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The Iranian regime’s security forces reportedly killed three Baluch civilians near Zahedan early Wednesday, in another deadly incident highlighting the regime’s violent repression in Sistan and Baluchestan. According to eyewitness accounts, security personnel opened fire on their vehicle without warning and shot two of the victims again after the car had stopped. The reported killings underscore the climate of impunity surrounding the regime’s security apparatus, as the authorities continue to rely on lethal force while evading accountability for abuses against the population.
According to a local human rights organization, security personnel opened fire on a Peugeot carrying three men from Tehran toward Zahedan at approximately 3 a.m. on November 11, near Lakhshak.
The victims were identified as Omid Jamalzehi, 30; Hanzaleh Jamalzehi, 32, a father of four; and Mobin Gangouzehi, 34. Witnesses alleged that officers fired without warning and subsequently shot Hanzaleh and Mobin at close range after their car stopped. Their bodies were transferred to a forensic medicine center, where relatives gathered demanding answers.
Iran’s ruling factions are openly clashing over #NuclearBomb, negotiations and intelligence failures. Rival newspapers attack each other as armed incidents continue in Sistan and Baluchestan and protests spread. The disputes expose deep disagreements over how the regime can…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 2, 2026
Parliament Moves to Restructure Intelligence Ministry
The regime’s parliament is preparing legislation that would substantially alter the Intelligence Ministry’s leadership structure after more than eight months without a permanent minister.
According to Mehr’s November 10 reporting, parliamentary spokesperson Abbas Goudarzi said lawmakers would consider an urgent proposal on November 15 to eliminate the requirement that the intelligence minister be a qualified Islamic jurist. Four potential candidates have reportedly been considered.
The proposal would establish two bodies responsible for intelligence protection and so-called ideological affairs. Their directors would be appointed by the supreme leader, while the intelligence minister would remain subject to presidential nomination and parliamentary approval.
The proposal follows accusations by hardline lawmakers that regime President Masoud Pezeshkian has obstructed the appointment of an intelligence minister by insisting on a candidate rejected by Mojtaba Khamenei. The prolonged deadlock is yet another indication of Khamenei’s precarious authority within the ruling establishment: despite occupying the regime’s highest office, he has apparently been unable to impose his preferred candidate on the president. The proposed restructuring, which would give him direct appointment powers over two intelligence bodies, appears to be an attempt to compensate for this weakness and consolidate his grip on the security apparatus. The legislation has yet to be approved.
Iran’s ruling factions are openly warring over U.S. negotiations and #nuclear policy.
Hardliners accuse Foreign Minister Araqchi of “capitulation,” demand his removal, call for #NPT withdrawal, and push for nuclear weapons as deterrence—while Pezeshkian’s government signals…— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 6, 2026
Steelworkers Protest Delayed Wages and Stalled Production
Workers at the National Iranian Steel Group in Ahvaz staged another protest on November 10, demanding overdue wages, regular payment schedules, renewed production and improved health insurance.
According to ILNA’s report, workers gathered inside the plant after demonstrating outside Khuzestan’s governor’s office the previous day. They demanded a binding commitment to pay salaries by the fifth day of each month and an end to unequal employment arrangements.
Management promised to begin paying October wages on November 16 and establish a regular payment timetable. Workers temporarily suspended their demonstrations but warned that protests could resume if the commitments were not fulfilled.
The dispute highlights mounting dissatisfaction over delayed wages, insecure employment and the deterioration of industrial production.
Iran faces deepening factional infighting over intelligence appointments and political prosecutions, reported killings of Baluch civilians, #protests in Shahroud and flood damage cutting off villages. Meanwhile, food prices and water shortages strain households as the regime…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 7, 2026
Retirees Offered Early Access to Their Own Pensions
On November 11, the Social Security Organization activated a purchasing-credit scheme allowing pensioners to spend up to one month’s pension before its scheduled payment.
The credit can be used only at participating retailers and is deducted from the pension when it becomes payable. It is not an additional benefit or an increase in retirement income. The announcement comes amid persistent complaints about shrinking purchasing power and unpaid obligations to retirees.
The government’s wage policy also remains under scrutiny. A proposal to increase some workers’ allowances by 2.8 million tomans has yet to be finalized, despite continuing demands for relief from rising living costs.
Iran’s retirees protest across multiple cities, denouncing #corruption, poverty and executions. Yazd’s bus strike enters its ninth day, floods disrupt 19 provinces, and new figures reveal over 10,000 road deaths in six months. With wages trailing #inflation and hospitals…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) November 8, 2026
Floods Damage 30 Bridges in North Khorasan
Provincial road authorities reported on November 10 that recent flooding had damaged 30 bridges and road structures in North Khorasan. Another drainage crossing was destroyed, and approximately 40 meters of road suffered erosion or structural damage.
The disclosure follows extensive flood-related disruption in several provinces, raising further concerns about the vulnerability of transport infrastructure to severe weather.
The latest developments point to a deeper crisis of authority within the Iranian regime. Mojtaba Khamenei’s inability to resolve a prolonged dispute over the leadership of the Intelligence Ministry, despite his position at the apex of the ruling establishment, suggests that the succession has not produced the cohesion the regime needs. Rival factions are increasingly challenging one another over control of the state’s most sensitive institutions, even as public discontent continues to erode the regime’s political and social foundations. The leadership faces a fundamental dilemma: tightening repression risks intensifying popular anger, while internal divisions complicate its ability to enforce a unified response. Far from consolidating power, the new leadership appears increasingly constrained by the very conflicts and crises it inherited.