Three-minute read
A coordinated narrative from several of Khamenei’s appointed Friday prayer leaders this week has exposed one of the regime’s most enduring fears: the potential for renewed influence and action by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI), coupled with domestic unrest. These speeches—delivered just weeks after the end of the recent 12-day war—signal that the regime considers itself still under existential threat, not from foreign powers, but from within.
The coordinated messages from the Friday prayer leaders of cities like Karaj, Birjand, Bandar Abbas, and Chahardangeh reveal a regime rattled not only by external military confrontation but also by what it sees as the looming specter of organized domestic uprising. The comparison repeatedly made by the clerics—to the politically explosive summer of 1988, when Ruhollah Khomeini, the regime’s founder, abruptly accepted UN Resolution 598 to end the Iran-Iraq War—underscores the seriousness of the concern. That year’s turning point was followed by the PMOI’s military operation in western Iran and the regime’s subsequent massacre of political prisoners, many of whom were PMOI members or sympathizers.
A Return to the 1980s Mindset
Mohammad Mehdi Hosseini Hamedani, the Friday Imam of Karaj and Khamenei’s representative, opened his sermon by recalling July 18, 1988, as “a day of sorrow” due to the regime’s acceptance of the UN ceasefire resolution. However, he argued that the acceptance was a “smart and rational decision” that deceived the enemy and enabled the regime to later carry out “Operation Mersad”—the military counterattack to the “Operation Eternal Light” of the National Liberation Army.
#Iran's Regime Admits Its Fear of #MEKResistanceUnits https://t.co/nmvFCsE6sx
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) July 6, 2025
He went on to claim that current conditions are “very similar” to those of the late 1980s, warning that “enemies are working hard to weaken the position of the Supreme Leader and the concept of Velayat-e Faqih.” This “cognitive warfare,” as he called it, is being waged to create the impression that Khamenei is in hiding or afraid, which he insisted is false. Instead, he praised Khamenei’s “heroic” leadership during the recent 12-day war, describing his appointment of military commanders and rapid response to Israeli attacks as a “masterpiece of leadership.”
Yet the need to insist so forcefully on the Supreme Leader’s strength and visibility suggests that the regime is concerned about public perception—and more importantly, internal legitimacy.
Coordinated Alarm Over the PMOI
In the southern port city of Bandar Abbas, another religious authority, Ghanbar Darvishy, was even more explicit. He claimed the PMOI had pre-positioned operatives with explosives, aiming to trigger domestic chaos, inspire an uprising, and topple the regime. “They were ready. Their plan was for people to rise up and overthrow the government,” he warned, hinting darkly that some insiders may have intentionally stirred dissatisfaction among the public to support such an outcome.
#IRGC-Linked Media Accuses @Mojahedineng of Targeting Youth Amid Growing Influencehttps://t.co/prg0rozDEV
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 3, 2025
In Birjand, cleric Mohammad Mokhtari warned that “the war is not over,” and that the PMOI, popular unrest, and infiltration efforts were part of a broader strategy by the enemy to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. He described a moment of acute vulnerability during the war’s first 24 hours, which was only reversed, he said, when Khamenei “took the scene in hand” and rapidly changed the situation.
Heightened Fear of Uprisings Post-War
The repeated references to the PMOI and uprisings reveal how closely the regime links external military pressure with domestic instability. The war with Israel, while officially declared over, has left a vacuum that the clerical regime now seems eager to fill with a different narrative—one that turns public attention to internal enemies and justifies continued repression under the guise of “hybrid warfare.”
The mention of “hybrid war” and “cognitive warfare” in nearly every sermon this week is notable. It reflects the regime’s recognition that traditional military threats may be less destabilizing than social discontent, digital activism, and underground organizing. In effect, the Iranian regime is shifting its public narrative to stress a multi-dimensional battlefront—military, economic, diplomatic, and psychological—where the PMOI and anti-regime protest movements are now considered front-line threats.
Former MOIS Interrogator Warns Against #MEK Influence in #Iran, Calls for Internet Restrictionshttps://t.co/FKQS8AGR8F
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) January 10, 2024
A Pretext for Further Repression
This coordinated clerical alarmism may also serve a more practical function: creating political space and justification for heightened security measures. By drawing parallels to the late 1980s—particularly the post-ceasefire crackdown—it may be laying the ideological groundwork for a new wave of arrests, censorship, and targeted repression.
Given recent reports of increased disappearances of political prisoners and growing unrest in prisons, the clerics’ language could signal that the regime is preparing for preemptive actions against dissident groups it views as capable of mobilizing a new uprising.
The unified messaging across cities and provinces suggests these are not isolated comments, but part of a centralized directive. The regime, fresh from a costly and politically volatile confrontation, is pivoting its propaganda machinery inward—to warn of “infiltrators,” “bomb-makers,” and “cognitive warfare.”
That it is choosing to revive the specter of the PMOI shows both the durability of the Iranian Resistance’s image and the degree to which Tehran remains haunted by the idea of organized resistance.