Four-minute read
Following the war between the United States, Israel, and the Iranian regime, Tehran claimed victory on the grounds that the system had not been overthrown. But this claim rests on a false premise. In reality, the conflict represents a Pyrrhic victory—a survival achieved at such a devastating cost that it has left the regime’s core power structure critically fractured.
The war resulted in the unprecedented elimination of the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenei), the regime’s highest-ranking political officials, and the top brass of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While factional feuding has always existed over the course of the regime’s 40-plus-year history, those past conflicts were primarily about dividing shares of power. Today, the internal fissure has fundamentally shifted: it is an existential battle over regime survival, fiercely contesting which political course and which faction is capable of preserving the state.
This decapitation of the old guard did not unify the system in the face of an existential threat; instead, the internal evidence points to severe economic strain, a highly volatile society, and a visibly fragmented ruling elite. Most importantly, the crisis has reached the central pillar of the Iranian regime: Velayat-e Faqih (absolute clerical rule). The dispute is no longer merely about whether to negotiate with the United States. It has become a struggle over whether Mojtaba Khamenei, presented as the new Supreme Leader in the wake of his father’s death, has the authority to impose a single line on the regime’s remaining factions.
"As internal factions wage intense political warfare over tactical #MoU concessions and hereditary succession, the fundamental crises driving the historic wave of popular uprisings since 2017 remain entirely unaddressed," writes Dr, @MasumehBolurchi. https://t.co/L5sGY8fPAp
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 16, 2026
1. State Media Censorship and Leaks
- The June 4 Incident: State television (IRIB) censored Mojtaba Khamenei’s anniversary message for Ruhollah Khomeini, omitting warnings against “self-willed extremism.” Rival factions labeled this a “media coup against the Leader’s office,” forcing state TV to later air the full text under the guise of a “technical editing error.” Even the new Supreme Leader’s written message was not transmitted intact by the official broadcaster.
- The June 20 Cutoff: Hard-line MP Mahmoud Nabavian read parts of highly classified correspondence on live television detailing Mojtaba’s criticisms of the negotiations. The broadcast was suddenly cut off, and state TV’s political department accused him of making distorted references to classified documents.
- The June 30 ghalibaf Interview: State TV abruptly terminated a recorded interview with Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf as he explained the agreement’s terms (blockade lifting, frozen assets, and a $300 billion reconstruction credit). While state TV blamed a technical issue, the political reality was clear: the official negotiator’s explanation was censored by his own regime.
"The infighting is taking place while the regime hasn’t decided about the course—concession or going to #IranWar. Once the final decision is made, a major fracture is expected to weaken the regime severely, exposing it to the outburst of social anger that is witnessing these…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) May 12, 2026
2. The Weaponization of the Leader’s Words
- The June 18 Message: Mojtaba Khamenei issued a statement regarding the US understanding containing the pivotal phrase: “In principle, I had a different view.” Hard-liners (including Hossein Shariatmadari of the Kayhan newspaper) seized on this phrase to argue the government and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) had bypassed or pressured the Leader. They turned his words into a weapon against the negotiating team, demanding strict red lines (Strait of Hormuz control, sanctions removal, and nuclear limits). Conversely, supporters argued the message legitimized the process. The fact that both sides used the exact same sentence against each other shows that the new Supreme Leader’s word no longer functions as a final command.
3. Institutional Rebellion
- Parliamentary Pressure: In June, 96 MPs wrote directly to Mojtaba Khamenei arguing that talks with the US were harmful. Invoking a “blood debt” for the elimination of Ali Khamenei and the wartime casualties, they demanded revenge. This was a direct attempt by regime insiders to dictate the political line to the new Supreme Leader.
- SNSC Splintering: On June 22, Nabavian revealed that within the SNSC, 12 of 13 members supported the US understanding, leaving hard-liner Saeed Jalili as the sole dissenter. Rather than coordinating strategic security, the council became a factional battlefield over what Mojtaba Khamenei actually meant.
- Assembly of Experts Defiance: On June 29, 63 members of the Assembly of Experts—the body constitutionally tasked with appointing and supervising the Leader—issued strict policy red lines regarding the negotiations, a move endorsed by 84 MPs on July 2. Instead of showing absolute obedience, the Assembly attempted to set parameters around Mojtaba Khamenei’s position.
"Deepening internal divisions within Iran’s ruling establishment have come into sharp focus in late April 2026, as officials, lawmakers, clerics, and state media openly clash over war strategy and #negotiations with the United States," writes @HakamianMahmoud.…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 29, 2026
4. Ideological and Existential Escalation
- The “Quasi-Coup” Accusation: On July 2, MP Ghazanfari accused the regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian and Speaker Qalibaf of executing a “political quasi-coup” to elevate the SNSC’s power while weakening the roles of the Leader and parliament.
- Challenging the Office: On the same day, Deputy President Mohammad-Jafar Ghaem-Panah sparked controversy by stating that if everything the Leader says must simply be implemented without review, state institutions like parliament are redundant. This drew fierce condemnation from Kayhan and Friday Prayer leaders (Ahmad Khatami and Ahmad Alamolhoda), who reasserted that absolute obedience to the Leader is non-negotiable.
5.Public and Military Fractures
- Funeral Weaponization: During Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies on July 4, hardline attendees used the platform to protest the government, chanting “Death to the compromiser” and carrying placards demanding a return to the Leader’s “true view.” The event intended to display unity instead exposed severe factional rifts.
- IRGC Coercive Fractures: On July 4, Abdollah Haji-Sadeghi, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, issued an urgent directive to commanders, Guardsmen, and Basij forces. Ordering them to accept Mojtaba’s June 18 message as the final word, he warned against internal accusations of treason or negligence—confirming that the post-war political rift has penetrated the regime’s vital security and coercive apparatus.
"A series of sharply conflicting statements from senior Iranian officials and clerical figures has exposed deepening infighting at the top of the ruling structure, centered on the #StraitofHormuz and potential negotiations with the United States," @MehdiOghbai writes.…
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 19, 2026
Conclusion: A Crisis of Legitimacy
The cumulative weight of these fractures demonstrates that the regime’s post-war crisis is structural rather than superficial. By eliminating the old guard, including the Supreme Leader, top officials, and the IRGC high command, the conflict did not just test the system; it shattered the consensus that once held its competing factions together. With state media practicing unprecedented censorship, state institutions openly debating the limits of absolute clerical rule, and the IRGC security apparatus itself experiencing internal friction, the Iranian regime faces an existential dilemma. Survival has not yielded victory; instead, it has inaugurated an era of unprecedented vulnerability where the very concept of Velayat-e Faqih is openly contested from within.