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At a time when Mojtaba Khamenei and the upper echelons of Iran’s ruling establishment are urging regime insiders to avoid public feuding, rival factions are doing precisely the opposite. In recent weeks, competing camps have intensified attacks on one another over negotiations, economic policy, the Strait of Hormuz, state media and even the conduct of senior officials, exposing widening cracks within the clerical dictatorship.
The internal warfare is particularly striking because it directly contradicts repeated calls from the leadership for officials and media outlets not to portray the state as weak, not to give encouragement to the regime’s enemies, and not to deepen divisions over the question of war versus negotiation. Yet statements carried by state media show rival camps accusing one another of surrender, damaging national interests, misleading the public and undermining the country’s strategic position.
Extremists Turn Their Fire on the Government
One of the clearest examples emerged in criticism of former economy minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. Rahim Zare, a member of parliament’s Budget Committee, publicly rebuked Hemmati on September 15, 2026, saying: “I ask Mr. Hemmati to give fewer interviews.” He argued that such remarks were interpreted as weakness toward Iran’s enemies and contributed to currency instability.
When Mojtaba Khamenei forbids the "#IranWar or negotiation” binary, both camps defy him within days. The new Leader’s word is no longer final. The pillar that once capped factional war is fracturing.
Analysis by @MehdiOghbaihttps://t.co/l4x1BQDA5V— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) September 1, 2026
The attacks are part of broader criticism directed at Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration from hardline factions dissatisfied with diplomatic and economic policies.
Tabnak, a regime-affiliated website, highlighted growing controversy around extremist parliamentarian Mahmoud Nabavian. In an article published on September 15, 2026, it accused so-called “super revolutionaries” of systematically attacking successive governments, from Hassan Rouhani to Ebrahim Raisi and now Pezeshkian.
Disputes Over Diplomacy and Oman Talks
Foreign policy has become a major battleground.
Hossein Shariatmadari, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative at Kayhan newspaper, launched a fierce attack on understandings reached through Oman regarding the Strait of Hormuz. He declared that “the understanding with Oman gives America a breathing opportunity” and argued that negotiations over opening shipping routes amounted to a strategic mistake.
The hardline newspaper Nobonyad similarly condemned current diplomacy as a “vicious cycle,” accusing Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of repeatedly pursuing agreements that ultimately benefit Washington.
Kayhan itself went further, describing the Oman process as a “diplomatic trap,” reflecting sharp divisions over how to manage growing regional and international pressures.
"A leader who merely ratifies is a leader who can be replaced by another ratifier. #Peace would retire the emergency that crowned him; war keeps grinding the economy that could bury him," Farid Mahoutchi writes.https://t.co/30kNzyCW3O
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 8, 2026
Media Wars and Declining Legitimacy
Factional conflict is also visible in disputes over Iran’s state broadcaster.
ILNA reported on September 15 that remarks by Abdolhossein Khosropanah acknowledging that 60 to 70 percent of the population does not use state broadcasting sparked renewed debate about the broadcaster’s performance. The agency warned that the problem was not simply falling viewership but declining trust.
State broadcasting chief Peyman Jebelli responded defiantly, declaring: “If anyone expects state television to retreat from the path of Iranian-Islamic identity after all this resistance, they are mistaken.”
His remarks came after the regime’s president reportedly complained that he does not watch state television because “it upsets my nerves.”
On the convergence of crises facing the regime, Farid Mahoutchi writes: "Mojtaba Khamenei’s attempt to suppress factional warfare inside Iran’s clerical dictatorship is already producing the opposite effect."
Read more:https://t.co/rKgklqmWlH— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) August 31, 2026
An Establishment Increasingly at Odds with Itself
Furthermore, factional media outlets are openly attacking one another. Kayhan recently denounced the so-called reformist newspaper Shargh for criticizing hardline street mobilizations, accusing it of insulting millions of Iranians. The unusually sharp rhetoric reflected an increasingly polarized political environment.
The significance of this infighting lies not merely in personal rivalries but in what it reveals about the regime’s broader predicament. Mounting economic pressures, international isolation and social unrest have intensified disagreements over how to navigate the regime’s existential crisis.
While the regime’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to stress for an image of cohesion, state media reports increasingly reveal competing factions blaming one another for policy failures. The dispute over negotiations, media strategy, economic management and public mobilization suggests that the regime’s internal divisions are becoming harder to conceal at precisely the moment external pressures are increasing.