Three-minute read
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has triggered widespread alarm within Iran’s ruling establishment. Statements from top officials reveal an effort to downplay the strategic loss while grappling with the growing fear of similar consequences at home. Their direct remarks shed light on the regime’s internal turmoil and its struggle to maintain control over narratives and public sentiment.
Mohammad Saeedi, Friday prayer leader in Qom, sought to temper the regime’s base, stating, “In the ups and downs of resistance, there may be occasional failures, but we must not despair over these setbacks.” His tone echoed the regime’s broader attempts to maintain morale while minimizing the scale of the strategic blow.
Similarly, Ahmad Alamolhoda, Khamenei’s representative in Mashhad, acknowledged the disquieting nature of recent developments, referring to them as “distressing and anxiety-inducing events in the resistance front.” Alamolhoda accused social media of spreading “hopelessness among our people regarding the power of the resistance,” but claimed the Supreme Leader’s guidance had effectively countered these narratives. He warned that “writing and verbal corruption” aimed at undermining the regime would not succeed.
In a more defensive tone, Mohammad Reza Nasouri, Friday prayer leader in Sari, cautioned against both fear and complacency, saying, “Some people are filled with doubt; some are filled with fear. Let’s not belittle the situation, but also, let’s not despair. Let’s not say the blood of our martyrs was wasted.” His words betrayed the regime’s effort to balance denial with reassurances for its increasingly skeptical audience.
#Iranian Regime’s Actions and Statements Reveal Scramble to Contain Fallout from #Assad’s Collapsehttps://t.co/WZBVMGWw8s
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 15, 2024
In a stark admission of internal dissent, Mohammad Mehdi Hosseini Hamedani, Friday prayer leader in Karaj, called for severe punishment for those spreading fear among the populace: “The judiciary must act decisively and not hold back against those who weaken the hearts of the people.”
Fear of Social Media and Cognitive Warfare
Perhaps the most telling remarks came from Siavash Moslemi, an IRGC commander, who identified social media as a key factor in Assad’s fall and a potential threat to the Iranian regime. “Today, the battlefield is no longer limited to land, sea, or air. Virtual space has become one of the most significant arenas for cognitive and psychological warfare,” Moslemi said, emphasizing that “narratives, not bullets or missiles, shape public opinion and determine victory or defeat.”
Moslemi further explained how “armed opposition groups used misinformation, exaggerated defeats, and manipulated public sentiment to cripple the Syrian army,” describing this as “a psychological war that delivered the final blow.” His comments reflect the regime’s growing paranoia about social media and its potential to destabilize their grip on power.
“Governance in virtual space has become a strategic tool for managing public opinion,” Moslemi continued, justifying the regime’s extensive internet censorship. He warned that “neglecting governance in virtual space means surrendering a strategic front to the enemy.”
Blame, Deflection, and Warnings
Some officials sought to shift blame for Assad’s fall. Allah Noor Karimitabar, Friday prayer leader in Ilam, claimed that Assad ignored Khamenei’s “wise counsel” and failed to bolster popular militias. “If Assad had not distanced himself from the resistance front, this tragedy would not have occurred,” he argued, adding that Iranian policymakers must learn from this and not be lured by “false promises from America.”
Khamenei Digs in As #Assad’s Fall Rattles #Tehranhttps://t.co/LW9OIi50Kp
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 11, 2024
Karimitabar issued a stark warning to the regime’s decision-makers: “If we do not fight on the frontlines of the resistance, we will be fighting ISIS and America’s proxies in the streets of Tehran. Resistance on the frontlines is the only preventive action.”
Meanwhile, Ali Shadmani, a senior IRGC official, dismissed claims of the resistance’s defeat, stating, “To say the resistance front has failed is a tongue that deserves to be silenced. Yes, the physical structure may have taken a hit, but the sacred ideology of resistance remains intact.” He warned against internal dissent: “Those who falter do so because they adopt calculations that deviate from reality.”
Veiled Threats and Escalating Tensions
The regime’s defensive posture extended to issuing threats against neighboring countries. Mohammad Marandi, a senior advisor to the regime’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hinted at retaliation if Iran’s nuclear facilities were attacked, stating in a now-deleted tweet, “If Iran is targeted, Qatar’s natural gas infrastructure will be entirely destroyed. Without Qatar, there will be no natural gas from Doha, and the region will face the consequences.”
State Media Reveals #Assad’s Fall Has Intensified the Blame Game in #Iranhttps://t.co/NZ7w6HXtPQ
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) December 11, 2024
The Bigger Picture
Despite officials’ attempts to downplay the collapse of Assad’s regime, their remarks reveal a deep fear of its broader implications. Hamidreza Jalaipour, a self-styled reformist and long-time revisionist, highlighted the precarious position of the regime, citing surveys that show “90% of Iranians are dissatisfied with the current situation, and many are disillusioned with the government.” He warned that this dissatisfaction could escalate if left unaddressed: “If this continues, no one can predict what might happen next.”
The coordinated messaging from Iranian officials underscores their recognition of the regime’s vulnerability. From acknowledging public discontent to blaming social media and deflecting responsibility, their remarks reflect a government grappling with the reality of losing a key ally and the broader fragility of its rule. The fall of Assad has exposed cracks in the regime’s narrative of invincibility, leaving its leaders scrambling to maintain control over both their internal ranks and the wider Iranian public.