claimed the Central Bank would “safeguard the people’s deposits.”
In practice, it marks the regime’s most serious financial-sector failure in years. Bank Ayandeh’s collapse reflects the deep rot of Iran’s credit system—opaque lending to regime-connected conglomerates, a crippled real estate sector, and the Central Bank’s own inability to enforce prudential rules. For ordinary Iranians, the message is chilling: even their deposits are no longer safe.
#Iran’s Ruling Elite Consumed by Infighting Amid Economic Ruin and Public Ragehttps://t.co/0Wk9C2RtFP
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 22, 2025
A Government Afraid of Its Own Reforms
On the same day, the regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian told a provincial gathering in West Azerbaijan: “There is no doubt we must raise gasoline prices.” Yet his speech was a study in hesitation. He conceded that implementing such a plan “is not simple” and “can worsen people’s livelihood problems.”
Leaks earlier in October showed a Cabinet framework for “price reform” of fuel; officials first denied, then admitted that multiple scenarios—including a three-tier system and hikes of up to 500 percent—were under review. Pezeshkian’s own chief of staff confirmed on October 21 that the issue had reached government working groups. The president’s oscillation betrays the regime’s central fear: another eruption like November 2019, when a fuel-price rise triggered nationwide protests and a bloody crackdown that killed at least 1,500 people.
This time, the government is paralyzed. It cannot sustain the world’s cheapest gasoline without bankrupting the treasury, yet any adjustment risks an explosion of anger from a population already impoverished.
#Iran’s Imploding Economy Exposes a Regime Beyond Preservationhttps://t.co/7N3OT7UFT2
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 17, 2025
Poverty Normalized
On October 20, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani claimed that the monthly poverty line per person was 6.13 million tomans, arguing that state subsidies and electronic vouchers had “filled the gaps in people’s lives.” Yet even regime-aligned outlets dismissed the figure as fiction: Khabar Online asked, “How can the poverty line be six million when even forty million isn’t enough for a family?” and ILNA cited independent estimates placing the real cost of living for a three- to four-person household at 40 to 50 million tomans. Labor economist Faramarz Tofighi noted that, adjusted for 45 percent inflation, Mohajerani’s own number translates to roughly nine million per person—about 29 million per household—while a minimum-wage worker with one child earns only 15 to 16 million, meaning the average Iranian family survives on barely half of what it needs.
Even these official figures likely understate the crisis. Food inflation has turned basic staples into luxuries. Poultry association official Mehdi Yousefkhani confirmed that chicken prices have been raised twice this year—unprecedented for the state’s “market-regulation committee.” Meanwhile, Ershad Talebi, head of the legumes association, described a “runaway increase” in bean and lentil prices, with pinto beans soaring from 150,000 to 500,000 tomans per kilo within months. Currency devaluation—from 28,500 to over 74,000 tomans per dollar—has compounded the pain.
Behind these statistics lies a broader social fracture: wage earners can no longer meet minimum calorie needs, and the government’s own spokesperson admits it. The regime’s promise of “economic resilience” has collapsed into managed destitution.
Expanding Wave of Strikes and Protests in #Iran as Economic Collapse Deepenshttps://t.co/ckfq3lCTpR
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 22, 2025
Factional War over the CFT
Amid economic freefall, Tehran’s power factions are fighting a different battle—whether to remain financially isolated. The controversy over joining the Convention against the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) has reopened bitter divides between pragmatic technocrats and ideological hardliners.
Although Pezeshkian signed the implementing order in late October, dispatching it to the judiciary, foreign, and economic ministries, rival factions erupted. MP Kamran Ghazanfari denounced the approval as “a signal of weakness sent to the enemy.” Within days, 150 MPs demanded the law’s withdrawal. The parliament then abruptly went on a ten-day recess, postponing any resolution until October 26.
This dispute underscores a regime at cross-purposes: desperate for relief from global banking isolation yet terrified of any transparency that might expose how it finances its regional networks.
#Iran’s Power Struggle: A Fractured Regime Hiding Behind Bold Rhetorichttps://t.co/SzNeQLYdh4
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 16, 2025
Defiance Abroad, Evasion at Home
Tehran’s defiance of the IAEA is the external mirror of its internal confusion. On October 20, the Foreign Ministry spokesman lashed out at IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi for confirming that Iran holds about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium at sites including Isfahan, Fordow, and Natanz. The spokesman accused the Agency of allowing itself to be “misused by the United States and three European countries.”
Other state officials doubled down. Majles security secretary Behnam Saeedi declared enrichment and missile development to be “red lines” and “not negotiable.” Atomic Energy Organization chief Mohammad Eslami insisted that any cooperation with the Agency depends on it condemning U.S. and Israeli ‘attacks’ and recognizing parliament’s law restricting oversight. In effect, Tehran demands international acceptance of its non-compliance—a sign of weakness disguised as defiance.
#Iran’s Power Struggle Escalates as State Media Admits Setbacks, Snapback Tightens, and the Street Simmershttps://t.co/sxHEeUIuiK
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 12, 2025
Memory of Revolt
Meanwhile this week, former minister Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi warned that the 2017–18 protests began as a state-approved rally against rising prices before spiraling out of control. His admission underlines how quickly economic discontent can turn political. For Pezeshkian’s government, the echo is unmistakable: another fuel hike or market shock could reignite the same anger.
The collapse of Bank Ayandeh, paralysis over fuel pricing, and rising poverty are facets of one systemic breakdown. The regime’s traditional levers—subsidies, censorship, and force—are colliding with fiscal exhaustion and deep factional rifts. Cornered at home while posturing abroad, the clerical state faces not just an economic reckoning but a political one: a society that may again decide that rejecting high prices means rejecting the regime itself.