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The liberation of Syria has reignited debate over the missed opportunities that prolonged Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime. Former French President François Hollande revealed in a recent interview that in 2013, he, former United States President Barack Obama, and former United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron planned a strike to destabilize Assad after his use of chemical weapons. However, Britain withdrew, and Obama postponed the operation. Hollande lamented this decision’s consequences, including prolonged suffering and emboldening Assad’s allies.
According to multiple reports, including insights from former Obama officials, one major factor influencing the decision to halt U.S. airstrikes in Syria in 2013 was the Obama administration’s focus on securing a nuclear deal with Iran. President Obama’s foreign policy advisor Ben Rhodes stated in the 2018 documentary The Final Year: “If the U.S. had intervened more forcefully in Syria, it would have dominated Obama’s second term and the [Iran Nuclear Deal] would have been impossible to achieve.”
This decision had severe consequences. Assad’s regime, with continued support from Iran and Russia, survived for another decade, perpetuating suffering in Syria and expanding Tehran’s influence in the region.”
🔴 Chute de Bachar al-Assad
🔙 Retour en 2013 : Le jour où Barack Obama a laissé tomber François Hollande pour une intervention en Syrie…
▶️ @DariusRochebin x @fhollande pic.twitter.com/XyZd7mJXqw
— LCI (@LCI) December 9, 2024
At the heart of this tragedy lies a sobering lesson about the perils of appeasement. Tehran, fearful that Assad’s fall would jeopardize its regional dominance, exploited Western hesitations by dangling the prospect of nuclear diplomacy. This move not only bought time for Assad but also allowed the clerical regime in Iran to solidify its influence across the Middle East. The price was paid not by negotiators in Vienna or diplomats in Washington but by ordinary Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Yemenis, and Iranians who bore the brunt of Tehran’s proxy wars and repression.
A Legacy of Violence and Betrayal
September 1, 2013, just weeks after the proposed strike on Assad was shelved, Iranian proxies carried out the massacre of 52 members of the opposition group Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. These individuals had been promised protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention by the U.S. military. Yet, as the ink dried on back-channel discussions between Tehran and Washington, their safety was betrayed. The timing of this atrocity raised unsettling questions about the price of appeasement—questions that remain unanswered to this day.
Despite Tehran’s claims of goodwill in nuclear negotiations, the regime’s nuclear program was not curtailed. Instead, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) became a shield, granting Iran economic relief while enabling it to double down on regional aggression. By the time the world woke up to this reality, the damage had already been done: Syria lay in ruins, Yemen burned, and Iraq’s fragile democracy had been hijacked by Iranian-backed militias.
Fundamentalism and terrorism under the banner of Islam, whether Shiite or Sunni, are either promoted and financed by the Iranian regime, or have their origins in the regime.
The policy of appeasement towards this regime has not only harmed the Iranian people, its primary victims,… pic.twitter.com/XUZpJJ1cUo— Maryam Rajavi (@Maryam_Rajavi) October 8, 2023
The Doctrine of Proxies: Khamenei’s Enduring Strategy
The fingerprints of the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are unmistakable in this decades-long strategy of manipulation and violence. Long before he assumed the mantle of Supreme Leader, Khamenei was the architect of Tehran’s proxy doctrine, using armed groups to project power abroad while maintaining plausible deniability at home. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, these proxies have not only destabilized the Middle East but also entrenched the regime’s control by framing external conflict as a defensive necessity.
In public speeches, Khamenei has repeatedly warned domestic critics that Iran’s regional adventures are essential for national survival. “If we don’t fight in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, we’ll have to fight the enemy in Kermanshah, Hamadan, or Tehran,” he declared, weaving a narrative that conflates the regime’s survival with its neighbors’ submission. It was under this pretext that Qassem Soleimani, the notorious commander of the IRGC Quds Force, orchestrated atrocities across the region. From igniting sectarian strife in Iraq to engineering the rise of ISIS as a means to justify Iranian intervention, Soleimani embodied the regime’s cynical calculus: chaos abroad secures power at home.
Breaking the Cycle of Appeasement
Western policymakers often misunderstood this strategy, mistaking Iranian aggression for opportunism rather than recognizing it as a cornerstone of the regime’s survival. By treating Tehran as a rational actor seeking pragmatic solutions, they fell into a trap, offering concessions that only emboldened its leaders. The myth of Iran as an invincible power, reinforced by analysts and diplomats alike, paralyzed international action for years.
Appeasement Brought #War, Only Regime Change in #Iran Can Deliver Peacehttps://t.co/S6Izl20Atd
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 6, 2024
But myths, like regimes, are not eternal. Iran’s economy today is in shambles, its currency has plummeted, and its population is increasingly defiant. The nationwide uprisings of 2017, 2019, and 2021 revealed the regime’s fragility and exposed the hollowness of its claims to legitimacy. Protesters chanting “No Gaza, No Lebanon, my life for Iran!” encapsulated the growing disdain for a regime that prioritizes foreign adventures over domestic welfare.
If the world has learned anything from Syria’s decade of suffering, it is that appeasement only prolongs the inevitable. Assad’s fall in 2024, though long overdue, proves that even the most entrenched dictatorships can collapse under sustained pressure. The same principle applies to Tehran. The Iranian regime, weakened by internal dissent, economic collapse, and international isolation, is not invincible. What it fears most is not foreign armies but the organized defiance of its own people.
Ending appeasement is not merely a moral imperative; it is a strategic necessity. The West must abandon the illusion that incremental concessions will moderate Tehran’s behavior. Instead, it should focus on empowering Iran’s opposition, both inside and outside the country. Just as Syrian rebels ultimately overcame a heavily armed dictatorship, Iranians have shown they possess the resilience and determination to challenge their oppressors.