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The Iranian regime is currently experiencing intense internal friction following the collapse of international agreements and recent military engagements. Rather than uniting the political establishment, the crisis has deepened divisions across virtually every level of the ruling establishment; individuals with opposing perspectives no longer neatly adhere to conventional political labels but instead differ fundamentally over how the regime can be preserved.
These conflicts must not be confused with disagreements between political parties in a democratic system. None of the competing factions questions the survival of the theocratic dictatorship itself. They are rival clerical, military, security, and economic power networks—effectively competing mafia-like gangs—fighting over control of the state and over which combination of war, repression, negotiation, and tactical retreat can keep the system alive.
This infighting is unfolding openly across state media, illustrating a high degree of polarization where both those who believe only war can save the regime and those who believe deceptive negotiations can view their domestic competitors as adversaries.
The conflict escalated sharply when former President Mohammad Khatami advocated for an “honorable peace,” stating that “warmongers walk the same path that Israel takes” and accusing proponents of perpetual conflict of endangering the state. This provoked an immediate and severe reaction from opponents. On July 19, 2026, Kayhan editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari denounced Khatami’s statements, claiming that proponents of negotiation were attempting to disguise a “dishonorable surrender” as peace. Shariatmadari explicitly labeled this camp a “fifth column” and demanded that the intelligence and judicial systems initiate a “decisive and regret-inducing crackdown” against them.
Iran’s principal weakness is internal, so the solution must be too. Deep economic and social crises, widespread public rejection, intensifying factional divisions, and a weaker leadership have created fertile ground for change. An organized domestic resistance—led by the…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 14, 2026
The mutual hostility is regularly broadcast on state television, turning national networks into factional battlegrounds. In a broadcast reported by Entekhab on July 20, 2026, hardline commentator Mohammad Hassan Rajabi Davani attacked former presidents, stating that “Khatami and Rouhani are aligned with the Monafeqin [the MEK]” and alleging they supported “the sedition of obscene behavior”. This prompted former government spokesperson Abdollah Ramazanzadeh to publicly question whether state broadcasting managers possessed “enough honor to give supporters of Seyed Mohammad Khatami an opportunity on television to respond to these absurdities”.
Purging Radicals from the Legislature
The factional warfare has physically manifested within the Parliament (Majlis), where Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s faction—representing the camp favoring deceptive talks—is actively attempting to marginalize the pro-war radicals and gain the upper hand. In an interview published on July 18, 2026, former MP Jalal Rashidi-Kouchi confirmed that parliament leadership removed Mahmoud-Reza Nabaviyan from the presiding board of the National Security Commission. Rashidi-Kouchi characterized this purge as a necessary rejection of the radical faction’s approach, which he stated “relies heavily on removing political rivals” and seeking to hand the country’s governance over to street crowds and military elements.
On July 18, 2026, MP Majid Nassirpour detailed how pro-war factions organized sit-ins in front of the parliament, continually attacked the diplomatic team, and even proposed dissolving the Supreme National Security Council during a period of active conflict. Slamming the pro-war camp, Nassirpour recounted a conversation with a colleague whom he challenged to join the armed forces in the south, narrating that the pro-war figure admitted, “Our specialty is only destruction; we do not know how to do those things”.
"Washington was prepared to provide a financial and #diplomatic lifeline; however, Tehran's regime lacked both the will and the capacity to play along. Because it is too weak and fragile to accept it," @MehdiOghbai writes.https://t.co/6R3QiV6hSS
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 14, 2026
The daily Khorasan reported on July 19, 2026, that pro-war factions used the funeral procession of Ali Khamenei to shout insults and curses at incumbent state officials. This profound insubordination underscored the deep trouble and fraying authority facing the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, whose July 17, 2026 public message was hastily issued to address the chaos. In an illustration of his weakened grip, both political camps immediately seized upon his statements to leverage them in their own favor: the pro-war radicals twisted his words to validate their attacks, while the negotiation faction cited his warning to draw a strict red line against “slander” and protect themselves from being branded as traitors.
These confrontations expose the regime’s deep weakness, as rival factions use state institutions, street pressure, military networks, and accusations of treason against one another.
Strategic Paralysis and Psychological Warfare
This relentless infighting has placed the administration in a position where it must battle its own political establishment while managing a foreign conflict. The newspaper Jomhuri Eslami observed on July 19, 2026, that the government and negotiating team are fighting on two fronts: dealing with the United States externally while fighting an internal space that weaponizes slogans like “death to compromisers” and reduces all diplomacy to a binary of “either negotiation or resistance”. Concurrently, warnings have emerged in outlets like Vatan-e Emrooz cautioning against the domestic trend of accusing frontline military commanders of treason, which only exacerbates the instability.
"As Iran's clerical elite cannibalize one another over #foreignpolicy, this profound systemic decay offers an unprecedented opening for the organized democratic coalition to transform widespread public fury into another wave of uprisings against the clerical dictatorship," Dr.…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 17, 2026
The increasingly public war among the regime’s factions carries one overriding political meaning. The system that once contained its internal mafia-like rivalries through the authority of a single supreme leader can no longer do so. Ali Khamenei’s death did not create these divisions, but it removed the figure who had kept them within manageable limits. Mojtaba Khamenei’s invisible leadership has failed to replace that authority.
Every new accusation of treason, every demand for the suppression of a rival faction, every institutional purge, and every public rejection of the official chain of command reveals the same underlying development: the Iranian regime has emerged from the recent war not more united, but substantially weaker, more fragmented, and less capable of controlling the conflicts within its own ruling apparatus.