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In a clear sign of mounting political pressure and narrative panic, Iranian state media on April 17, 2025 released the transcript of the second session in a series of closed-door clerical seminars aimed at justifying the 1988 mass executions of political prisoners—just days after the public release of a new audio recording from the late Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri reignited public outrage.
The session itself had taken place months earlier, on September 17, 2024, at the Imam Reza Seminary Institute in Qom, and featured Mohammad Niazi, a senior regime jurist and former Supreme Court judge, delivering what was framed as a “critical review” of theological and legal objections raised about the executions.
According to Rasa News Agency, which published the transcript, the timing of this release was a direct response to what it described as the “recent re-publication of Montazeri’s audio file by hostile media,” which it claimed had stirred “ambiguities and accusations” regarding the executions of members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
Mostafa Pourmohammadi's staged interview reveals the regime's desperation to rewrite history on the #1988Massacre and counter MEK's influence on a restless society—an organization #Tehran has tried hard to eliminate and defame while claiming it has no significant following. pic.twitter.com/dbxo2jjZGa
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) June 25, 2024
The agency stated that Niazi’s lecture was a “reasoned” rebuttal to those concerns. Yet the regime’s hurried release of only the second session—while still withholding the others—underscores how volatile and unresolved the 1988 massacre remains within Iranian society. Thirty-six years later, the Islamic Republic is still scrambling to justify a mass atrocity not because its argument has grown stronger, but because its fear of public reckoning has grown sharper, particularly among younger generations and families of victims.
Niazi explicitly referenced the release of Montazeri’s meeting tape as the trigger for this session, acknowledging: “Unfortunately, over the years, there has been no comprehensive response to Imam [Khomeini]’s historic ruling, which has led enemies to exploit this issue as a weakness of the Islamic Republic.”
In this new session, Niazi zeroed in on Montazeri’s rejection of labeling MEK members as “hypocrites” (monafeqin), revealing the regime’s acute discomfort with the former Deputy Supreme Leader’s refusal to accept the state’s propaganda lexicon.
“Montazeri argues that calling them ‘hypocrites’ is unfair. He cites Imam Ali (AS), who refused to label his battlefield opponents as disbelievers or hypocrites, but rather as brothers who had rebelled,” Niazi admitted. “Montazeri says, ‘We have no right to call the Mojahedin hypocrites.’”
MEK’s Impact on the #Iran-Iraq Warhttps://t.co/DQC5tILQhe
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) October 4, 2023
This objection, rooted in deep Shiite jurisprudence, exposes the ideological bankruptcy of the regime’s justification. Niazi was clearly rattled, attempting to counter the argument with strained references to classical texts that define “rebels” (baghi) as deserving of execution.
“Even if they weren’t actively fighting, anyone affiliated with the MEK, even those not in the military phase, must be considered part of an organization at war with Islam,” he claimed.
“Hence, they are either baghi or mohareb [those who wage war against God].”
In a rare admission, Niazi conceded that the central issue wasn’t military activity but ideological steadfastness.
“The Imam’s ruling said that those who remain steadfast in their beliefs are mohareb and must be executed,” he confirmed, reinforcing what countless survivors have long maintained: the victims were killed not for what they did, but for what they believed.
#Iran News: Regime Cleric Struggles to Justify #1988Massacre Amid Growing Public Scrutinyhttps://t.co/Hp32ZNgETp
— NCRI-FAC (@iran_policy) April 15, 2025
While the session was framed as a response to general criticisms of the 1988 executions, Niazi’s focus remained overwhelmingly on the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), making clear that their ideological steadfastness posed the regime’s core existential threat.
Elsewhere in the session, Niazi lashed out at Mir Hossein Mousavi, the former Prime Minister often portrayed by Western analysts as a “reformist,” accusing him of spreading lies about the massacre’s secrecy.
“The then-Prime Minister [Mousavi] said in a 1988 interview with Ettela’at newspaper that ‘we were unaware of the executions and had not seen the Imam’s order.’ But according to existing documents, Mr. Mousavi Ardabili, as Chief Justice, received the Imam’s letter and relayed it to the national prosecutor’s office. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader [Khamenei] also expressed his religious opinion in support of the Imam’s decree at the time during a meeting with officials.”
Niazi asserted that Khamenei’s position was “completely clear,” claiming he had provided religious justification in support of Khomeini’s decree. According to Niazi, Khamenei argued that “even those who hand over supplies or give ideological guidance are combatants,” and described the mass executions as “a fully calculated decision by the Imam.”
“Montazeri’s objections are not consistent with his own jurisprudential positions,” Niazi argued, attempting to portray Iran’s one-time heir to the Supreme Leadership as confused, emotional, or politically motivated.
In one of the most revealing comments, Niazi acknowledged the depth of the regime’s fear: “If Imam’s ruling had not been issued, no one knows what would have happened to the country and the people.”
The remark lays bare the regime’s foundational terror—that the MEK’s ideological influence, even from behind prison walls, was too powerful to contain by any other means.
To justify the executions religiously, Niazi tried to resurrect obscure jurisprudential concepts of “collective punishment” and “legitimate rebellion,” even claiming that the lack of trial procedures didn’t matter because “this was not a judicial sentence, but a ruling by the Supreme Leader.” Such logic speaks volumes about the regime’s continuing reliance on unaccountable clerical power to whitewash crimes it knows the public has neither forgotten nor forgiven.
As protests mount in Iran and abroad calling for justice over the 1988 massacre, the regime’s scramble to hold sham academic panels and issue long-winded defenses shows just how destabilizing the memory of that crime remains. Thirty-six years on, the massacre is no longer just a historical wound—it is a political litmus test, dividing a ruling elite clinging to absolute power from a population that demands truth, dignity, and change.